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Abstract 
Since the late 1980s the need for improved ethical sensibility, on the part of 
those in managerial leadership roles, has been widely recognised throughout 
Australian society. Unfortunately, while the hortatory nature of the discourse 
has been both loud and consistent, what has been lacking is any firm set of 
guidelines on how to bring about the necessary improvement. The argument 
presented in this essay represents one attempt to address that shortcoming. 
In particular, I will show that a discipline I call critical eudaimonistic 	- 
reflection can play a pivotal role in cultivating the sort of deliberate 
character needed to underwrite ethically competent leadership practice. 
I begin by establishing firm ground on which to postulate a robust 
conceptualisation of managerial leadership. In doing this, I identify the 
notions of trust and community as pivotal themes. Specifically, I show that 
an ability to build and maintain a high-trust community lies at the core of 
what effective managerial leadership is all about.. Moreover, as trust and 
community are concepts rich in ethical implication, I show how a meaningful 
conceptualisation of ethical competence can be built around them. 
By way of addressing the challenge posed by the mythical figure of the 
hard-nosed decision-maker (the budget-conscious senior corporate 
executive holding the authority to commission leadership development 
programmes), I argue for learning to work within the prevailing corporate 
idiom. This includes ensuring adherence to the correct vernacular, and also 
the selection and adoption of suitable conceptual models. I show how one 
particular model of strategic change planning can be successfully employed 
to re-cast the development challenge in a manner that not only guarantees 
idiomatic compliance, but that also ensures that consideration is given to 
the relevant variables. 
One such variable consists in the need for a robust syllabus structure. I 
argue that when human character is the developmental focal point, the 
syllabus can be appropriately built on a virtue ethics platform. More 
specifically, I argue for adoption of one particular neo-Aristotelian 
expression of the ancient doctrine of eudaimonism. I go further to show 
how the syllabus content can be shaped so as to expedite the acquisition of 
competence in critical eudaimonistic reflection. 
I finish with the claim that neither recognition of the need for a development 
programme aimed at character cultivation, nor availability of a robust 
syllabus, will of themselves guarantee enthusiastic participation in such a 
project. To achieve that, in the Australian corporate context, I argue that 
one must be capable of overcoming the perception that the subject matter is 
too vague and esoteric. I address this by describing a strategy, currently 
being employed, with some success, a number of test sites. I close off by 
suggesting some ways in which it can be improved in light of lessons 
learned to date. 
To honour the memory of my mother, Lily Flynn 
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Prologue 
Prologues and epilogues are recognised devices employed, respectively, 
to set the scene for, and later close off on, the type of discourse that carries a 
storyline of some sort. While many essays in the broad field of moral 
philosophy do not follow such a pattern, this one does. To begin with, the 
project started out as a PhD candidature in the field of organisation and 
management (O&M) studies, and migrated its way into ethical enquiry. 
By the early 1990s there was a great deal of economic and social 
upheaval in Australian society. One specific manifestation of the sort of 
discontent associated with the upheaval was the widespread popular 
disenchantment with the gross excesses of corporate greed displayed during 
the late 1980s. Communities were also struggling to come to terms with the 
deleterious effects of two major recessions. On top of all this, there was a 
noticeable build-up of momentum in what I term the new efficiency imperative. 
In short, this can be described as the managerial injunction to 'do more, with 
less, under conditions of ever greater scrutiny and accountability'. Needless to 
say, an important upshot of attempts to implement this imperative was a 
significant increase in on-the-job stress levels, together with a corresponding 
decrease in satisfaction levels. 
My personal acquaintance with these developments resulted from roles 
in corporate management during the 1980s, and subsequent work as a 
management consultant. This involvement provided ample opportunity for 
close observation of management practice in practice. By the mid 1990s, I had 
arrived at the conclusion that poor managerial leadership was exacerbating an 
already acute problem, often resulting in even higher stress levels on the part 
of affected stakeholders. I set out, accordingly, as an O&M student, to 
1 
formulate a more systematic understanding of this perceived deficiency in 
managerial leadership, in the hope of eventually being able to offer some - 
prescriptive guidelines on how to improve the situation. As a necessary 
starting point for purposes of academic rigour, however, my intuitive concerns 
needed to be validated in some empirical way; and, assuming this could be 
done, then the precise nature and extent of the problem would need to be 
correctly and comprehensively articulated. 
At roughly the time these concerns were peaking, the Australian federal 
government published the findings of a major three-year research project 
conducted under the direction of the specially commissioned Industry Task 
Force on Leadership and Management Skills. The formal title of the final report 
was Enterprising Nation: Renewing Australia's Managers to Meet the Challenges 
of the Asia-Pacific Century. But as members had worked under the 
chairmanship of David Karpin, a leading figure in corporate Australia at the 
time, it quickly became informally known as the Karpin Report. (Hereafter, I 
will simply refer to the Task Force, the Karpin Study, and the Karpin Report 
when the need arises.) As will be seen in Chapter 1, this authoritative 
document lent considerable empirical support to the intuitive concerns that had 
motivated me in the first place. But there was a surprise in store. 
While conducting a detailed review of this two-volume, eighteen-
hundred page tome, I was simultaneously turning my attention to the relevant 
literature on leadership. Doing so, I came across what I thought was an 
intriguing title, Ethics: The Heart of Leadership. I was surprised to discover 
that the volume editor, Joanne Ciulla, was a professional philosopher, and that 
several of the contributing authors came from backgrounds in the humanities. 
Most intriguing of all, however, was discovering the existence of a discipline, 
leadership ethics, which seemed to offer a range of important insights into 
precisely the sorts of concerns that had stimulated commencement of my 
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project. Among issues addressed in the book were abuse of power by those 
with positional authority, problems with trust, attitudes to obligation and 
responsibility, and so forth. The eventual outcome of this unanticipated 
discovery was a decision to re-position the project from one located in the 
discipline of O&M studies to that of applied ethics. 
As I became progressively more familiar with the leadership ethics 
literature, I was impressed and encouraged by most of it. Indeed, I believe the 
corporate world is indebted to those professionally-trained philosophers now 
paying attention to organisational leadership, among them Ciulla, Solomon, 
Flores, Hartman, Werhane, Gini, Freeman, to name but some of the prominent 
contributors. Their work makes a telling contribution to the type of critical 
discourse now required. The same cannot be said of the musings of those 
management theorists and commentators who attempt to position themselves 
as 'ethical gurus'. As Ciulla correctly points out, the charlatans generally 
distinguish themselves by quickly "running out of steam" when something 
substantive needs to be said on ethical questions. 
Their good work, notwithstanding, leadership ethicists need to take care 
when it comes to plying their trade in the cut and thrust arena of actual 
corporate life. This is a vastly different cultural biosphere to that of the 
philosophical academy, where appeals to reason, logic and rational argument 
prevail. A whole different set of norms and values combine to shape the cultural 
milieu of business management and leadership, and it has as much to do with 
the workings of the gut and the heart as those of the head. 
As my investigation progressed, accordingly, I became increasingly 
worried by what might happen to the well-intentioned ethicist who, unprepared 
for what to expect, ventures forth into the world of corporate Australia hoping 
to convince the powers that be to pay more attention to matters of ethical 
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sensibility. I was not so much concerned that her claim would be summarily 
rejected, on pointing out the need for more refined levels of ethical 
consciousness among corporate leaders. Indeed, she would likely be met with 
a fairly sympathetic ear. (Our business leaders do, after all, read newspapers 
just like the rest of the community. As such, they too are well aware of the 
many blatant and egregious examples of unethical behaviour that litter the 
annals of recent corporate leadership in this country.) Instead, I was 
concerned on account of the disappointment she is likely to feel on discovering 
that the prima facie sympathetic hearing generally does not quickly translate 
into commitment to reform-oriented action. If you define a problem for 
someone, and they agree it is indeed a serious issue, then logic suggests they 
will be motivated to do something about it. But philosophical logic and what 
passes for corporate decision-making logic often travel along divergent planes. 
Thus, convincing senior-level decision-makers of the benefits of 
allocating scarce resources to the systematic development of ethical sensibility, 
constitutes a much bigger challenge than convincing them of the existence of 
the need. In fact, I believe this to be the major obstacle to the advancement 
of applied leadership ethics in this country. If we cannot get the decision-
makers to move from intellectual acquiescence to sponsorship commitment, we 
effectively fail as applied practitioners. The reader is put on notice, therefore, 
that what follows is intended to be unashamedly pragmatic in its tone. As the 
reader will discover in Chapter 3, a major component of my investigation 
consisted in a three-year ethnographic style study of the daily cut and thrust 
leadership affairs of one leading Australian organisation. This produced several 
phenomenological insights that materially informed the gradual unfolding of the 
overall argument. 
In closing, let me suggest that the reader might find it helpful to 
consider what follows as an account of a work in progress. The work in 
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question started in the early 1990s as little more than a form of crude 
phenomenological observation and reflection. It became systematised as an 
O&M research project. But on discovering that the issues involved appeared to 
have strong ethical connotations, the project migrated into the domain of 
applied ethics. And, as will become clear on reading the Epilogue, much more 
needs to be done by way of further applied research and fine-tuning. In the 
meantime, the vision that inspires me is that of playing a role in bringing my 
two sets of professional colleagues, corporate leaders and applied ethicists, into 
more mutually rewarding engagement. 
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Chapter 1 
A Blindspot in Australian Managerial Consciousness 
1.1 Introduction 
1.11 Outline of the argument 
This essay may be thought of as falling logically into three broad 
segments. In the first, comprising the arguments of this opening chapter, I set 
the scene by presenting empirical evidence that support the initiating intuitions 
described in the Prologue. In the second, approximating the arguments 
presented in Chapters 2-4, I offer an account of the nature of managerial 
leadership. I eventually conclude that a case can be made for suggesting that a 
solid platform for a plausible ethics of leadership can be constructed around the 
notions of trust and trust-building, assuming that these concepts are 
understood to include a rich emotional underpinning. In the final segment, 
Chapters 5 and 6, I move to the question of how to formulate, and 'sell' to 
corporate decision-makers, a strategy for developing a form of enhanced 
ethical sensibility based on such a foundation. In doing so, I undertake two 
primary tasks. The first is to argue that, from an applied ethics perspective, it 
is essential to be able to satisfy the needs and concerns of a hypothetical figure 
I call the hard-nosed decision-maker. My point here is to suggest that unless a 
solid 'business case' can be presented, the applied ethicist may well receive a 
sympathetic hearing vis-a-vis the perceived need, but still fail to engender 
sufficient commitment from management to enable the developmental work to 
proceed. 
In this opening chapter, therefore, I set the scene for what follows by 
completing a number of introductory tasks. First of all, in the remainder of 
§1.1, I make my position clear on two issues that bear upon the overall thesis, 
doing so for the purpose of averting unnecessary confusion and ambiguity down 
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the track. One involves offering an acknowledgement of the complex nature of 
the managerial role per se, while the other responds to the need to be specific 
about one's perspective when discussing work organisations. 
The second task, described in §1.2, is to provide a brief description of 
the work of the government appointed Industry Task Force on Leadership and 
Management Skills. In §1.3, I describe how a preliminary excursion into the 
leadership literature revealed, inter alia, the existence of the discipline of 
leadership ethics. In §1.4, and in demonstration of why it is justifiable to view 
the unfolding of the project as a 'storyline' l , I describe a set of circumstances 
that completely changed the direction and focus of my work. In effect, I 
describe how insights gained from the leadership ethics literature caused me to 
interpret the earlier survey findings in a completely new light. This, in turn, 
leads me to argue that a blindspot can be identified in contemporary Australian 
managerial consciousness, namely, the apparent inability to see, within an 
acknowledged deficiency profile of practising leadership, any shortcoming in 
terms of inadequate levels of ethical sensibility. My final task in the chapter is 
to provide readers with a 'roadmap' to guide them through the remainder of the 
essay. This I do in §1.5. 
1.12 The nature and complexity of managerial work 
Throughout the argument that follows, I subscribe to the classic 
definition of a manager as referring to those individuals who carry professional 
responsibility for getting work done through the efforts of others, in addition to 
their own. I also subscribe to the formulation that breaks the managerial role 
down into four constituent functions: planning, organising, leading, and 
'As discussed in the Prologue. 
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coordinating. 2 On this view, and at an admittedly very simple level, it can be 
seen that leadership is a component function within the managerial role. Or, to 
use the common contemporary parlance, leadership is a subset of 
management. 
One way of preempting an objection in respect of the overly simplistic 
picture painted above, is to place the four constituent activities in the context of 
manager-stakeholder relations. Hosmer, following Freeman, defines the 
corporate stakeholder as "any group or individual that can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of the firm's objectives". 3 Using this definition, a 
manager's stakeholder group can initially be thought of as sub-dividing into two 
categories, internal and external. While this continues to offer a fairly benign 
picture, the next level of detail brings out the potential complexity. 
The internal stakeholder group includes non -managerial process workers of 
all kinds4, those in the management and supervisory roles, and on-site trade 
union representatives. It also includes the 'management team' as a discrete 
entity, and the various work groups as discrete social entities. 
The external stakeholder group includes clients 5 , banks and other 
financial institutions6 , professional firms providing a range of services relating 
to accounting, auditing, management consulting, staff training, staff 
recruitment, and so forth. Also in this category are goods suppliers (raw 
2 An excellent summary of the history of managerial scholarship, which gives ample 
attention to the "classical" schools, can be found in Marvin Weisbord, Productive Workplaces 
(New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 45-70. 
3 As quoted in La Rue Tone Hosmer, 'Why be Moral? A Reply to Shaw and Corvino', Business 
Ethics Quarterly, Volume 7, Issue 4, (1997), p. 140. 
4 This category includes filing clerks, typists, data entry operators, stores personnel, 
couriers, cleaners, and so forth 
5 This group is further divisible into such groupings as major-minor, government-private, 
credit-cash, and so forth 
6 For instance, institutions dealing with insurance, pension fund administration, specialist 
investment advisory services, and so forth. 
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materials, consumables, et cetera), professional membership bodies', public 
interest groups8, government and other regulatory agencies 8 , trade union and 
employer representative bodies, and so forth. 
Thus, the managerial role can be seen to include the planning, 
organising, leading and coordinating of an almost infinite array of potential 
interactions between any or all of the above stakeholders. Indeed, this listing 
is neither complete nor exhaustive. But it is surely comprehensive enough to 
illustrate the diversity of human interests and relations involved in a small-sized 
organisational setting containing no special or unusual circumstances. w 
Moreover, it hints at the extent of the ethical challenge involved in effectively 
managing such a complex conglomeration of interests. Precisely how this 
challenge is interpreted is itself a problematic question for two reasons. 
First, as the upcoming evidence will show, ethics remains a poorly 
understood discipline at the level of applied managerial practice. Many 
managers continue to entertain the simplistic notion that it is fundamentally 
about explicitly drawn up professional codes (e.g. the code of ethics for the 
Australian Society of Agronomists, as displayed in the Agritest head-office 
foyer). For such individuals, the following unspoken injunction often applies: 
"If an ethically explicit code does not apply to my job or my profession, then 
ethics is one less thing with which I have to concern myself". Second, there 
are several competing systems within the formal field of ethical enquiry that do 
7 For instance, The Australian Society of Agronomists, The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, and so forth. 
8 Such as those interested in sustainable agricultural practices, genetic engineering, et 
cetera. 
9 Such as those responsible for setting and monitoring standards relating to control of 
pesticides and other chemicals. 
m I make this claim as a practising management consultant with a portfolio of 
approximately two hundred corporate clients, drawn from both the government and 
private sectors. The circumstances of this particular organisation can be classified as 
'typical' for an organisation employing approximately five hundred people in the 
contemporary Australian environment. 
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not agree with one another in respect of fundamental ethical questions. For 
instance, the three well-known platforms of deontology, consequentialism, and 
virtue ethics each construe the moral agenda in its own idiosyncratic way. 11 
One way or the other, however, there is significant complexity associated with 
the ethics of organisational leadership. This will be more fully explored in 
Chapter 4. For the moment, it should suffice simply to take note of the claim. 
1.13 The organisation as a 'human community' 
A modern work organisation can legitimately be viewed as a system of 
inter-acting process technologies. For example, a vertically integrated steel 
producer will utilise relevant interacting technologies for geophysical 
exploration, ore mining, smelting, production planning, manufacturing, 
marketing and distribution, accounting, and so forth. Alternatively, it can be 
seen as an economic system that monitors the transfer of raw material inputs 
(e.g. iron ore) into higher-value outputs (e.g. processed stainless steel 
household goods). Yet again, it can be viewed as an information processing 
and intellective l2 system that, for instance, identifies and interprets market 
demand indicators and transfers them into product development blueprints. 
Looked at from yet another perspective, it can be viewed simply as a place of 
employment for large numbers of people. 
11 These will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6. 
12  I have only encountered the word 'intellective' on one occasion, and that was in Zuboff's 
excellent description of the impact of technological change on workers in the American 
paper manufacturing industry. She uses the term to describe the type of cognitive ability 
needed to interpret reality through the medium of symbolic representation. Thus, when 
computer based control systems were introduced into pulp mills in the 1970s and 1980s, 
she found that many workers struggled to apprehend meaning in the environment of 
'abstraction' associated with symbolic representation of plant functioning. Shoshana 
Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power, (New York: Basic 
Books, 1988), pp. 76-82. 
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While no discussion has taken place as yet concerning the substantive 
nature of managerial leadership, it is reasonable to say that it is essentially a 
human interactive phenomenon. After all, it is difficult to conceive of the role 
of leader in the absence of the logical counterpoint, follower. As we shall see in 
Chapter 2, a defensible interpretation of leadership posits its as a relational 
process in which one party non-coercively influences others in the pursuit of 
some common purpose or goal. From this, it can readily be deduced that 
leader and follower co-exist within human communities. It is not possible to be 
one or the other in social isolation. 
A human community can be thought of as any group of people working 
or living together under a set of shared circumstances, where the latter can 
include some form of shared commitment to a superordinate goal or goals, 
commonly held values, and respect for the same rules and behavioural norms. 
The extent to which the community is robust and tightly knit will be determined 
by the extent to which the latter are commonly held and accepted. But, by 
definition, any group calling itself a community can be assumed to have some 
minimum level of cohesiveness along these lines. In the argument that follows, 
in which I address the matter of organisational leadership and its ethical 
intricacies, I will do so from a perspective that holds the work organisation to 
be primarily a human community. 
1.2 The Karpin Study 
The reader will recall from the Prologue that the original concern 
motivating my enquiry was a subjectively held view arising from prolonged 
personal involvement in and observation of the world of Australian 
management practice. Commencing the formal enquiry as an O&M scholar, I 
sought in the first instance to validate these concerns by seeking out 
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evidentiary support from secondary-source research. As it happened, research 
findings were available from two unrelated sources. 
1.21 Background 
In 1992 the Australian federal government commissioned an industry 
task force to investigate a range of issues pertinent to strengthening leadership 
standards in Australian government and industry. It was known as the Task 
Force on Leadership and Management Skills. It in turn commissioned Professor 
David Midgley of the Australian Graduate School of Management at the 
University of New South Wales, to design and carry out a research programme 
commensurate with the following terms of reference: 
ri Examine and provide information to business and government on world-
wide enterprise trends and best practice in the development of 
manages, including supervisors or first-line managers. 
LI Promote and encourage awareness of the importance of leadership and 
management skills to enterprise productivity, innovation and 
international competitiveness, and recommend measures for fostering 
enterprise commitment to the continual development of managers. 
LI Examine and report on the management training and advisory needs of 
small and medium sized businesses and advise on strategies to meet 
those needs. 
o Initiate and oversee a review of higher education award and non-award 
programs, the inclusion of management content in other programs at 
graduate and undergraduate levels and the administration, resourcing 
and delivery of management programs in higher education. 
o Identify and advise on measures to improve management and 
supervisory syllabus and delivery by TAFE and other training providers. 
(b) Identify and advise on measures to strengthen syllabus and to 
improve the provision of relevant training in small business skills by 
TAFE and other training providers. (c) Advise on the implications of such 
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measures to improve the quality and effectiveness of leadership and 
management skills in Australia. 
ID Provide advice on other measures to improve the quality and effectiveness 
of leadership and management skills in Australia. 
This eventually played out in a total of twenty-seven separate research 
projects. The programme commenced with a conceptualisation and design 
phase in the period January to March 1993; with the majority of the actual 
data-gathering taking place in the six months from October 1993 through 
March 1994. Methods employed included desk research, literature review, 
analysis of statistics, individual and group discussions, focus group interviews, 
personal interviews, telephone interviews, and questionnaire surveys. In total, 
across the twenty-seven constituent projects, the experiences, opinions, and 
advice of over 4,800 individual managers and organisation development 
experts were collected. 
The extent of the overall programme rendered it "... one of the most 
extensive exercises of its kind undertaken in the world in recent years.' 
Given the nature and extent of the programme's terms of reference it is not 
surprising that the final reporting of the Task Force consisted in 1,845 pages of 
written submissions in three volumes. No attempt will be made here to provide 
a comprehensive coverage of all the above. Instead, I will present a summary 
of relevant key findings, and then work towards the conclusions pertinent to my 
enquiry. 
13 Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, Enterprising Nation: Renewing 
Australia's Managers to Meet the Challenges of the Asia -Pacific Century (Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1995), p. 2. 
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1.22 Key Findings 
Fl 	Describing managers and leaders 
Managers - those responsible for the achievement of enterprise goals 
through the work of others as well as their own - have a major role to play in 
shaping a new era in the economic and social development of Australia. 14 To 
an arguably greater extent than at any previous time in the nation's economic 
history, they are expected to exert significant influence over the nation's 
standard of living, levels of employment, and quality of life. In line with the 
classical formulation of Fayo1 15 , the overall managerial enterprise is itself 
broken down into four constituent functions: planning, organising, leading, and 
coordinating. Of these, leading or leadership is the function that seeks to align 
the aspirations of individual constituents with legitimate enterprise goals, and 
to do so in non-coercive ways. As such, it implies the patterns through which 
the manager demonstrates behaviours and characteristics which serve to shape 
the work group's guiding values and beliefs, and which induce individuals to 
identify with those ideals. Thus, the leadership function is the one through 
which a collection of individuals (the followers or constituents) - who may be 
indifferent, neutral or even hostile - can potentially be transformed into a 
committed and cohesive team with a shared vision and values. Accordingly, 
there exists a clear correlation between standards of management and 
leadership practice, and the anticipated overall wellbeing of individual agents, 
collections of individuals, and indeed, the nation as a whole. 16 
14 The Task Force takes this new era to be the twenty-first century, and refers to it as "the 
Asia-Pacific Century". The title "Asia-Pacific Century" is intended to convey the Task 
Forces' conviction that this region is likely to become the economic focal point of world 
trade in the near future. 
15 Henri Fayol, General and Industrial Management, (London: Pitman, 1949). 
16 Based on this formulation, there are over 900,000 managers in Australia out of an overall 
population of circa 17, 500.000. There is, accordingly, a significant number of people with 
the capacity to exert some form of mediating influence over the well-being of others, both 
directly and indirectly. See Enterprising Nation: Renewing Australia's Managers to Meet the 
14 
15 
F2 	Competency Mix 
To be effective in a managerial role requires a different and more 
complex set of competencies than those required for most non-managerial or 
individualist roles. Non-managerial roles require specialist competencies with 
emphasis on the 'technical' functionality demanded by the job. (For example, if 
my role as a laboratory scientist is to prepare slides for microscopic inspection 
by the plant pathologist, then the main bundle of competencies required is 
largely constituted by relevant scientific knowledge and skills.) But the role of 
manager - precisely because it involves getting work done through the efforts 
of others - demands a very different competency profile. Again turning to 
Fayol's traditional conception, one can immediately see that the manager must 
develop a much more eclectic set of competencies to meet the demands of 
functions that vary as widely as planning, organising, leading, and coordinating. 
Whilst the successful carrying out of these four functions will clearly involve 
some level of technical appreciation of the work activity of subordinates, it 
should nonetheless be clear that the competency emphasis lies elsewhere. The 
complexity of the required competency mix can be sensed by reflecting on the 
fact that modern managers are typically expected to succeed in accommodating 
a number of key demands which not readily mutually reconcilable. Consider 
the following: 
0 Managers are responsible for representing the interests of shareholders 
and owners, who typically expect a maximisation of return on their 
financial investment. 
0 They are responsible for supplying product and service to customers in 
line with the latter's full range of expectations, contractual and 
otherwise. 
Challenges of the Asia -Pacific Century, Vol. 1, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), 1995, 
pp. 29- 57. 
O They must provide employees, individually and collectively, with every 
reasonable opportunity to enjoy rewarding, satisfying, and fulfilling 
working lives. 
It should be noted that this does not represent an exhaustive list of 
managerial responsibilities, but it does capture some sense of the complexity of 
the challenge of being an effective manager. 
F3 	Profiling the "ideal manager" 
Having set the scene by drawing attention to these sorts of issues, the 
Task Force went on to disclose the "disturbing finding" that competency 
standards observable in Australian management were currently falling well 
short of normative ideals. A key piece of evidence supporting this claim came 
from one of the twenty-seven constituent projects. The relevant survey set out 
to identify two main indicators: (a) the characteristic competencies of the "ideal 
manager", and (b) the perceived strengths and limitations of Australian 
managers in cross reference to the ideal? 
From structured interviews with ninety-one experienced respondents, a 
profile was constructed which identified the eight characteristics considered the 
hallmarks of the ideal manager. The percentage of thcise consulted nominating 
each feature was also noted. The resulting profile is shown in Table 1.1 on the 
following page. 
When asked to compare the perceived strength-weakness profile of 
Australian managers against this normative ideal, what emerged was a 
significant negative discrepancy. Of the eight attributes nominated, six were 
identified as weaknesses of Australian managers. More specifically, they were 
typically perceived to: 
17 Enterprising Nation: Renewing Australia's Managers to Meet the Challenges of the Asia- 
Pacific Century, Vol. 1, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1995), pp. 521-535. 
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Characteristic % of respondent 
nominations 
1. People skills 75% 
2. Strategic thinker 58% 
3. Visionary 52% 
4. Flexible & adaptable to change 50% 
5. Self management 33% 
6. Team player 32% 
7. Ability to solve complex problems 25% 
8. Ethics/high personal standards 23% 
Table 1.1 	Characteristics of the 'Ideal Manager' (as per Karpin) , 
o lack vision 
o lack a strategic perspective 
• operate poorly in the teamwork arena 
o tend towards inflexibility and rigidity in their thinking 
o demonstrate poor people skills 
o tend towards complacency in self-management's 
The project report concludes that, in summary, according to 
respondents: " ... the ideal manager is an ideal which few Australian managers 
live up to at the present time." 19 
F4 	Required competencies 
Having thus concluded that the overall standard of Australian leadership 
and management does not rate highly in comparison to normative ideals and 
international best practice benchmarks, 2° the Task Force then went on to 
identify ways in which the perceived shortcomings might be systematically 
rectified. Towards this end, a number of the constituent surveys were directed 
18 Ibid., p. 548. 
19 Ibid., p. 550. 
28 [bid., p. 617. It is interesting to note that Australian leadership and management 
standards were also considered inferior by selected respondents surveyed in four of 
our major Asian trading partners, namely: Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Japan. 
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to the identification of generic competencies in need of remedial attention. 
Those nominated were: 
0 knowledge of the job and its context (in part, the technical 
dimension mentioned earlier) 
0 problem solving and decision making (once problems have arisen 
and have been correctly diagnosed) 
0 situational insight (identified as the ability to assess the 
requirements of the work situation, including the aspirations, 
motivations, and needs of others) 
0 communication ability (referring to a combination of the content of 
what needs to be conveyed, selection of the manner in which it 
should take place, and the style and flavour of delivery) 
0 
	
	influence (i.e. ability to influence peers, superiors, and 
subordinates) 
0 team management (direction setting, motivation, recognition) 
0 self-insight (understanding one's own personal psychology) 
0 drive (i.e. energy and initiative; goal-orientation; persistence) 
0 adaptability (capacity to learn quickly, and to adapt one's 
behaviour to a given situation). 
F5 	Task Force "Vision for the Future" 
In its final report the Task Force chooses to encapsulate its overriding 
response through the articulation of a visionary ideal for the year 2010. This 
held that by the year 2010 the following will be true of Australian enterprises 
and their managers: 
0 Knowledge, the ability to learn, to change and to innovate in the 
new marketplace, will be accepted as the more relevant criteria for 
selecting managers than gender, ethnicity or even prior 
experience. 
0 The 'learning organisation' will be the standard philosophy for 
many Australian enterprises and a major way they cope with 
change and turbulence. 
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0 Managers will create conditions conducive to learning for both 
individuals and the enterprise as a whole, within and between 
groups, across individual business units and between enterprises 
and their external environments. Employees will be more 
motivated and skilled. 
0 	Quality will act as a guiding light within all organisations with a 
customer first mentality being all-pervasive. This focus will help 
improve productivity and profitability in enterprises through a 
concerted commitment to continual improvement. 
0 Enterprises will earn higher rates of return on investment than in 
1995 and successfully defend and expand their position in the 
global marketplace. 
El Many Australian enterprises will be benchmarked as achieving 
world best practice in their operations, some will be acknowledged 
as setting world best practice standards. 
To point the way towards realisation of this vision, the Task Force 
identifies five key challenges. These are: 
1. The need for Australia to develop a positive enterprise culture through 
education and training. 
2. The need to upgrade vocational education and training and business 
support. 
3. The need to capitalise on the talents of diversity within the Australian 
workforce. 
4. The need to strive for best practice management development. 
5. The need to reform management education. 
Before conducting an interpretive analysis of the above findings, I will 
begin by sketching out the philosophical background relating to the field of 
leadership ethics. I do this explicitly because some of the insights associated 
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with this background informed, in no small way, my evolving understanding of 
the issues involved here. (I will return to the analysis in §1.4 following.) 
1.3 Leadership Ethics 
1.31 The term 'leadership ethics' 
While examining the research material described above, I began 
simultaneously a preliminary review of the leadership literature. While a full 
exposition of the findings is given in Chapter 2, it is appropriate at this juncture 
to mention a seminal turning point. I discovered, in effect, an emerging 
literature on the topic of leadership ethics21 . 
It is unclear when or where the term 'leadership ethics' was first used, 
but philosopher Joanne Ciulla has clearly adopted it into her vocabulary. She 
describes her position in the following terms. 
Because leadership entails very distinctive types of human 
relationships with distinctive sets of moral problems, I thought it 
appropriate to refer to the topic as leadership ethics; however, my main 
reason for using the term is that it is less awkward than using 
expressions like leadership and ethics (original italics). 22 
She goes on to characterise it as "... the study of the ethical issues 
related to leadership and the ethics of leadership". 23 Ciulla sees ethics as 
consisting in "... the examination of right, wrong, good, evil, virtue, duty, 
21 The terms ethics and morality will be used interchangeably throughout this dissertation, as 
they often are in the literature. Yet philosophers sometimes find it convenient to 
distinguish between the two. One well accepted differentiation is that of viewing ethics as 
primarily referring to the systematic general science of right and wrong conduct, especially 
as it bears upon the goodness of human lives. Morality, in contrast, refers to the actual 
patterns of conduct, and the direct working rules that guide or dictate those patterns. 
Without the latter, ethics would be an empty formal abstraction, because philosophers tend 
to base ethics upon a reflective analysis of moral experience. 
22 Joanne Ciulla, Leadership Ethics: Mapping the Territory, in Joanne B. Ciulla (ed.), Ethics: The 
Heart of Leadership (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 4. 
23 Ibid., p.4. Her definition is interesting in that it draws attention to the fact that there are 
both direct and indirect dimensions to the relevance of moral enquiry in leadership. This, 
if nothing else, provides a further indication of the likely complexity of the topic. 
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obligation, rights, justice, fairness, and so on, in human relationships with each 
other and other living things". 24 
There are two noteworthy features of this interpretation. First, it alerts 
us to the broad-ranging field of coverage embraced within the discipline. 
Second, it points to the axial role played by human relationships within the 
ethical enterprise. Alfred Gini, like Ciulla a philosopher with a special interest in 
organisational leadership ethics, puts this another way in asserting that, "As a 
communal exercise, ethics is the attempt to work out the rights and obligations 
we have and share with others." As such, it is "...elementally the pursuit of 
justice, fair play, and equity." But he also points out that "...the paradox and 
central tension of ethics lie in the fact that although we are by nature 
communal and in need of others, at the same time we are by disposition more 
or less egocentric and self-serving." 
One specific passage I came across during this early encounter with the 
topic struck me as especially noteworthy. This again came from Ciulla, and is 
worthy of quoting in its entirety. As she puts it: 
Some people become leaders because they have or develop certain 
talents and dispositions, or because of their wealth, military might, or 
position. Others lead because they possess great minds and ideas or 
they tell compelling stories. And then there are people who stumble 
into leadership because of the times or circumstances in which they 
find themselves. No matter how people get to be leaders, no one is a 
leader without willing followers. Managers and generals can act like 
playground bullies and use their power and rank to force their will on 
people, but this is coercion, not leadership. Leadership is not a person 
or a position. It is a complex moral relationship between people, 
based on trust, obligation, commitment, emotion, and a shared vision 
of the good. Ethics, then, lies at the very heart of leadership." 
24 Ibid., p. 4. 
25 'Joanne Ciulla, Introduction, in Joanne B. Ciulla (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of Leadership, 
(Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p. xv. 
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On first blush, this may strike the reader as offering a quite 
disconcerting picture of leadership. It does, after all, seem to portray it as an 
eclectic, disparate, and somewhat confusing miscellany of constructs. 
But a more careful analysis pays dividends by bringing into sharp relief 
some key ideas. At this point, I would like to draw attention to four of them: 
(a) the relational nature of leadership, (b) its ontological grounded in earned 
acclamation, (c) the importance of values and value commitments, and (d) a 
focus on mutual goals and purposes. 26 
1.32 Some key early insights 
1.321 The relational nature of leadership 
Leadership is about self and others, and the web of complex relations 
that can exist between the two. This is evidenced in the last sentence of Ciulla's 
paragraph. It is clear that Gini supports this view. He states: "Like ethics, 
labor, and business, leadership is a symbiotic, communal relationship. It's 
about leaders, followers-constituencies, and all stakeholders involved."27 He 
goes further to suggest that it is a necessary requirement of communal 
existence, adding: "Minimally, it tries to offer perspective, focus, appropriate 
behaviour, guidance, and a plan by which to handle the seemingly random and 
arbitrary events of life." 28 As we shall see when attempting to unravel the 
ethical intricacies 29 of leadership in Chapter 4, this is a pertinent observation in 
that it suggests where some of those intricacies may lie. 
26 Before explaining each in more detail, I wish to advise the reader that I will return to 
many of the themes discussed in this opening chapter at a later point in the 
dissertation. In Chapter 4, in particular, when giving a fuller account of the concept of 
ethical sensibility in leadership, I will go beyond the four tenets here being introduced. 
27 Al Gini, Moral Leadership and Business Ethics, in Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart 
of Leadership, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), pp. 27-46. 
28 Ibid., p. 34. 
29 I find the term "ethical intricacy" an especially apt one vis-à-vis leadership analysis, and 
will use it occasionally throughout the essay for that reason. As with many of the themes 
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As will be seen in Chapter 6, Western philosophers have long pointed to 
the agonistic nature of reality. Deriving from the Greek notion of agon, meaning 
conflict, the suggestion is that human life is a highly contingent affair, with 
much of what has to be confronted of a troubling, agony-inducing nature. (The 
well-known Buddhist aphorism, "Life is ten thousand joys and ten thousand 
sufferings", offers a supporting view from the Eastern tradition.) Kekes offers a 
contemporary perspective, pointing to the "permanent adversities" we are 
forced to face on a daily basis: "Contingency, conflict, and evil are unavoidable 
features of human existence."3° On this view, it would seem likely that, in 
order to be or become a leader capable of demonstrating ethical sensibility, one 
must attain a deep understanding of the human condition. This would be 
needed to conduct the relationship with constituents in a manner that helps 
them cope with the lack of motivation, lack of confidence, and lack of hope that 
often accompany inability to deal with adversities like contingency, conflict and 
In the meantime, suffice to say that leadership can certainly be 
understood as a communal or social construct that carries with it, in 
consequence, a need to be able to understand and respond to the vagaries and 
vicissitudes that are an inevitable part of human life. 
1.322 Grounding in earned acclamation 
Referring again to the lengthy quotation from Ciulla (§1.31), the claim 
can be made that leadership is about earned affirmation. The first four 
sentences in the quoted paragraph make this clear. What she is effectively 
saying is that 'leadership', when claimed in virtue of institutional position, 
and concepts pursued here, I am indebted to Joanne Ciulla for bringing it to my attention. 
She uses this particular term in her essay: Leadership Ethics: Mapping the Territory. 
3° John Kekes, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 
p. 72. 
3 1 1 will return to this topic in greater detail in Chapter 7. 
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formal title, organisational hierarchical status, or coercive power, effectively 
represents a misapplication of the term. Instead, it should be viewed as 
fundamentally about a certain status being earned by one person (the leader), 
in virtue of that status being affirmed by another (the willing follower). The 
capacity to earn this type of affirmation, in the structural hierarchy of a modern 
work organisation, is built around a set of perceptions. These are mainly the 
perceptions of subordinates, and once adequately reinforced over a period of 
time, lead to those individuals (would-be followers) deciding to give freely their 
trust, loyalty, and commitment to the other person (the newly-affirmed leader). 
As Gini points out in this respect: "Like the "Guardians" of Plato's Republic, 
leaders must see their office as a social responsibility, a trust, a duty, and not 
as a symbol of their personal identity, prestige, and lofty status." 32 How to win 
this acclamation is one of the most pertinent and pressing managerial 
challenges in the contemporary world of industry and government. It is also a 
critical personal challenge for those in managerial roles who aspire to become 
leaders. 
1.323 Values in leadership 
In the second last sentence of the quoted paragraph, Ciulla emphasises 
that leadership is based on trust, obligation, commitment, emotion, and a 
shared vision of the good. This suggests that human value commitments are 
central to the notion. Gini is clearly of this view, defining leadership as a 
"...power- and value-laden relationship between leaders and 
followers/constituents who intend real changes that reflect their mutual 
purposes and goals."33 He in turn defines values as "... the ideas and beliefs 
32 Al Gini, Moral Leadership and Business Ethics, in Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart 
of Leadership, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p. 36. 
33 Ibid., p. 34-35. The reader will note the similarity between this definition and that of 
Joseph Rost, namely: "Leadership is an influence relationship among leaders and 
collaborators who intend real changes that reflect the purposes mutually held by both 
leaders and collaborators." 
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that influence and direct our choices and actions."34 But how can one be sure 
that leadership is a value-centred enterprise? The answer lies in recognising 
that those in managerial roles, in modern organisations, invariably bring with 
them their own beliefs, worldviews, biases, foibles, and philosophical views on 
life, love, and learning. Each will have what Gini calls his or her own "agenda". 
Once the interaction begins between manager and subordinate, and 
once enduring patterns begin to form and become obvious, subordinates are 
then in a position to make judgements. They will decide, inter alia, to invest 
their trust in the other and ultimately to commit to willing followership, on the 
basis of whether they perceive the other party's agenda to be one that is 
compatible with their own best interests. Burns asserts that "...leaders and 
followers are engaged in a common enterprise; they are dependent on each 
other, their fortunes rise and fall together". 35 This is suggestive of why he also 
feels that the essence of the leader-follower relational dynamic only asserts 
itself when there is something significant at stake - ideas to be clarified, issues 
to be determined, values to be adjudicated. 
I will return to the question of values and leadership on a number of 
further occasions, most notably in Chapter 7 when discussing the connection 
between the two notions in the context of virtue ethics. In the meantime, I 
wish to do not more than make the claim that, in view of the evidence pointed 
to here, values and value commitments are clearly central to the concept of 
leadership, as we now understand it. 
1.324 Focus on mutual goals and purposes 
Let me remind the reader of the four core functions, discussed in §1.12 
above, that are classically associated with the role of manager, namely: 
planning, organising, leading, and coordinating. The first of these highlights 
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34 Ibid., p. 36. 
the responsibility managers have to prepare a variety of plans relating to their 
respective areas of jurisdiction. Thus, a divisional-level manager is typically 
expected to ensure that at least three sets of mutually consistent plans are in 
place and being regularly monitored. The first involves identification of a long-
term vision of where the division expects to be, say, five years hence. Second, 
there is the annual business plan. This maps out the precise nature and scope 
of business activity schedules to be undertaken over the next twelve months, 
and includes a detailed set of financial papers in line with stipulated protocols 
for sales forecasting, expense and capital budget provisioning, profit forecasts, 
and so forth. Third, there is the short-term operational plan, often constructed 
on a monthly cycle. This sets out the major tasks and projects to be 
undertaken within the division over the nominated period. 36 
I mention these details to draw the reader's attention to the fact that 
planning activities consume a great deal of the professional manager's time. 37 
As such, they represent a regular opportunity for the manager to demonstrate 
her willingness and capacity for collaborative association. In theory, a manager 
can conduct all elements of the planning function in isolation and without 
consultation. Some in fact are renowned for doing this. They are rarely 
affirmed as leaders however. While the professional manager is expected, 
therefore, to formulate plans and strategies, true leaders, according to Gini 
35 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1979), p. 426. 
36 A supportive account relating to managerial planning can be found in many O&M texts. 
Two that are especially helpful are: (a) Karl Albrecht, The Northbound Train: Finding the 
Purpose, Setting the Direction, Shaping the Destiny of Your Organization, (New York: Amacom, 
1994); and (b) Ichak Adizes, Corporate Lifecycles: How and why organizations grow and die and 
what to do about it, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988). 
37 The production of this set of three plans, (a) the division strategic plan, (b) the annual 
business plan, and (c) the monthly activity plan, is standard practice in most modern 
Australian business settings, both public and private sector. 
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"...achieve all this by drawing on the milieu and membership of which they see 
themselves as merely one part, albeit the most influential one." 38 
In view of this, an attribute required by those aspiring to become 
leaders, is the ability to recognise and respond to difference and diversity. 
Different people have different agendas, constituted by such variables as their 
different personal and professional aspirations, different personality types, and 
different levels of personal maturity. Given this, it is not difficult to see that 
aspiring leaders not only need to be receptive to the idea of collaborate 
exploration, but must also possess the skill to negotiate mutually acceptable 
outcomes. In fact, Gini believes that a given 'leadership community' - the term 
he uses to describe any group consisting of leader and followers — will reach its 
true developmental potential only with the appropriate interplay of two main 
forces, power and education. 39 This is an important point, the ramifications of 
which will be become clearer during later discussions, especially those in 
Chapters 5 through 7. 
1.4 Identifying a Blindspot 
Let us now return to the Karpin Report and try to interpret the findings 
in more detail. As was noted earlier, this report was the culmination of a 
thorough and comprehensive investigation, conducted to the highest standards 
of professional rigour. Its findings can therefore be taken as presenting an 
accurate picture of the state Australian management and leadership practice at 
the time of publication. 
38 Al Gini, Moral Leadership and Business Ethics, in Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of 
Leadership, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), pp. 27-46. 
39 Al Gini, Moral Leadership and Business Ethics, in Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of 
Leadership, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), pp. 27-46. 
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1.41 Exposing the evidence 
To begin with, let us focus our attention once again on Table 1.1. A list 
of eight characteristics was offered from which respondents were asked to 
choose what they considered to be hallmarks of the "ideal manager". (Bear in 
mind that respondents to this particular part of the survey were themselves 
practising managers.) Results show that only 23% considered high personal 
ethical standards to count. Notwithstanding the fact that the report did not 
state, in explicit terms, what the respondents precisely understood this to 
mean, it is surely a statistic that indicates some form of malaise. Moreover, it 
can be further argued that only one of eight factors made any sort of overt 
appeal to the potential significance of moral consciousness. Yet, we know from 
the account provided in §1.3 above that leadership and ethics are deeply 
connected. In fact, we can go further to suggest that all eight parameters 
identified are, from the perspective of leadership ethics, ethically ramified to 
greater or lesser extents. 
But note how the survey concluded that "... the ideal manager is an 
ideal which few Australian managers live up to at the present time". Thus, an 
interesting deduction can be made in respect of perceived standards of ethical 
consciousness in the Australian management community. On the one hand, 
the contribution of ethical consciousness to effective management (the so-
called "ideal manager" profile) is poorly appreciated. On the other hand, there 
is a widespread view that current management practice in any event falls well 
short of the ideal. Another way of looking at this is to suggest that while there 
is limited ethical consciousness among those currently in management roles, 
there is likewise limited consciousness among those offering purportedly expert 
commentaries on the topic. One way or the other, the picture is less than 
encouraging. 
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Even the following observation, taken from one of the individual 
research reports, failed to elicit any form of commentary concerning either the 
possibility or gravity of ethical deficiency: 
Quite a number of comments were made regarding the "people skills" 
of Australian managers. There is a tendency to adopt autocratic styles 
of management, since managers are "reluctant to let go of the control 
level", and get things done by "pushing people", rather than 
motivating and encouraging. 4° 
While it might be argued that nothing in this statement points 
conclusively to unethical managerial practice, it is surely suggestive of limited 
moral sensibility. "Pushing people", in the sense in which the term can here be 
interpreted, implies a number of things. First, it hints at subordinates being 
forced to act in response to some form of coercive stimulus: the 'heavy hand' of 
authority, the raised voice, the aggressively delivered command, a threat of 
some kink, and so forth. Indeed, the idea of autocratic style is directly referred 
to in the quote. Second, it suggests the possibility of injustice in the sense 
that this form of coercion might well be perceived by its recipients as 
representing an unfair distribution to them of the harms associated with an 
abuse of formal positional power. Third, as the upcoming account of the 
Agritest study will demonstrate, this form of 'pushing' will be interpreted, by at 
least some subordinates, as an affront to their personal wellbeing and dignity. 
One does not have to delve too deeply behind the phrase "pushing people", 
therefore, to come up with at least a hint of diminished ethical consciousness 
on the part of those doing the pushing. 
But what of the objection that occasional 'pushing' is indeed called for in 
workplace relations between boss and subordinate? My response is to concede 
the point with a proviso. The proviso holds that, so long as the 'pushing' is 
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done with what I will term 'an Aristotelian sense of emotional maturity', then I 
think it may constitute an ethically acceptable practice. Aristotle famously held 
that displays of emotional maturity are typically characterised by an ability to 
'get it right'. As such, my conception of 'an Aristotelian sense of emotional 
maturity', in the context discussed, would manifest as a form of encouragement 
or cajoling delivered (a) at the right time, (b) with the right degree of intensity, 
(c) towards the right individual(s), and (d) for the right reasons. It is the case 
that in the cut and thrust of a busy and pressured situation, it can be 
appropriate for a manager to act this way. In this respect, Oakley refers to 
"...Aristotle's well-known (albeit under-appreciated) claim that moral virtue not 
only requires acting well, but also having the right emotions in the right way 
towards the appropriate objects and to the right degree". 41 
However, returning to the quoted original passage from the report, it is 
fair to suggest that what the writer had in mind was an interpretation of 
"pushing people" more in the sense of an objectionable form of intervention 
than one imbued with Aristotelian sensitivity. 
I will finish by noting one further indicator of limited ethical 
consciousness observable from the Karpin account. This time we turn to the 
vision outlined for the future development of leadership and management 
capabilities in Australia. Learning opportunities, quality, and international 
competitiveness are the three dominant themes mentioned in the vision 
statement (see Table 2). These are, without question, laudable and relevant 
ideals in the context of the report findings. But nothing in the vision statement 
can be construed as even remotely inferring any sort of commitment to the 
40 Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, Enterprising Nation: Renewing 
Australia's Managers to Meet the Challenges of the Asia -Pacific Century (Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1995), Volume I, p. 842. 
41 Justin Oakley, Morality and the Emotions, (London, UK: Routledge, 1992), p. 2. 
30 
improvement of ethical standards with reference either to management or 
leadership, remembering that both are mentioned in the Task Force title. 
1.42 Interpreting the evidence 
As mentioned earlier, I began this project as an O&M 42 student. 
Motivated by concerns in respect of perceived shortcomings in the standard of 
leadership practice, my aim was to conduct a systematic study with a view to 
offering suggestions on how to improve it. I had assumed that the principal 
theoretical foundation for these suggestions would come from the behavioural 
sciences. But on conducting the first part of my research programme, in effect 
the work described in this chapter, I was drawn to a conclusion that could not 
be ignored. 
It was becoming apparent that those involved in the practice of 
organisational leadership in contemporary Australia, including the so-called 
'expert commentators' invited to participate in the Karpin investigations, had 
limited ethical consciousness in respect of the leadership role. I should make it 
clear to the reader that, prior to my encounter with the leadership ethics 
literature (itself a somewhat fortuitous outcome given that I had not explicitly 
set out to find it), I had been equally guilty in this respect. In the twenty-four 
year period (1972 - 1996) I had spent in the corporate world, I too had failed 
to make any substantive connection between ethics and leadership. If you are 
unaware of something, it is difficult to be concerned about it. A blindspot is a 
blindspot. 
There is a well-known concept in management education called the 
"stages of competence model". It describes four states we tend to go through 
in becoming competent at something. The first is held to be unconscious 
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incompetence. Here the manager, Fred, is incompetent but does not realise it. 
He carries on blithely plying his trade, often in an arrogant and self-important 
way. If lucky, at some point he will come to recognise his incompetence and 
thus make the rather small but nonetheless important move to the next stage, 
conscious incompetence. He is still deficient, but at least he now recognises it. 
This can often result in a diminution of displayed arrogance, something likely to 
be appreciated by colleagues. By now he is most probably motivated to do 
something about the newly recognised incompetence, aware that career 
prospects could be on the line. If he makes the necessary effort, he may in due 
course progress to the next stage, conscious competence. At this level, Fred is 
a much better manager, in consequence of paying close attention to his 
performance and striving to work at improving it. He is good, but he continues 
to work at it. After much persistent practice at this level, often an entire 
working-life span, he may eventually go into 'automatic pilot' mode, that is, 
achieve unconscious competence. He is now a fully competent performer, akin 
to the internationally renowned concert violinist who plays exquisitely on all 
occasions, without the need to practice any more. An ability to perform to the 
highest standards in effect becomes a way of being. 
I mention this model for two reasons. First, I want to introduce it now 
so that the reader will be familiar with it when I return to it later in my 
argument. Second, it is useful in helping to identify the situation that I believe 
prevails in contemporary Australia. Briefly, the majority of Australian managers 
are deeply ignorant of the ethical implications of the leadership dimension of 
their roles. But they are unconcerned by this, not so much because they do not 
care, but rather because they do not realise it. They are unconsciously 
42 I remind reader that the abbreviation "O&M", which appears frequently throughout this 
essay, refers to both the practice of organisation and management, and the discipline of 
organisation and management studies. 
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incompetent, as it were, in respect of the ethical domain of their leadership 
responsibilities. 
I believe that with this discovery I have uncovered what can be called a 
serious blindspot in Australian managerial consciousness. A problem exists, but 
those who should be concerned about it are not, in view of not recognising it as 
a problem in the first place. Moreover, the problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that, as we shall see in Chapter 2, the theoretical domain that traditionally 
informs the practice of management, O&M studies, has very little to say of a 
helpful or instructive nature. But, as we saw in the introductory account of the 
relevant literature offered earlier, professional philosophers have potentially 
important insights to offer. Nevertheless, at the practical level, it should be 
noted that unconscious incompetence is arguably the worst of all 
developmental evils. The reason relates to the difficulty likely to be 
encountered when trying to motivate those in need of the development. 
1.5 Summary and Preview 
1.51 A brief summary 
An extended period of involvement in the Australian corporate 
community has given me ample opportunity to observe, at first hand, the 
dynamic relations between managers and their constituents. By the mid-
1990s, the accumulated observations had given rise to a strongly felt concern 
about the lack of sensitivity so often displayed by managers in their dealings 
with professional colleagues. I was concerned, in particular, by the emergence 
of what I call the new efficiency imperative, which by then had become well 
entrenched in the collective Australian corporate psyche. People in 
organisational life - public, private, and not for profit sectors - were 
increasingly carrying the psychological scarring associated with the relentless 
drive to achieve more, with less, under conditions of ever-more-stringent 
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scrutiny and accountability. Under such conditions, effective leadership is 
crucial. But at a time in Australian corporate life when it was most needed, it 
was conspicuous by its absence. 
The findings of the Karpin Report, published in 1995, were to provide 
important empirical support for these private intuitions and speculations. Of 
greater significance, however, was the eventual interpretation I arrived at in 
light of discovering the emergent literature on leadership ethics. Juxtaposing 
these insights alongside the Karpin findings enabled me to see that, from a 
systemic cause and effect perspective, the problem appeared to lie not so much 
in managers lacking sensitivity, or lacking 'people skills' in the parlance of 
Karpin. These were but observable manifestations of a deeper and more 
insidious ailment, namely, a foundational deficiency in ethical sensibility 43 . 
But this was a layman's interpretation, in that I lacked a substantive 
theoretical grounding in ethics. In consequence, a fundamental choice had to 
be made. I could continue with the project from a traditional O&M perspective, 
but in doing so run the risk of compromising my capacity to interpret 
adequately the ethical implications. Alternatively, I could defer the logical next 
stage of the investigative process in order to concentrate, in the short term, on 
building the necessary theoretical grounding in ethics. I opted for the latter. 
43 In the early chapters I use terms such as ethical sensibility or ethical consciousness. In 
doing so, I recognise that they are vague and indeterminate. They do, however, convey 
sufficient meaning for the present stage of the argument. I will later adopt the term 
"ethical competence", defining it in quite a specific way and validating its selection by 
contrasting it to a systematic account of degrees of ethical development provided by Bert 
Dreyfus in Hubert L. Dreyfus, What is Moral Maturity? A Phenomenological Account of the 
Development of Ethical Expertise. (An occasional paper presented at Murdoch University, 
Perth, Western Australia, 1996.) 
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The argument that follows is a contribution, accordingly, to the general 
field of applied organisational ethics. In it I explore the moral" intricacies of 
managerial leadership, but do so from a quite specific perspective. This is a 
standpoint dictated by the primary and overriding aim of formulating a strategy 
to foster ethical sensibility among those with forma145 leadership roles to play. 
In reinforcement of a comment made in the Prologue, and following Freeman, I 
intend the project to be flavoured throughout by an unashamedly "pragmatic 
vein". 46 
On re-commencing the investigative process after obtaining the 
necessary ethics grounding, I was of the opinion that two pivotal tasks needed 
to be satisfactorily addressed. The first involved the identification of a specific 
construct, from among the plethora of ethical intricacies associated with 
leadership practice47 , that might in due course turn out to be an appropriate 
developmental leverage point. Is there, in other words, some identifiable 
ethical construct or notion that might lend itself to being the 'lever' which, if 
correctly pulled, would result in a shift in ethical consciousness among 
members of the target group? I felt this was a necessary tactical manoeuver 
because, in the absence of such a determinate leverage point, the project ran 
44 Throughout the upcoming argument, I use the terms moral and ethical interchangeably. 
While this is a common practice among philosophers, it should not hide the fact that they 
have technically different meanings. I will provide an account of that difference when I 
deal with the topic of syllabus structure in Chapter 6. 
45 Within all forms of human community, any individual person can potentially play a 
leadership role. My interest, however, is limited to those who hold formal management or 
supervisory positions in business corporations, and via these, retain certain leadership 
responsibilities. The theoretical niceties of this are examined in Chapter 2. 
46 Freeman sums up the feelings and concerns of many of us interested in the field with the 
admonition that... "There is a great deal of important intellectual work to be done in 
business ethics. It is time to get on with it, and get on with it in a pragmatic vein." Refer to 
R. Edward Freeman, (ed.), Business Ethics: The State of the Art, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), pp. 3-9. It should be noted that, as used here, the term is not meant 
to imply any reference to the formal philosophical doctrine associated with American 
thinkers such as Dewey and Peirce. 
47 The nature and extent of these intricacies will be explored in Chapter 4. 
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the risk of becoming overwhelming, from both practical as well as conceptual 
perspectives. 
The second task was equally daunting, in view of the fact that there was 
no evidence to suggest that it had previously been attempted in corporate 
Australia with any degree of transparent success. (Indeed, the wider 
leadership ethics literature, most of which emanates from the United States, 
suggests that the position may be similar in the Northern Hemisphere.) The 
task involves figuring out how to put successfully into practice, in the real-world 
context, an ethics-based leadership development programme that meets three 
key criteria. First, it must be conceptually robust in respect of relevant theory 
relating both to leadership per se and to normative ethics. Second, it must be 
robust in respect of pedagogical considerations pertaining to adult learning in 
the workplace setting. Third, it must successfully address the entirely 
pragmatic consideration of how to engender enthusiasm among prospective 
participants for actual participation." 
1.52 Outlining the remainder of the argument 
Notwithstanding the seminal role played by the leadership ethics 
literature in re-directing the focus of my project, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that it is not a widely read literature within the Australian management 
community, neither by scholar or practitioner. Instead, the traditional O&M 
literature continues to play the role of principal conceptual guide to more 
48 The target audience for the type of programme I have in mind comprises management 
level personnel whose discretionary time is limited. It is generally quite easy for such 
individuals to gain a dispensation from participation with the claim: "Gee, I'd love to 
attend, but frankly, I'm far too busy right now. Come see me again regarding next year's 
programme." Needless to say, the same excuse is likely to be invoked the following year. 
Moreover, in the 'real world' of business organisations, there is a tendency for "Murphy's 
Law" (If something can go wrong, it will!) to strike with monotonous regularity. Examples 
often encountered by developmental programme directors include (a) last minute 
withdrawals of key personnel, (b) requests for re-scheduling, and (c) illness. Accordingly, 
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refined managerial thought and practice. I turn to it, accordingly, in Chapter 2 
for the purpose of ensuring that no stone is left unturned in establishing a 
sound theoretical footing in respect of the nature of managerial leadership per 
se. 
Mindful of the need ultimately to formulate practical guidelines for the 
fostering of ethical sensibility in the 'real-world' setting, and in response to the 
shortcomings of a literature that, as we shall see, lacks both structural 
coherence and theoretical convergence, I felt an additional strain of research 
was required. In Chapter 3, accordingly, I bring to the investigative process 
what I call a humanities perspective. I do this for the purpose of 
complementing the largely social scientific grounding that applies to most of the 
traditional approaches to understanding leadership. In illustration of this 
perspective, I describe two further investigative tasks undertaken. The first 
involves an ethnographic-style study conducted, over a three-year period, of 
the day to day affairs of one specific organisation, Agritest Laboratories. The 
findings of this study are seen to offer an important clue as to how the ethical 
intricacies of leadership, clearly eclectic and complex in nature, can be reduced 
to a more manageable package, in terms of both ease of comprehension and 
heuristic guidance. In particular, it is seen that, in consequence of a distinction 
drawn between Real Leaders and OK Bosses, leaders tend to distinguish 
themselves in virtue of an ability to build and maintain high trust communities. 
This discovery turns out to be especially germane to my overall 
argument, in light of the fact that trust is by no means a morally neutral or 
inconsequential notion. As I make clear in Chapter 4, where a detailed account 
of the nature of trust is provided, whatever excitement might be associated 
with uncovering its seminal role must be tempered by the realisation that 
flexibility of both attitude and logistics, together with a high level of personal resilience on 
the part of the directors, are generally much needed qualities for on-going success. 
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proposals on trust-building are likely to be received unenthusiastically by the 
hard-nosed decision-maker. This mythical individual possesses the all-
important discretionary authority to sign the contracts that authorise 
commencement of leadership development programmes. He is caricatured as 
male, middle-aged, university educated in a business discipline, highly outcome 
and results focussed, dismissive of appeals to any value other than economic 
rationalism, and, in general lacking in refined ethical sensibility. He will not be 
swayed, accordingly, by otherwise compelling arguments if they lack 
appreciation of this profile. I finish Chapter 4 on the note that an additional 
challenge must now be factored into our overall investigation, that of figuring 
out how to satisfy the hard-nosed decision-maker without compromising the 
importance of high-trust community building as a pivotal theme? 
The account of trust presented in Chapter 4 makes explicit its 
inextricable conjunction with human emotion when the context is that of 
leadership and leadership ethics. This provides an important hint on how to 
overcome the problem of the sceptical hard-nosed decision-maker. The new 
discourse on "emotional intelligence" (EQ) is currently fashionable in the 
Australian corporate community. Much of the interest revolves around the work 
of Daniel Golennan, especially his presentation of research evidence linking EQ 
level to high-performance leadership practice. Validating the inclusion of EQ in 
the overall argument, however, turns out to be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for presenting a compelling case to the hard-nosed decision-maker. I 
address the full scope of this challenge in Chapter 5 
I begin Chapter 5 by reaffirming the conviction that serious obstacles 
need addressing by anyone hoping to convince the hard-nosed decision-maker 
to sponsor a development programme underpinned by a syllabus that appears, 
at first blush, to be soft, flaky and ephemeral. A good way to begin the 
process, I argue, is to recognise the importance of working within an 
38 
acceptable corporate 'idiom'. Then, having identified and discussed some of 
the key parameters associated with the prevailing Australian idiom, I suggest 
slotting the entire project into the framework of an appropriate planning model. 
I argue for an interpretive variant of the Peters et al 7-5 Framework, 
demonstrating that it assists with idiomatic compliance in two important ways. 
First, it provides access to an appropriate vernacular. Second, it draws 
attention to a mix of variables with which corporate change planners are both 
familiar and comfortable. 
In the remainder of the chapter, I set forth a position resulting from 
consideration of six of the seven variables covered by the model. Preeminent in 
this is positioning of the notion of ethical competence within a wider leadership 
competency framework. 
This leaves outstanding the seventh variable, designated in the original 
model as 'Structure'. Invoking poetic licence in respect of the authors' original 
interpretation, I argue for now using the term to draw attention to the need for 
a robust syllabus structure. Such a structure represents the theoretical 
framework on which the pedagogical viability of the programme rests. Given its 
importance, I devote the remaining two chapters to its detailed articulation. 
I begin Chapter 6 by reminding the reader of a concern foreshadowed in 
the early chapters regarding the complex and eclectic nature of the ethical 
intricacies of managerial leadership. This concern must now be addressed as 
part of the process of arriving at a coherent syllabus structure. I argue, 
accordingly, for selecting an appropriate developmental focal point as a way of 
reducing if not totally resolving the complexity. I go on to argue that, on 
account of its conceptual location at a critical intersection point between the 
psychology of emotion and normative ethics, human character is an appropriate 
candidate for the role. 
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Given this, I argue that the ancient ethical doctrine of eudaimonism 
represents, with suitable qualification, an appropriate overall structural 
framework for the syllabus of a programme that seeks to improve the level of 
ethical competence of participants. Eudaimonism, however, is a doctrinal 
platform, from which specific themes relevant to a given programme syllabus 
must be fleshed out. The challenge of identifying and specifying these themes 
is taken up in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2 
Managerial Leadership: A Theoretical Review 
2.1 Introduction 
2.11 Aim of the chapter 
May aim in this chapter is to examine the literature on managerial 
leadership for the purpose of ascertaining to what extent a theoretical review 
might contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon. It is within the 
field of organisation and management (O&M) studies that most of the relevant 
work has traditionally been performed. As such, this is the logical focus of my 
early attention. Before proceeding further, I put the reader on notice that I 
make no attempt to provide a detailed exegetical analysis of the voluminous 
material available. In particular, I make no attempt to argue for the respective 
merits of one theoretical approach over another, as such a task would require 
far more space than that available here, and in any event would add little value 
to the overall argument. 
Instead, in §2.2 and §2.3 respectively, I content myself with providing 
an overview of what I refer to as the reductionist and systemic accounts into 
which the general O&M treatment of leadership can be categorised. In §2.4, I 
discuss the merits of these accounts, drawing two main conclusions. I show 
that, of the two approaches, the systemic models by and large offer a more 
penetrative set of insights from the perspective of my special area of interest. I 
also argue, however, that even when combined, they fail to provide a 
sufficiently rich account to prepare the way for a thorough investigation of the 
associated ethical intricacies of leadership. The reason for this, I suggest, is 
the O&M community's historical over-reliance on the social scientific enquiry 
method. 
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2.12 Two generic approaches 
The origins of leadership study can be traced to the time of the 
pioneering work on what subsequently became known as the Classical Theory 
of Administration. Under its more infamous alternative description, Scientific 
Management, it is most famously associated with the writings of Frederick W. 
Taylor. 49 From a contemporary perspective, however, it can be argued that the 
really interesting work on leadership theory did not emerge until the middle to 
late 1950s. During that period a quasi-doctrinal debate gathered momentum 
between proponents of Classical Theory and those supporting the emergent 
Human Relations School. In contrast to the former, this new school 
emphasised the emotional, spontaneous, and non-rational elements of 
organisational life and work. It pointed to the significance of the social 
dimension of work organisations and, more significantly, to the importance of 
'leadership' in fostering emotional communication, participation, and individual 
and group commitment. 
During this period, there was, in addition, a notable shift to a more 
formally empirical method of enquiry, with social scientific disciplines like 
organisational sociology, social psychology, organisational psychology, and 
management studies now vying with each other to provide the most 
penetrative insights. In consequence, much of the work done on managerial 
leadership from the 1950s through to the 1990s has been conducted from a 
distinctly scientific or objectivist perspective. 59 Indeed, as has recently been 
49 Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, (New York, NY: Harper 
& Row, 1915). 
5° It is interesting that philosophy has had very little to contribute until the relatively recent 
emergence of 'business ethics'. Even this, however, is arguably more closely aligned with 
schools of business than philosophy departments. 
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pointed out, the resultant corpus of material is as noteworthy for its lack of 
theoretical convergence as it is for its voluminous content and eclecticism. 51 
Notwithstanding this divergence, I believe it is possible to identify 
certain useful patterns in the O&M literature on leadership. For instance, I 
would argue that two main approaches to the study of the topic can be 
identified, what I refer to as the reductionist and the systemic. Reductionist 
theories are noteworthy on account of their attempt to explain leadership by 
recourse to a process of isolation and compartmentalisation. They seek to 
isolate what they consider to be specific factors constitutive of leadership, and 
then compartmentalise them into like categories. Thus, for instance, we see 
that the so-called trait theories seek to isolate and compartmentalise those 
characteristics considered hallmarks of managers who demonstrate an effective 
leadership style. More will be said about this in §2.2 upcoming. 
The systemic accounts, for their part, take a different tack. To 
understand what I mean here by the term systemic, consider the contrast 
between Patient A, Julie, presenting to her physician with a broken wrist and 
Patient B, John, presenting with lower abdominal pain. Julie has a non-
systemic condition, in that it can readily be isolated and then addressed without 
affecting other aspects of her general health and wellbeing. John, on the other 
hand, presents with what are, prima facie, contingently indicative symptoms. 
They may signal a particular disorder, but not necessarily so. In fact, 
diagnosing his problem may require a good deal of eliminative investigation. 
Moreover, if the condition turns out to be a prostate problem, the physician will 
be concerned about the extent to which it might affect other organs (the 
bladder for instance) and physiological functioning (urinary, sexual, 
reproductive, et cetera). 
51 Joanne B. Ciulla, Leadership Ethics: Mapping the Territory, Business Ethics Quarterly, 5(1), 
1995, pp. 5-28. 
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Thus, what I call the systemic accounts tend to examine leadership from 
a more eclectic set of perspectives, and tend to consider the implications of 
leadership along a range of parameters, including the ethical. For this reason, I 
pay more attention to the systemic models. But this is not to say that 
reductionist models are without merit. In fact, as we shall see, they do 
represent a useful place to start when conducting what Heifetz calls "leadership 
analysis". 52 The reason for this is that they generally work by providing lists of 
factors (traits or attributes possessed, behaviours displayed, definitions 
applying, et cetera) by which students of the topic can gain a relatively easy, if 
ultimately somewhat unsophisticated and inadequate, entrée into the topic. 
2.2 Reductionist Approaches to Leadership Analysis 
One can readily identify within the literature four approaches to 
understanding the topic that can be positioned quite uncontroversially under 
the reductionist umbrella. These are the (a) behavioural models, (b) 
contingency models, (c) trait models, and (d) what I refer to as the 'list-
making' models. The brief descriptions that follow are intended purely to ensure 
the reader grasps the essential differences between the four types of model. I 
round off the segment by identifying what I consider to be a subtle form of 
reductionism clearly in evidence throughout the literature, to such an extent 
that it in turn pervades and reinforces the reductionism already inherent in 
each of the above three generic models. I refer to the passionate and 
relentless attempt by so many leadership scholars to reduce the concept to a 
single, all-encompassing definition. 
2.21 Behavioural models 
In the period following World War II, and with a retrospective eye on 
stand-out figures like McArthur, Churchill and Eisenhower, a wave of O&M 
52 Ronald Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers, (New Delhi, India: Harper, 1991). 
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research began to associate leadership practice with certain sorts of 
behaviours, and sought to differentiate effective from ineffective leaders on this 
basis. As with other investigative approaches, no clear pattern emerged to 
suggest a definitive normative platform. One particular research project did, 
however, dominate the period, and was to act as a catalyst for many 
subsequent studies during the 1970s and 1980s. 53 Based on the identification 
and analysis of over fifteen hundred behavioural elements, a research team 
from Ohio State University concluded that only two factors seemed to account 
for most of the observable variance between effective and ineffective leaders. 
The first was the tendency to act with care and consideration towards the 
emotional needs of subordinates. This included an observable readiness to 
afford them respect and trust. The second was something they called 
"initiating structure", a parameter that reflected the degree to which managers 
acted to structure and coordinate the work of subordinates in a manner that 
assisted and empowered them rather than the reverse. Interestingly, even 
though this sounds like it might be a relatively technical notion (in the sense of 
having to do with 'structure and coordination'), the qualification towards the 
end is telling. The association of leadership behaviour with the empowerment 
of subordinates tends to suggest that both factors identified as ultimately 
significant are grounded in affect as well as whatever else. 54 
53 Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, Enterprising Nation: Renewing 
Australia's Managers to Meet the Challenges of the Asia-Pacific Century (Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1995). 
54 It is clear, for instance, from Ciulla's account in her essay entitled Bogus Empowerment, 
that the business of empowering people can be an emotionally loaded experience. Consider 
the following situation: As a result of my dealings with you, my boss, do I feel that I can 
exercise some control or autonomy over my choices and actions? Or, do I feel that, 
irrespective of what words you use, I am in reality left with little or no room for 
autonomous decisions or actions. See Joanne B. Ciulla, Leadership and the Problem of Bogus 
Empowerment, in Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of Leadership, (Westport: Praeger 
Publishers, 1998). 
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In general, the study found a positive correlation between both the 
above indicators and the effectiveness of leadership practice. Later studies, 
however, were inconclusive in one respect. As Craig and Yetton point out: 
Although hundreds of studies have examined the correlation between 
initiating structure and consideration (on the one hand), and 
subordinate satisfaction and performance (on the other), findings in 
this line of research have been inconclusive and contradictory. The 
one exception is a generally positive relationship between 
consideration and subordinate satisfaction. 55 
Before moving on to examine the trait theory approach, it is appropriate 
to make a specific point about the various alternative approaches here being 
outlined. There is no clearly delineable chronological pattern associated with 
their emergence. As it happens, the Ohio State study took place in the middle 
of the twentieth century. However, even in its aftermath, theorists have 
continued to nominate specific behaviours as hallmarks or evidence of what 
they mean by leadership. For example Greenleaf, writing thirty years later, 
identifies serving others as the primary behaviour associated with the 
leadership practice. By and large, however, it can be stated that more 
substantive systemic accounts are all of relatively recent vintage. 
2.22 Trait models 
Heifetz begins his discussion of trait theory as follows: "Perhaps the first 
theory of leadership-and the one that continues to be entrenched in American 
culture-emerged from the nineteenth-century notion that history is the story of 
great men and their impact on society." 56 What are called trait theories of 
leadership focus on the sorts of characteristics or traits typically possessed and 
demonstrated by those considered role models. These theories place particular 
55 Craig and Yetton, as quoted in the report of the Industry Task Force on Leadership and 
Management Skills, Enterprising Nation: Renezving Australia's Managers to Meet the Challenges 
of the Asia-Pacific Century (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1995), p. 1190. 
56 Heifetz, op. cit., p.123. 
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emphasis on identifying those traits that differentiate the effective from 
ineffective practitioner. 
Until the 1940s, leadership scholars seemed to believe that differences 
in personal characteristics accounted for differences in managerial style and 
effectiveness. As Craig & Yetton point out: 
Hundreds of studies in the 1930s and 1940s searched for evidence of 
traits such as intelligence, need for power, need for security, need for 
achievement, dependability, sense of responsibility, self-assurance 
and decisiveness. Two questions typically were asked: What traits 
distinguish leaders from others? and What is the extent of those 
differences? 57 
However, as the Karpin Report correctly points out, it was the number of 
these studies, rather than the penetrating insight or consistency of findings 
found therein, that was most impressive. Indeed, it made the interesting 
discovery that factors distinguishing leaders from non-leaders in one study, 
typically failed to replicate in subsequent research. After a quarter century of 
work within this paradigm (the early 1920s through to the late 1940s), Craig 
and Yetton suggest that the only consistent finding was that effective managers 
generally tended to display above average scores on the traits of self-
confidence, need for job/ career success, and personal initiative. 
It is interesting to note, however, that most of the traits considered 
relevant to effective leadership could be designated as socially significant. 58 In 
this sense, being self-confident would be seen as a desirable quality, being 
arrogant as the reverse. Despite a waning of interest in trait theories after 
World War II, the Karpin Repot points to a resurgence of interest during the 
1980s. But while the resultant output again fails to offer any definitive 
57 Craig and Yetton, as quoted in the report of the Industry Task Force on Leadership and 
Management Skills, Enterprising Nation: Renewing Australia's Managers to Meet the Challenges 
of the Asia-Pacific Century (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1995), p. 1190. 
55 The relevance of this will become apparent later in the chapter. 
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connection between personality, or other individual characteristics, and 
leadership effectiveness, it does suggests that a number of these studies did 
succeed in highlighting an important point. This concerns the claim, 
subsequently important in this dissertation, that leadership traits could be 
broadly grouped under three generic headings: technical skills, conceptual 
skills, and interpersonal skills. This is a useful contribution to a field of enquiry 
which, as the foregoing diversity of accounts illustrates, is notable for its 
theoretical divergence. In fact, irrespective of whether one prefers the 
behavioural, contingency, or trait option, one eventually arrives at descriptive 
parameters that can indeed be seen to fall under one or other of these three 
categories. 
Perhaps the most influential of all trait theories is one currently in vogue 
and receiving much attention in the leadership literature. According to 
Goleman, essential to effective organisational leadership are three key 
capacities: (a) sound technical skills; (b) above-average cognitive abilities, and 
(c) emotional intelligence. 59 Referring to a major research project carried out 
in the late 1990s under the aegis of the Consortium for Research into Emotional 
Intelligence, he clams that the findings show that of the three, emotional 
intelligence is by far the most influential in determining quality of leadership 
performance. In fact, the study pinpoints that differences in levels of emotional 
intelligence among managers surveyed account for more than ninety percent of 
the variation in levels of leadership performance. Assuming the integrity of the 
research methodology and other research parameters, this is a very significant 
finding. 
So, what exactly is meant by emotional intelligence. Goleman answers 
this by pointing to what he considers to be the five principal characteristics of 
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the emotionally intelligent person. First is the ability to know one's emotions, 
to recognise a feeling as it happens. Second, the ability to manage one's 
emotions, including the control of impulse. Third, the ability to motivate 
oneself, to marshal appropriate emotions in the service of a goal. Fourth, the 
ability to recognise and respond to emotions in others, to have and to show 
empathy. And last, the ability to handle relationship effectively, in large part 
the ability to manage the emotional interaction with others. 6° 
Before moving on, it is worth noting one interesting reaction to the 
'great man' theory of leadership. This is captured in the so-called situationalist 
objection. This holds that far from the man begetting the times, it is more the 
case of the times begetting the man. Situationalists point out, for instance, 
that America's great early leaders - Jefferson, Washington, Adams, Madison, et 
cetera - were products of their time. Not only that, they displayed an 
assortment of complementary abilities rather than each possessing some 
specific list of characteristics that hallmarked them as great leaders. 
2.23 Contingency models 
In O&M theory, the concept of contingency planning refers to the 
practice of making provision for the possibility of having to adapt to various 
possible scenarios. Thus, my plan is to travel from Sydney to Melbourne next 
week by air. But in the event that the threatened airline pilot strike takes 
place, I have provisionally reserved a seat on Wednesday's morning's train. In 
this respect, I have a contingency plan. Contingency theories of leadership 
operate along analogous lines. They fall generically into a number of 
categories. For instance, following on from the situationalist response in trait 
59 See Daniel Coleman, What Makes a Leader? Harvard Business Review, November-
December, 1998, pp. 93-102. 
60 As a great deal of significance attaches to identification of the pivotal role played by 
emotional intelligence in determining quality of leadership practice, and given what will be 
seen to be the importance of emotion to moral enquiry, I return to this topic in Chapter 5. 
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models, an approach emerged during the 1950 that sought to characterise 
effective leadership as the ability to adapt to prevailing circumstances. An 
effective leader is therefore able to call on different characteristics and to adopt 
different modes of practice in response to the presenting situation. For 
instance, she might read some situations as requiring her 'iron fist approach' 
and others as needing the 'velvet glove'. 
Another contingency model considers it a leadership imperative to divide 
subordinates into various categories, depending on particular combinations of 
strengths and weaknesses. Effective leadership, accordingly, is about using 
them interchangeably in situations demanding their respective styles and 
capabilities. 61 A third variant of the contingency approach advocates choosing 
the leader to fit the type of constituency needing to be led. For instance, if the 
prevailing culture of the subordinate group is hard-nosed, unemotional, and 
highly focussed, then it may be appropriate to put someone in charge with an 
assertive personality and correspondingly no-nonsense style of leadership. 62 
Before leaving the notion of the contingency model, it is worth reflecting 
briefly on one final approach to leadership that has received prominent 
treatment in the literature. Perhaps most famously associated with respected 
theoretician John Kotter, this approach seeks to explain the nature and scope of 
leadership by making a differentiation between manager and leader. 
61 This is the approach advocated by Fiedler in F.E. Fiedler, A Theory of Leadership 
Effectiveness, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). This citation is taken from the account given 
in the report of the Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, Enterprising 
Nation: Renewing Australia's Managers to Meet the Challenges of the Asia-Pacific Century 
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1995). p 1197. 
62  This is the approach advocated by Dansereau et al in Dansereau, F. Jr., Graen, G., & 
Haga, W.J., A Vertical Dyad Linkage Approach to Leadership Within Formal Organizations: A 
Longitudinal Investigation of the Role Making Process, Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance, 13, pp. 46-78. 
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As mentioned earlier, classical organisation and management (O&M) 
theory posits the view that leadership represents but one of four major 
constituent functions of management - the others being planning, organising, 
and coordinating (Weisbord 1987). But this alternative approach seeks to 
specify the idea of leadership by making an explicit differentiation between an 
organisational supervisor, at whatever hierarchical level, operating either as 
leader or manager. According to this view, the more talented the individual, the 
greater her capacity to operate in either mode at will. In contrast, less talented 
individuals display a tendency to become stuck in one mode or the other. 
A simple characterisation of the suggested difference between leader 
and manager is captured in the following: 
• The manager builds new organisational forms and structures. 
The leader creates inspiring new visions. 
• The manager controls things (money, logistics, strategies, et cetera). 
The leader motivates people. 
• The manager gets things done through positional power and appeal to 
authority, and engenders a culture of compliance. 
The leader gets things done through the non-coercive engagement of 
the minds and hearts of followers, creating, along the way, a culture of 
commitment. 
Table 2.1, adapted from Kotter by Davies63 , provides a more thorough 
portrayal of the distinction between the two concepts. This is useful in the way 
it breaks down the role of manager/leader into four generic functions: 
o Creating an agenda 
o Marshalling people to work in support of achieving the agenda 
o Executing the work demanded by the agenda 
Li Examining eventual outcomes as a result of implementing the agenda 
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What this perspective makes clear is that the leadership view of 
supervisory work is clearly more people-centred, while the managerial one is 
more structural and instrumental. In all four of the generic task areas, the 
leader is sensitive to the vagaries of the human condition, and is obviously 
intent on achieving the agenda by dint of tapping into insights created by that 
sensitivity. The manager, in contrast, is more focussed on manipulating the 
structural, technological, and other resources available to achieve the same 
ends. For the manager, the person is simply a 'human resource'. 
Kotter's work, as reflected in this table, enables us to recognise that 
organisational supervisors, irrespective of their level in the structural hierarchy, 
must successfully perform two generic categories of tasks. These can be 
differentiated by thinking of one as relating to things and the other to people. 
As the analysis in Table 1 shows, this is no mere facile differentiation. Rather, it 
serves to illustrate that whereas the managerial dimension is really about the 
efficient leverage and optimal utilisation of resources, the leadership component 
is about the human side of enterprise, that is, the effective (as in goal-directed) 
and affective (as in emotionally sensitive) engagement of people. 
Kotter shows us that while management has something to do with 
functions that affect organisational efficacy (getting the job done) and efficiency 
(getting it done with optimal resource utilisation), leadership addresses those 
dimensions that affect the human spirit. He asserts further that it is leadership 
that establishes an inspiring vision for the future and focuses the attention of 
followers thereon. Likewise, it is leadership that encourages and promotes the 
sort of communication that must operate in a human community for it to be 
politically workable and socially stable. And, it is leadership that facilitates 
63 M. Davies, Leadership and Development in the Public Service, (Brisbane: Queensland Office 
of the Public Service, 1994). 
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collaborative and creative problem solving in the face of adversity and 
challenge. 
Activity Management Leadership 
Creating 
an 
agenda 
Planning and budgeting - 
establishing detailed steps and 
timetables for achieving needed 
results, and then allocating the 
resources to achieve these results. 
Establishing direction - developing a 
vision of the future, often the distant 
future, along with strategies for 
producing the changes needed to 
achieve that vision. 
Developing a 
human 
network 
for achieving 
the 
agenda 
Organising and staffing - establishing 
some structure for accomplishing plan 
requirements, staffing that structure 
with individuals, delegating 
responsibility and authority for 
carrying the plan, providing policies 
and procedures to help guide people, 
and creating methods or systems to 
monitor implementation. 
Aligning people - communicating the 
direction by words and deeds to all 
those whose cooperation may be 
needed, so as to influence the creation 
of teams and coalitions that 
understand the vision and strategies 
and accept their validity. 
Execution Controlling and problem solving - 
monitoring results against the plan in 
some detail, identify deviations, and 
then planning and organising to solve 
these problems. 
Motivating and inspiring - energizing 
people to overcome major political, 
bureaucratic, and resource barriers to 
change by satisfying very basic, but 
often unfulfilled, human needs. 
Outcomes 
Produces a degree of predictability 
and order, and has the potential of 
consistently producing key results 
expected by various stakeholders 
(e.g. for customers always being on 
time; for owners, being on budget). 
Produces new directions, often to a 
dramatic degree, and has the potential 
of producing extremely useful new 
directions (e.g. new products that 
customers want, new approaches to 
labor relations that help make the 
firm more competitive). 
Table 2.1 	Differentiating Management and Leadership as per Kotter i 
Notwithstanding the useful insights evoked by Kotter's approach, I 
remain concerned that the alleged strength of the model - its reduction of a 
complex notion into an overtly simple structural dichotomy - is in fact its 
weakness. My feeling is that the conceptual reduction of organisational 
supervision to a dichotomous polarity sends the wrong message to students. 
As we saw above, it tends to show the leader as the good guy, thus 
condemning the manager to the role of villain. Moreover, in steering the analyst 
into a purely comparative and oppositional thought process, it stimulates the 
sort of intellectual one-up-manship that so often bedevils academic enquiry in 
the social sciences. 
2.24 List-making models 
Also prominent under the reductionist heading are what I call the list-
making models. As the term implies, authors working under this category 
simply seek to explain leadership by recourse to the simple enumeration of 
constitutive factors. Thus, for instance, Rosen identifies what he calls the 
"eight principles of leading", namely: 
o Vision 
o Trust 
o Participation 
o Learning 
o Diversity 
o Creativity 
o Integrity 
o Community64 
As it happens, and as we shall see between now and the end of Chapter 
4, some of these factors are indeed critical to an appreciation of the nature and 
scope of leadership. But the list also has a weakness that takes away from its 
potential explanatory power. It consists of factors that individually belong to 
different conceptual categories. Thus, for instance, it may be said that 
creativity and integrity constitute personal attributes of the individual leader. 
But community, diversity, learning, and participation are clearly not personal 
attributes. This type of listing thus suffers from getting the apples and oranges 
mixed up. 65 
64 Robert H. Rosen, Leading People, (New York: Viking Press, 1998). 
65 Other authors to fall into the same trap in dealing with leadership include Covey, and 
Oakley and Krug. See Stephen R. Covey, Principle-centered Leadership, (New York, NY: 
Simon and Schuster, 1991); Ed Oakley and Doug Krug, Enlightened Leadership: Getting to the 
Heart of Change, (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1991). 
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2.25 Seeking the ultimate definition 
In preparing his Presidential Address for the fiftieth anniversary 
celebrations of the American Society for Aesthetics in 1992, Peter Kivy decided 
that it was appropriate, on such a seminal occasion for philosophers of art, that 
something be said by way of pointing to a new direction for the discipline. On 
reviewing the available options available, he decided that a movement away 
from the relentless pursuit of the ultimate definition of art was a worthy choice. 
He writes: "For I thought we were at a point where an alternative to the single-
minded pursuit of art's "definition" was open, and beckoning." 66 
I draw attention to Kivy's observation because much the same criticism 
can be levelled at the community of theorists working in the field of leadership 
studies. It, too, retains a preoccupation with the challenge of encapsulating the 
essence of its subject matter into a single, incisive, all-encompassing definition. 
While this does not constitute a 'model', in the manner of the three approaches 
discussed above, it stands out as a pervasive reductionist tendency. To 
illustrate the point in absurdum, note how, in a recent study, Rost identifies 
221 different definitions of leadership that have appeared in the literature over 
the past seventy-five years. (This seems like such an extraordinary 
achievement, testimony both to the reductionist tendency of the scholarly 
community and to Rost's resilience as a researcher. )67 
Then, having analysed the chronological evolution of these definitions, 
he succeeds in narrowing the list to seven, one for each of the decades from 
the 1920s through to the 1980s. His selections are based on the judgement 
that the one chosen best captures the prevailing sentiments and understanding 
for the period in question. These are as shown in Table 2.2 below. 
66 Peter Kivy, 1997, Philosophy of Arts: An Essay, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), p. ix 
67 Joseph Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century, (New York: Praeger, 1991), P 23 
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1920s 	[Leadership is] the ability to impress the will of the leader on those led and induce 
obedience, respect, loyalty and cooperation. 
1930s 	Leadership is a process in which the activities of many are organised to move in a 
specific direction by one. 
1940s 	Leadership is the result of an ability to persuade or direct men, apart from the 
prestige or power that comes from office or external circumstances. 
1950s 	[Leadership is what leaders do in groups.] The leader's authority is spontaneously 
accorded him by his fellow group members. 
1960s 	[Leadership is] acts by a person which influence other persons in a shared direction. 
1970s 	Leadership is defined in terms of discretionary influence. Discretionary influence 
refers to those leader behaviors under control of the leader which may vary from 
individual to individual. 
1980s 	Regardless of the complexities involved in the study of leadership, its meaning is 
relatively simple. Leadership means to inspire others to undertake some form of 
purposeful action as determined by the leader. 
To the above he then adds his own definition for the 1990s, claiming it to reflect the 
emergent realities and imperatives of a now fast-changing organisational work 
environment: 
1990s 	Leadership is an influence relationship among leaders and collaborators who intend 
real changes that reflect the purposes mutually held by both leaders and 
collaborators. 
Table 2.2 Definitions of leadership identified by Rost 
2.26 Observations on the reductionist models 
For someone wishing to discredit what I have collectively termed the 
reductionist approaches, one obvious criticism would be to suggest that they 
succeed in doing botany rather than biology. What I mean by this is that they 
seek to classify and categorise rather than analyse. The classification of body 
parts into, for instance, glands, limbs, bones, cells, and so forth does little to 
explain why and how the entire functioning organism actually work. 
Building on this metaphor, it could be further objected that they tend, by 
and large, to present a fairly sterile and formulaic account of a topic that is, in 
truth, rich and expansive, not only in conceptual terms, but also in terms of the 
reality of its real-world practice. For instance, wading through the entire list of 
over fifteen hundred behavioural signifiers identified by the Ohio State team 
mentioned in §2.21 above would certainly prove to be a somewhat sterile and 
formulaic exercise for most of us, as would the task of working through Rost's 
list of 221 definitions. But the Ohio team's eventual conclusion that the two 
most significant behaviours turn out to reflect the affect-laden nature of 
leadership is anything but a sterile indicator. Similarly, it is an interesting and 
instructive exercise to juxtapose each of Rost's final decade-by-decade 
selections against each other for purposes of comparative review. 
My own view is that much of the work in leadership analysis suffers from 
over-reliance on the social scientific method of enquiry. In their attempts to 
present entirely objective and value-free interpretations based on entirely 
objective and value-free assumptions and methods, many of the authors have 
succeeded in producing work that can fairly be criticised as sterile and 
formulaic. But this s not to say that it is without merit. Indeed, I can safely 
say I have examined no work that is entirely without merit. In general terms, 
the reductionist models I have studied have enabled me to form some 
preliminary views about the conceptual nature of leadership. For present 
purposes, and with brevity in mind, let me restrict myself to just one such 
observation. What I perceive as the limitations of the classification method 
prompts me to think of leadership more in terms of an evolving relational 
process between the relevant parties than any set of attributes, whether 
heterogeneous or homogenous in composition. However, rather than expand 
on this point at this juncture, let us firstly turn to an examination of the second 
stream of work, that which I refer to as the systemic models. 
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2.3 Systemic Approaches to Leadership Analysis 
2.31 What I mean by 'systemic' 
O&M theorist Peter Senge introduces the notion of systems thinking in 
the following manner: 
A cloud masses, the sky darkens, leaves twist upward, and we know 
that it will rain. We also know that after the storm, the runoff will 
feed into groundwater miles away, and the sky will grow clear by 
tomorrow. All these events are distant in time and space, and yet 
they are all connected within the same pattern. Each has an influence 
on the rest, an influence that is usually hidden from view. You can 
only understand the system of a rainstorm by contemplating the 
whole, not any individual part of the pattern.68 
He goes on to employ the metaphor of 'complex system' in reference to 
understanding work organisations. He says that, like the rainstorm, they tend 
to be bound by "... invisible fabrics of interrelated actions, which often take 
years to fully play out their effects on each other." 69 Thus, he warns, the 
interventionist concerned with strategic organisational change must take care 
to avoid falling into the time-honoured trap of concentrating on snapshots of 
isolated parts of the system, and in consequence running the risk of 'missing 
the wood for the trees'. (This will become a pertinent consideration for me in 
Chapter 4.) 
But there is more immediate relevance, consideration of which is 
prompted by the reductionist accounts of leadership just examined. As was 
seen, a criticism that could justifiably be levelled at them centred on their 
tendency to isolate and classify. Arguments about which traits as opposed to 
behaviours (or vice versa) ultimately constitute leadership fall into precisely this 
trap. In consequence, as Rost, Ciulla and others have pointed out, we end up 
68 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 
(London, UK: Century Business, 1990), pp. 6-7. 
69 Ibid., p. 7. 
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with lots of ardently conducted research findings to pore over, but not a great 
deal of expansive understanding of what leadership really means. While a 
majority of theorists working in the field employed a reductionist approach, 
fortunately not all of them did so. Examination of the literature does reveal a 
number of them that tackled leadership somewhat differently. 
While there are other models that would qualify, for the purpose of 
illustrating what I mean by systemic approaches to leadership analysis, I will 
provide a brief introductory account of three, all of which are currently 
influential in the literature. These are (a) Burns' theory of "transforming 
leadership", (b) Greenleaf's notion of "servant-leadership", and (c) Blank's 
"natural laws" theory. We will see that each is systemic in accordance with the 
above introductory comments, but notably in respect of the manner in which it 
succeeds in pinpointing the oftentimes "invisible fabrics" missed by the 
reductionists. 
2.32 Burns' concept of "transforming leadership" 
The best way to gain a grasp of the concept of transforming leadership, 
as postulated by James McGregor Burns, is to approach it from the perspective 
of his particular conception of what leadership as such is all about. He sees it is 
as fundamentally grounded not in a manager's persuasiveness in inducing 
subordinates to do what they otherwise would not do, nor in an ability to get 
them to comply with something concerning which their own feelings are 
neutral. Rather, he sees leadership as a term which describes the phenomenon 
by which leaders induce followers to act willingly in pursuit of certain goals 
which clearly reflect the needs, wants, aspirations, and expectations of both 
leader and follower alike. As he puts it: "... the genius of leadership lies in the 
manner in which leaders see and act on their own and their followers' values 
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and motivations."70 He sees the interaction between leader and follower as 
essentially one obtaining between individual human agents who are pursuing 
some common or joint purpose, but who are doing so from the perspective of 
differential motivational structures and power relations. 
He goes on to argue that this interaction takes one or other of two basic 
forms. What he calls transactional leadership occurs when the manager takes 
the initiative in contacting others for the purpose of making an exchange. The 
object of the exchange will be some valued outcome that can variously be 
economic, political, or psychological in nature. Respective examples would be, 
for instance, financial gain, increase in personal influence, or a reduction of 
work-related stress. In a transactional environment, the parties do indeed see 
each other as persons, and as such are broadly aware of, and sensitive to, the 
emotional and moral texture of their common environment. Indeed, all 
concerned tend to be conscious of the differential power relations and 
attitudinal structures that are mutually at play. In general parlance, it could be 
said that they show evidence of 'being on the same general wavelength'. But 
all the time, their mutual focal interest resides in some instrumental end to 
which they are jointly committed, the attainment of which all involved see to be 
in their respective best interests. Indeed, the strength of the bond between 
them tends to be determined by the degree to which they are committed to the 
common or joint purpose to which they have 'transacted' to be committed. 71 
The relationship can thus be characterised as primarily an instrumental one. As 
Burns puts it: 
70 James McGregor Burns, Leadership, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1979), pp. 100-101. 
7 ' As we shall see later in the chapter, this transactional environment is not dissimilar to 
what might be expected to obtain in a moral economy driven by contractarian values. 
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But beyond this the relationship does not go. The bargainers have no 
enduring purpose that holds them together; hence they may go their 
separate ways. A leadership act took place, but it was not one that 
binds leader and follower together in a mutual and continuing 
pursuit of a higher purpose. 72 
It is important to recognise that this can be a highly effective form of 
relationship, from which all concerned derive genuine benefit. Burns believes, 
however, that it falls short of being the normative ideal for true leadership. That 
accolade he reserves for what he calls transforming leadership. The 
fundamental premise lying behind this alternative conceptualisation is 
recognition of the importance of something that 'binds together' the parties in 
such a way that leader and follower succeed in elevating each other's 
consciousness to higher levels of psychological and ethical maturity. In his own 
words: 
Such leadership occurs when one or more persons engage with others 
in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher 
levels of motivation and morality. Their purposes, which might have 
started out as separate but related, as in the case of transactional 
leadership, become fused. 73 
Two important insights can be gleaned from this. First, it is clear that, 
for him, leadership does not imply a one-way flow of either power or influence. 
Rather, they flow both ways and are constantly being directed towards 
realisation of some loftier goal or purpose to which the parties are becoming 
increasingly committed. Second, the on-going enactment of this process of 
mutual human engagement renders the outcomes increasingly edifying and 
rewarding for the parties. Something happens in the relationship that motivates 
the players to become more ethically sensitive and committed. 74 
22 Ibid., p.100 
23 Ibid. p. 101 
74 Burns makes no mention of having any awareness or understanding of Gadamer's notion 
of Bildung. Nevertheless, it clearly applies to the type of mutually uplifting relationship 
here being conceived. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, translated by Garrett 
Barden and John Cummings, (New York, NY: Seabury Press, 1975). 
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It will be clear from this brief introduction that Burns' ideas on 
leadership are of a deeper and more complex nature than those of most earlier 
management theorists. A major differentiating feature of his work resides in 
the fact that he was one of the first authoritative figures to make explicit 
mention of the moral dimension in leadership. However, he never developed it 
beyond the suggestive or indicative expression highlighted here. In fairness, 
however, it should be said that Burns was an historian by training and not a 
philosopher. He opened the way, nevertheless, and his work certainly invited 
further examination of the ethical intricacies of leadership. It is arguably one of 
the ironies of leadership study that, in the forty years since Burns' passing, so 
few of the myriad writers on the topic have accepted that invitation. For the 
moment, however, let us defer further discussion pending a brief review of the 
second systemic model. 
2.33 Greenleaf's concept of "servant-leadership" 
The thinking that lies behind this conception of leadership is in large part 
derived from Robert Greenleaf's long career as a management development 
specialist at AT&T. His thinking on the topic was therefore shaped more 
through phenomenological and discursive experience than through purely 
abstract, detached speculation. Notwithstanding this, the catalyst for the 
eventual formal articulation of his servant-leadership theory was a reading of 
Herman Hesse's short novel, The Journey to the East. 75 A good way, therefore, 
of getting a grasp of the notion is by reflecting briefly on Hesse's story. 
The Journey to the East is the story of a mythical journey Undertaken by 
a group of people on a spiritual quest. The central figure in the fable is Leo, 
whose role is that of servant to the travellers. As the story unfolds, however, 
and as the journey progresses, it becomes apparent that his value to the group 
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extends well beyond the routine servile tasks he performs for his patrons. Of 
greater significance, readers realise, is the role he performs in sustaining the 
group with his humility, his caring and compassionate nature, and his 
personable disposition. Thus, facilitated by Leo's contribution, the journey 
progresses well until, one day, he mysteriously disappears. The group quickly 
falls into disarray and becomes dysfunctional. As it becomes apparent that it 
simply cannot manage without Leo, the journey is abandoned. After many 
years of searching, the narrator of the story eventually locates the religious 
order that had sponsored the original journey. On being taken into the 
community he discovers that Leo, whom he had known as a simple servant, is 
in fact the titular head and spiritual mentor of the order - someone considered 
a great and noble leader. 
Greenleaf concludes that a central message of the story is that 
leadership is something that is bestowed on those who are seen to be 
motivated, in the first instance, by a desire to serve others. As such, they are 
seen to have neither ulterior motives nor private agendas. They display no 
tendency to want to control, dominate, or in any way take advantage of those 
others who participate in the same community. True leadership, he concludes, 
is grounded in a simple and unadulterated desire to serve and to help others. 
He goes on to call this approach servant-leadership, and to characterise it as a 
style that emphasises increased service to others, a holistic approach to work, a 
sense of community, and shared decision-making power. He suggests that the 
orientation towards being a servant-leader "... begins with the natural feeling 
that one wants to serve, to serve first. Then conscious choice brings one to 
aspire to lead."76 
75 Hermann Hesse, The Journey to the East, translated by Hilda Rosner, (New York, NY: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1956). 
76 Robert K. Greenleaf, The Servant as Leader, (Indianapolis: The Robert K. Greenleaf 
Center, 1991), p. x. 
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In his later writings he claims that this philosophy of leadership differs 
markedly from those others he had encountered both in the literature and in 
practice. He pinpoints the difference as residing in the amount of care taken by 
the leader to ensure that other people's legitimate and priority needs are being 
addressed, something that requires discernment as well as a caring disposition. 
He says: "The best test is: Do those served grow as persons; do they, while 
being served, become healthier, wiser, freer, more autonomous, more likely 
themselves to become servants?" 77 Apart from the emancipatory implications 
of this, the last component clearly suggests that effective leadership is about 
transformation of consciousness. As Greenleaf puts it: 
It is important to stress that servant-leadership is not a "quick-fix" 
approach. Nor is it something that can be quickly instilled within an 
institution. At its core, servant-leadership is a long-term 
transformational approach to life and work, in essence, a way of being 
that has the potential to create positive change throughout our 
society. (His italics.) 78 
In this we can see a similarity between the Greenleaf and Burns 
conceptions. 
2.34 Blank's concept of the "natural laws" 
A hint as to the systemic nature of Robert Blank's 'natural laws' 
approach to understanding leadership is provided in the following extract from 
his Preface: 
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" Ibid., p. xi. 
78 Robert K. Greenleaf, Reflections from Experience, in Larry C. Spears, (ed.), Reflections on 
Leadership: How Robert K. Greenleaf's Theory of Servant -Leadership Influenced Today's Top 
Management Thinkers, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995), p. 23. 
The Nine Natural Laws of Leadership answers the questions: What 
does it mean to be a leader? When and how does leadership occur? 
How do leaders and managers differ? What is the source of a leader's 
power? And, perhaps most important: How can leaders provide more 
enlightened, life-supporting direction for their organizations?" 79 
What is immediately evident is that he sees leadership very differently 
to the reductionist theorists. His view of leadership is that of a 'complex 
matrix', an understanding of which involves simultaneous consideration of 
several variables. He elaborates on this by pointing to the paradigm shift he 
believes has occurred in our knowledge of nature's deeper realities, a reference 
to the seminal breakthroughs of quantum physics during the early twentieth 
century. A key component of this so-called "new science" 80 revolves around the 
notion of their being a certain fundamental order in the apparently chaotic 
structure of the natural world, and in consequence of which we have had to re-
articulate many of the basic laws of natural science. Blank views this as a 
useful metaphor for forging a better understanding of organisational leadership. 
What he means specifically by this is captured in the following: 
By natural law, I mean the intelligence or order that explains the 
patterns of behavior and interaction of leadership. Today, people 
commonly view leadership by focusing only on the leader, and they 
commonly define leaders by their personal traits, behaviors, habits. 
This approach fails to address the deeper reality: that to be a leader 
means to have willing followers. The focus on the leader alone 
obscures the interactional quality of leadership, and the obsession 
with individual attributes fails to recognize that such characteristics 
are important only in relation to followers. 81 
To understand leadership, accordingly, it is necessary to take into 
account the fundamental dynamics of the relationship obtaining between leader 
and follower. Within this relationship, at some point in time one person decides 
to give something freely to another; one person, in fact, decides to give her 
79 Warren Blank., The Nine Natural Laws of Leadership, (New York: American Management 
Association, 1995).p. vii. 
80 Margaret J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science: Learning About Organization from an 
Orderly Universe, (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers Inc., 1992). 
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willing allegiance in response to the lead offered. The simple word for this form 
of allegiance is followership. The moment at which this followership is freely 
affirmed and granted, is the point at which, according to Blank, leadership 
comes into existence. 
This conception, while not necessarily at odds with the accounts given in 
the reductive models, certainly brings a new twist to things. For instance, it 
highlights that a person cannot be formally appointed to a leadership role. 
Thus, when business corporations say, as they regularly do, that they are 
pleased to announce the appointment of John Doe as 'leader' of the marketing 
team, they are in fact misrepresenting the truth, albeit unwittingly. The 
positional power and authority vested in the new role for sure gives John a 
certain elevated hierarchical status within the group. But whether or not he 
emerges into leadership is yet to be determined. 
Another twist introduced by Blank in explaining leadership is his special 
use of metaphor, a device not typically associated with the traditional O&M 
scholarship community. In suggesting that leadership can be likened to a 
dance, he says: 
The leadership field is an undivided wholeness that resembles a 
dance. Watch Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers dance in one of their 
exquisite routines. The symmetry of the dance does not unfold from 
Fred's graceful lead alone, from Ginger's flawless following, or from 
the dance's spellbinding choreography. The wonder of the dance 
emanates from the totality of Fred-Ginger-music-movement-floor. 
The dance is a field — a pattern of relationship that connects all the 
diverse parts simultaneously." 
Suffice to say, then, by way of summary of Blank's position, that for him 
leadership is a concept that can be properly understood only in terms of what 
might be called a holistic relational field. As such, it offers an excellent 
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81 Warren Blank, op. cit., p. viii. 
82 Ibid, p. 13. 
example of the sort of richer explanatory power that I believe the systemic 
perspective brings to bear. 
2.4 Concluding Comments 
The reader will recall that, in Chapter 1, I identified the principal factor 
motivating my overall argument as an intuitive concern that arose from 
inadvertently coming across the newly emergent literature on leadership ethics. 
More specifically, I articulated it as concern about the fact that lack of 
awareness and understanding of its ethical intricacies, on the part of theorist 
and practitioner alike, is contributing to the poor standards of leadership 
practice currently taking place in Australian work organisations. I mentioned, 
moreover, that until leadership development programmes begin to address this 
lacuna, we cannot realistically expect to see any substantive improvement. 
With this background in mind, I went on to describe the principal aim of my 
project as that of formulating credible prescriptive guidelines in respect of both 
the content and implementation one such programme. Towards that end I 
nominated, as a logical starting point, a review of the traditional literature for 
the purpose of establishing a sound conceptual understanding of the nature and 
scope of managerial leadership. What progress, then, can be reported in 
respect of the investigations conducted thus far? 
On first encountering the O&M literature on leadership, one is 
immediately struck by two things. The first is its vastness, and the second the 
apparent lack of any obvious conceptual convergence among its myriad 
contributors. Notwithstanding these challenges, I eventually made progress by 
identifying two generic streams of stylistic approach, what I called respectively 
the reductionist and systemic accounts. 
67 
In a manner reminiscent of the expanded perspective suggested by the 
well-known metaphor of 'taking the helicopter view', the systemic models offer 
the advantage of allowing leadership to be seen in a more holistic way. By 
conceptually expanding the construct, rather than the reverse, they succeed in 
revealing aspects of its meaning typically hidden from reductionist enquiry. 
This is not to say that the latter adds no value. To know that effective leaders 
display this set of personal attributes, or that set of behaviours, helps one come 
to terms with what the concept is all about. But having one's attention drawn 
to such variables, especially when presented as little more than generically 
similar but isolated constructs, does not induce a grasp of the bigger picture, at 
least not to anything like the same extent as the systemic approaches. 
Where the reductionist models seek to explain by way of lists and 
categories, the systemic counterpart seeks to explain by recourse to other 
heuristic devices. Two in particular stand out. The first involves its appeal to 
holism. Leadership should be seen as 'frog rather than bicycle'. 83 To 
understand it correctly, according to proponents of the systemic approach, one 
must view leadership as a relational matrix, within which can be found many 
intersecting vectors. The second is the ready appeal to metaphor, of which the 
concept of a relational matrix is a case in point. 
Of the material examined thus far, Blank's so-called "natural laws' 
theory offers perhaps the most compelling example of combined appeal to both 
holism and metaphor. In likening leadership to a dance, he characterises it as 
a form of human relationship wherein one or more persons freely decide to give 
83 Mant describes a frog as something which, on being "disassembled", cannot be put back 
together again. The sum seems to be something more than the sum of the parts. A bicycle, 
in contrast, can be re-assembled, and is effectively no more than the sum of its parts. While 
he uses this clever if somewhat simplistic metaphor in respect of different approaches to 
understanding the nature of a modern business organisation, the same device is instructive 
in illustrating my point here. Leadership, too, is better understood as a frog than a bicycle. 
See Alastair Mant, Intelligent Leadership, (St Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1997). 
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their personal allegiance to another. This happens because a particular type of 
'psychological economy' has emerged between them, one that is grounded in 
four key forces: empathy, trust, confidence and respect. Moreover, as all three 
models examined emphasise, the robustness of this economy is independent of 
formal role structures and positional power. The only form of power that carries 
weight in the relationship is that relating to the degree to which all parties are 
seen to grow and evolve as individual human agents. According to Burns, this 
is a power that fuels a process of mutual elevation to higher levels of both 
psychological and ethical maturity. For his part, Greenleaf sees it as carrying 
an emancipatory function. When high levels of empathy, trust, confidence and 
respect exist (as with Leo and the group he serves in Journey to the East), 
individuals party to the relationship are emancipated from self-limiting attitudes 
and mindsets. 
Leadership, thus construed, provides an environment within which all 
involved in the 'leadership community' serve to empower each other. What is 
also apparent in this picture is the fact that true leaders see their followers not 
as amorphous groups of undifferentiated individuals. As Burns makes clear, 
one of the key reasons certain persons are afforded leader status by their 
colleagues is because of their capacity to treat others as unique agents, a 
capacity that is reflected in the leader's ability to tap into the distinct 
motivational structures of those individuals. 
In summary, then, I would argue that the systemic models, in a way not 
matched by their reductionist counterparts, have succeeded in providing two 
key insights into the nature of organisational leadership. The first views 
leadership as a relational economy as opposed to some set of defining traits or 
behaviours. One of the ancillary benefits of adopting this particular perspective 
is that of extinguishing the debate regarding precisely which traits or 
behaviours are constitutive, a problematic consideration right through the 
history of leadership analysis. The second identifies the pivotal importance of 
empathy, trust, confidence and respect in shaping the character of that 
economy. A key ancillary benefit of this insight is the positioning of such factors 
as positional power and formal authority at the margin rather than the centre of 
the analysis. I will return to this discussion in Chapter 4. 
In the meantime, I turn to a second and complementary form of enquiry 
I employed in order to penetrate more deeply the conceptual secrets of the 
managerial leadership enterprise. 
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Chapter 3 
Leadership: A Humanities Perspective 
3.1 Introduction 
My aim here is to expand the analysis of leadership begun in Chapter 2, 
offering an account from a position I refer to as a humanities perspective. 
Before describing what I mean by this, it is appropriate to make three 
introductory comments of a general nature. The first is that I am not taking a 
humanities standpoint because nothing can be gained from the other traditional 
approaches. Instead, my aim is to see if the insights already gained can be 
complemented or augmented by looking at the subject from a different angle. 
The second is that my feeling is that this additional perspective may well serve 
to allow more penetrative exploration of the systemic dimension of leadership 
analysis introduced earlier. My third and final introductory point is to 
acknowledge the fact that some readers may feel uncomfortable with the fact 
that I made no attempt thus far to offer my own definition of leadership. 
While I made my objections to such a reductionist tactic clear in the 
previous chapter, I will however now present a stipulative explication in the 
concise format of a 'definition'. In doing this, I adopt a noteworthy feature of 
Rost's definition, namely, his emphasis on the "non-coercive" 84 nature of the 
influence exerted by a leader. In taking a preliminary position, therefore, at 
this early stage of the overall argument, I offer the following conceptualisation: 
In a community with diverse stakeholder interests and relations at play, 
leadership is the relational process through which one individual emerges to 
play a role in non-coercively influencing the attitudes and actions of others, as 
they jointly pursue a common goal or goals. In anticipation of possible 
objections that could well be made, however, let me add that I am far from 
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convinced that this view is adequate for purposes of drawing out the full ethical 
ramifications. This is but another reason why I wish to tackle the topic from an 
alternative perspective. 
3.2 A Humanities Perspective 
Donaldson85 describes how the modern notion of 'the humanities' has its 
roots in the Renaissance period, when the term was first used to refer to an 
emerging revolution in the means and modes of education. During this period 
there was renewed interest in the development of the human intellect and 
human potential, reflected in the movement to so-called humanist philosophy. 
The rediscovery of ancient Latin and Greek classical texts served to fuel the new 
movement and manifested, in Donaldson's words, as a "... break with 
pedagogical dogma at the same time that it legitimated human studies as equal 
in importance to the study of God and the natural world". 88 At the time, the 
effect was one of liberating educators from the constraints of the narrower, 
more limiting worldviews that had previously held them in thrall. It is in the 
spirit of this expansionary heuristic transition that I now wish to advance the 
present enquiry. 
But I cannot claim it as an exclusively innovative move on my part. 
Donaldson tells us that in recent years a group of O&M educators, albeit small 
in number, has likewise come to realise that the propensity for penetrative 
insight into the human dimension of business was being constrained by the 
overly-restrictive appeal to purely social scientific modes of enquiry. He notes, 
in particular, how such complex topics as managerial responsibility, employee 
rights, questions of justice and equity, and what he calls the "poignant 
84 Refer to Table 2.2 in the previous chapter. 
85 Thomas J. Donaldson, 'Introduction', in Donaldson, Thomas J., and Freeman, R. Edward 
(eds.), Business as a Humanity, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
86 Ibid., pp. 3-8. 
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problems of leadership", are now being better understood as a consequence of 
theorists turning to political philosophers, ethicists, and historians. 
In adopting this heuristic trend, I have pursued a humanities approach 
along two distinct but complementary vectors. The first involves using what I 
refer to as a Wittgensteinian -style primary investigation of leadership practice in 
an actual business organisation, played out within a broadly ethnographic 
framework. 87 The second involves the use of what I call literary licence, that is, 
appealing to devices such as myth, archetype, or metaphor to help unravel the 
poignant problems of leadership and the ethical challenges associated with 
them. 
3.3 The Agritest Study 
3.31 Background to the study 
I commenced my studies in applied ethics from the premise that theory 
on its own generally represents a suspect platform from which to forge 
meaningful insight into the vagaries of managerial reality. This predilection was 
grounded in the realisation, long since arrived at, that much of what I had 
learned in business school had contributed but little to making sense of the 
events, circumstances, and behaviours I subsequently encountered in the 'real 
world'. Accordingly, I had always felt that some form of phenomenological 
immersion in a real-life organisational setting might add to the efficacy of the 
investigative process. Thus, when confronted by the concerns mentioned 
above, I had no hesitation in deciding to complement the propositional 
component of my research with an experiential counterpart. This eventuated as 
87 I explain what I mean by a 'Wittgensteinian-style' of philosophical enquiry in §3.1 
following. 
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a three-year case study investigation into the day-to-day workings of one 
organisation, Agritest Laboratories. 88 
An important intuition underpinning the investigation was the view that 
because there is so much conceptual complexity associated with leadership, it 
should ideally be examined with at least three key dimensions of that 
complexity in mind. The first relates to the fact that leader-follower relations 
always play out within some specific context, and that the parameters of that 
context must surely have some bearing on the texture of relations evolving 
therein. Some effort should accordingly be expended in examining a real 
environment within which a given leadership community or communities 
undertake their daily functions. Second, some attempt should ideally be made 
to identify and understand the structures of the personal interactions that make 
up the various leader-follower encounters taking place on a daily basis. Third, 
an attempt should be made to identify the manner in which the human 
condition plays a role in shaping the constitutive relations and their outcomes. 88 
The disquiet hinted at in the preceding remarks is reminiscent of a wider 
concern that troubled Wittgenstein in the later period of his philosophical work. 
As his thought matured in the period between writing the Tractatus and the 
Investigations, he became increasingly averse to the project of theorising for its 
own sake. Instead, he sought to relate abstract speculation to the practical 
imperative of achieving worthwhile social change. 90 To explain more fully the 
88 A profile of Agritest follows in §3.2. 
89  For present purposes, I use the term "human condition" to refer in a general way to the 
fact that individuals differ one from another, and moreover, can never be counted on to act 
with absolute predictability. As Kekes points out, our lives are much too dependent on the 
forces of contingency, conflict and evil to ever give us anything but the illusion of control 
over either ourselves or others. See, John Kekes, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1995). 
90 For an interesting discussion of the early work of Wittgenstein, see Allan Janik and 
Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1996), pp. 20-30. 
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relevance of this position to the present enquiry, let us consider Bowden's 
(1998) recent investigations into the ethical possibilities of caring. 91 
Commencing from the intuition that caring is ethically significant, she 
sets about examining its moral structures by choosing an enquiry method based 
on the later Wittgenstein. She recognises that in the Philosophical 
Investigations he advocates an approach to speculative enquiry that 
emphasises sensitivity to context and "situatedness", and to the social 
dimension of human interaction, in contrast to exercising the more traditional 
exclusive appeal to purely abstract theoretical reflection. She worries that any 
effort to attend to the complex ethical possibilities of interpersonal relations is 
likely to be subverted by attempts to penetrate the nature of caring through 
purely speculative means. With this in mind she suggests that her primary aim 
is to "... reorient interest in the ethics of care by directing attention to the 
multiplicity and diversity of its practice in a variety of examples of specific 
caring relations". 92 
I believe there is a crucial similarity between Bowden's concerns and my 
own. We are both interested in the ethical possibilities of relationally intensive 
human activities, caring and leadership respectively. 93 Proceeding from a 
similar concern to that which motivated Wittgenstein a half-century earlier, she 
expresses a general unease with the penchant within moral philosophy for 
"grand theory-making". She suggests that the difficulties ultimately reside in 
"...deformations in understanding that emerge from moral theories that self-
confidently presume their own universality and impartiality." 94 
91 Peta Bowden, Caring: Gender-Sensitive Ethics, (London: Routledge, 1997). 
92 Ibid., p. 34. 
93 It might well be argued, in fact, that Bowden could have added leadership as a fifth 
domain of caring, augmenting her work on mothering, friendship, nursing and citizenship. 
94 Ibid., p. 34. She cites Sidgwick's, The Methods of Ethics, as a classical exemplar of this 
grand-theorising approach. 
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Whatever the merits of this latter claim, what interests me is the 
rationale she provides for selecting an alternative mode of investigation. She 
asserts that the reductionist tendencies of traditional moral enquiry - in which 
intellectual, intuitive, and emotional habits are conceptualised in common terms 
- assume that universal and impartial moral codes can, in and of themselves, 
give answers to particular, concrete questions of morality. She rejects this 
framework by postulating, correctly in my view, the ethical irreducibility of 
specific real-life situations. She argues that "...no single theory can be created 
to subsume all instances, no moral concept can catch the essence of all of its 
uses, and no moral judgement can be expected to resolve a particular conflict 
without leaving further ethically significant aspects in its train." 95 Instead, by 
way of implied endorsement of Wittgenstein's notion of situatedness, she 
suggests that ethics should be viewed as constitutively contextual, and that its 
study should be pursued via interaction with the actual experiences of real 
people. 
There is a further element of this position to which I am attracted. The 
real world is as much constituted by the mundane lives of so-called 'ordinary 
people', as it is by the glamorous and exciting lives of the rich and famous. This 
is especially true in the world of organisation and management. For every Bill 
Gates, Lee Iacocca, or Christopher Skase, there are thousands of ordinary 
individuals, possessing little by way of formal authority, status or positional 
power, who collectively make up the most representative expression of leader-
follower relations in the vast majority of organisations. % 
95 Ibid., p. 35. 
96 Bill Gates, President of Microsoft Corporation, is arguably the best-known business figure 
in the world today, while also reputedly the wealthiest individual on the planet. Lee 
Iacocca was a well-known figure in US big-business circles in the 1980s, notably as the CEO 
of the Chrysler Motor Corporation. Christopher Skase (now deceased) was an Australian 
business "icon of notoriety", famous for the role he played in the collapse of the Qintex 
Corporation in the early 1990s and his subsequent life as an international criminal. 
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While their stories may lack the glamour appeal of the larger-than-life figures 
found in the works of contemporary leadership writers like Peters and 
Waterman, Bennis, Handy, Klug and Oakley, et cetera, they are nonetheless 
very real. Their lives resonate just as well with the joys, sorrows and 
vicissitudes that constitute, perhaps more faithfully, the everyday drama of 
practical social existence in the average workplace. 
This is not to say, of course, that celebrities (be they moral saints or 
villains) are not 'real people'. But it is to assert that the reality of the 
extraordinary few must be seen in contrast to that of the ordinary many, whose 
daily working lives are marked more by stress, struggle and routine than power, 
privilege, or special circumstance. Needless to say, there is little difficulty 
finding examples. They account for an overwhelming majority of those working 
in the average Australian business organisation. 97 I was drawn, accordingly, to 
the prospect of enriching my understanding of leadership by using an 
investigative process that would put me in touch with the palpable daily 
experiences of those actually living out the realities of the leader-follower 
dynamic within 'non-extraordinary' circumstances. The opportunity to conduct 
this form of enquiry presented itself through the medium of my role as a 
professional management consultant. I was engaged in November 1997 by 
Agritest Laboratories to act as external facilitator to what was expected to 
become a major process of planned medium-term organisational change. 
Upon commencement, I sought and received permission from the client 
to act in the dual role of consultant and researcher. Towards this end, I looked 
for a research methodology that would allow for satisfactory discharging of both 
sets of responsibilities. Bearing in mind that the chosen methodology would 
97 It is worth noting that of the approximately five hundred people employed by Agritest 
Laboratories, only five could be considered to enjoy real power and privilege, in the sense 
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need to satisfy the various parameters described above, I settled in the end on 
the process known as Action Research. For brevity purposes, I do not intend to 
say much about the nature of Action Research at this point. Suffice to record 
that it falls very much into the mode of non-scientific enquiry, insofar that it 
allows the researcher to immerse herself in the day to day activities of the 
situation being researched. It requires no appeal to the notion of detached 
observation, urging the researcher instead to take an active role with the 
subjects in the challenges associated with planning, implementing, monitoring 
and evaluating strategies undertaken to improve some situation or other. It is, 
therefore, very much a humanities rather than science centred enquiry method, 
thus fulfilling my particular need. 98 
3.32 Profile of Agritest Laboratories 
Agritest Laboratories (Agritest for short) 99 is a privately owned 
agricultural science practice operating in regional Australia. It consists of 
several geographically separate and semi-autonomous laboratories, the largest 
of which was to become the focal point of my investigation. 
The term 'semi-autonomous', as used here, reflects the fact that the 
individual laboratories are free to exercise individual discretion on (a) matters of 
scientific determination vis-a-vis cases presented; and (b) day to day decision-
making in respect of routine financial and administrative matters. Matters of 
major managerial discretion, such as capital expenditures and negotiation of 
that their personal circumstances are palpably different from those of the other four 
hundred and ninety five. 
98 For a fuller account of Action Research, as it relates to the contemporary Australian 
context, the interested reader can refer to Cliff Bunning, Action Research: An Emerging 
Paradigm, (Brisbane: The Tertiary Education Institute, University of Queensland, 1994), 
Occasional Papers Series — No. 4, pp. 2-37. 
99 "Agritest Laboratories" is a fictional entity. To protect the identity of the client, what 
follows may best be termed a fictionalised account of an investigation within an actual 
organisation. Moreover, it should be noted that formal permission was received from the 
client (a) to undertake the study, and (b) to report it in this manner. 
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wage and salary levels, are coordinated centrally through head-office, but 
usually involve substantive input from the General Managers of the subsidiary 
laboratories. 
The purpose of an agri-testing laboratory is to provide definitive 
diagnostic determinations on matters referred to it by clients, where the latter 
include individual growers (e.g. crop farmers), practising agricultural scientists 
who do not have their own testing facilities, specialist government agencies, 
and primary produce processing companies. Test materials normally come to 
Agritest as either randomly chosen or overtly diseased crop and plant 
specimens. When such specimens arrive at the laboratory, they are categorised, 
labelled, logged into a computer database, and streamed for subsequent 
analysis and processing. Approximately five hundred people are employed at 
Agritest facilities throughout Australia, with roughly half working at the 
Hawkesbury Laboratory, the main site of the investigation. Hawkesbury also 
houses the headquarters of the company. Of the five hundred or so employees, 
a total of fifty-three individuals hold formal supervisory or management roles. 
Agritest managers typically have between six and twelve subordinates reporting 
to them. To avoid confusion in the use of terminology in describing the 
research findings I will, in the remainder of this chapter, restrict myself to just 
two designations: supervisor and subordinate. 
3.33 The research project 
As mentioned above, the research investigation was undertaken in 
conjunction with a professional consultancy programme. The client stipulated, 
on commencement, that the main purpose of the latter would involve facilitating 
the introduction of development initiatives during a period of anticipated 
change. The notion of 'development initiatives', as the term is used here, 
denotes two generic types of activity. First, assisting with the formulation of 
organisational development strategies, where the latter term is intended to 
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signify any of a range of developmental initiatives which might from time to 
time be undertaken to improve the systematic functioning of the company as a 
whole. In respect of the designated work at Agritest, I was directed to 
concentrate on two main projects: (a) the introduction of a new system of 
performance review and evaluation; and (b) the design and implementation of 
professional development for supervisory staff. No restrictions were placed by 
management on the manner or extent to which the two roles of consultant and 
researcher were to be aligned, this being left to my own discretion. However, 
as indicated earlier, part of the rationale for choosing the Action Research 
methodology was its suitability for such a coupling, a fact that was both 
understood by and appealing to the client. It was agreed on commencement 
that the period of formal academic research would comprise the three calendar 
years 1998 through 2000. Finally, it should be noted, and is hereby 
acknowledged, that no attempt was made by Agritest management to interfere 
with, or influence, either the process or the outcome of the research component 
of the project. 
The research component of the Agritest intervention had two distinct but 
related points of focus. The first, as indicated earlier, sought to use the 
opportunity for significant immersion in both the operations and culture of the 
company for the purpose of providing a phenomenological or experiential 'feel' 
for how leader-follower relations actually cash out in a practical workplace 
setting. The Action Research methodology provided scope for collaboration with 
company personnel in the planning and implementing of various social research 
projects. The protocols of the methodology ensured that (a) the research was 
carried out with as much rigour and discipline as is possible in a social setting 
where perceptions are being canvassed, and (b) there would be careful 
observation of, and reflection upon, the outcomes achieved. As we shall see 
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below, the process revealed insights more extensive in number and more 
penetrative in depth than had been anticipated. 
The second focal point of the Agritest involvement, reflecting the 
intended prescriptive component of my overall project, was to investigate what 
might be done in practice to promote and expedite the cultivation of ethical 
effectiveness among those with leadership roles to play. The outcomes in 
respect of the latter component will be more fully discussed in Chapter 6. 
Before moving to an examination of the findings, the reader can note that the 
data that led to them was forthcoming, in line with Action Research guidelines, 
from a combination of on-the-spot observation, personal discussions, and group 
sessions in which I acted as facilitator/participant. The latter were often used 
as forums to discuss and evaluate the outcomes of particular initiatives 
undertaken, with a view to determining their impact against cost-benefit or 
other pre-ordained parameters. All in all during the three-year period of the 
study, I logged approximately 1,400 hours of contact time in direct involvement 
with or observation of Agritest personnel. 
3.34 Findings 
3.341 Two findings of indirect significance 
Before giving an account of the specific findings that directly inform the 
discussion of the ethical intricacies of managerial leadership, let us firstly take 
note of two more general discoveries. These relate respectively to (a) the 
pervasiveness of change in the contemporary Australian environment, and (b) 
the low-level of understanding of the nature of the ethical encountered among 
Agritest employees. During the three-year period of my research process, the 
Agritest environment was characterised by a number of significant changes. 
Chief among these was a takeover resulting in the ownership structure of the 
company changing from privately owned and completely autonomous to the 
status of being a relatively minor subsidiary of a European-based publicly-listed 
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multinational corporation. This took place approximately one year into my 
period of involvement. 
While a corporate takeover is by no means an unusual occurrence in 
contemporary Australia, what happened next at Agritest certainly is. Within six 
months of the European takeover, the new owners in turn sold out to a publicly-
listed Australian corporation in a move nobody anticipated. This forced Agritest 
employees, by now just about becoming accustomed to the original change of 
proprietorship, into a state of organisational and psychological discontinuity. 
Readers with experience of corporate takeovers will appreciate the significant 
dislocating impact they can have on those employed by the acquired entity, in 
this case Agritest. In such situations it is not uncommon for the new owner to 
insist on compliance with its existing corporate policy platform. In the case of 
Agritest, this meant a quick-fire double dose of such enforced changes. 
All in all, within a period of eighteen months from the time of 
commencement of my project, Agritest employees faced a non-negotiable 
requirement to implement a range of major changes. These included (a) a new 
system of performance management, (b) revised operating procedures within 
the various scientific functions, (c) participation by staff in mandatory training 
programmes, (d) compliance with altered quality assurance standards, and (e) 
adoption of new customer service protocols. Running concurrently with these 
changes was an overriding imperative, initiated under the first new owner but 
intensified under the second, to improve productivity via a tightening up of cost 
structures. At one Agritest meeting, it was bluntly stated by a senior executive: 
"You'd better get used to the idea from now on of having to do more, with less, 
"loo under conditions of ever-more-stringent scrutiny and accountability! 
100 This is what, in Chapter 1, I referred to as the 'new economic imperative' shaping the 
culture and operation of many modern Australian corporations. 
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The effects of these changes were twofold. As one would expect, it 
created within Agritest an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, of wondering to 
what extent this inexorable trend might ultimately begin to threaten 
employment security. This was especially the case after the second take-over, 
as the new corporate owner had many similar operations to Agritest in the 
Australia-New Zealand region. Added to the burden of the additional work 
created by the introduction of the various initiatives mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, the net effect was a significant increase in stress levels throughout 
the company. 
The second perceived effect had to do with the manner in which these 
changes affected supervisor-subordinate relations. In most instances mediated 
by the elevated stress levels just alluded to, these relations were frequently 
seen to deteriorate. Hitherto stable relationships often turned sour as a 
consequence of the inability of both parties to cope with the higher stress levels 
to which they were being subjected. This is undoubtedly main reason why the 
topic of leadership style had such currency during the period of my intervention. 
Of significance to the current project was one further ancillary finding to 
which I now wish to draw attention. Again the result of specific questions asked 
during one-on-one discussions, and confirmed by the results of focus group 
interviews, I discovered that there was a very low level of understanding 
throughout Agritest of the nature and scope of ethics. I posed questions such: 
(a) In your view, what's covered by the term "ethics"? (b) What does it mean to 
act ethically or to be ethical? (c) How does ethics come into the relationship 
between supervisor and subordinate? The resultant discussions clearly 
suggested that the majority of respondents had but a vague and nebulous 
grasp of the concept. Those with tertiary level education in professional 
disciplines (an impressive percentage at Agritest) tended to equate ethics with 
codified behavioural standards laid down by their representative bodies-for 
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example, the Code of Ethics of the Australasian Society of Plant Pathologists. 
Those with secondary or equivalent level education were more prone to offer 
answers such as: "Well, I've never really thought about it. I think I know what 
ethics means, but I just can't put it in words."" When these questions were 
asked of groups comprising exclusively management-level personnel, and when 
related specifically to what constitutes ethical practice in leadership roles, the 
responses were equally vague. In this context, the main interpretive aberration 
seemed to be a tendency to equate the ethical with the legal. With these 
macro-level findings acting as a backdrop, the stage is set to examine their 
micro-level counterparts addressing the specifics of leadership. 
3.342 Ability to recognise leadership 
I believe it was the British aristocrat, Lord Longford, who once said of 
the elephant: "I can't describe the fellow, but I certainly recognise him when I 
see him." Much the same ability exists among Agritest employees in respect of 
leadership. They seemed well capable of distinguishing it from other styles or 
modes of supervision. As very few of them were trained in business 
management or associated social scientific disciplines, this seems to suggest 
that Australian workers do not need access to textbooks, journals or other 
propositional learning opportunities in order to make correct discriminations as 
to the nature of leadership. Common sense and reflective observation seem to 
suffice. 
Two independent sources contributed to this finding. First, during the 
numerous one-on-one discussions in which I participated, individual staff 
members consistently demonstrated an ability to speak of leadership in a 
101 The reader should note that during the three-year period of the Agritest investigation, I 
also conducted more limited consulting assignments at other organisations. On various 
occasions in these different environments, I also posed questions regarding the nature and 
scope of ethics. I did this in order to test the extent to which the Agritest response pattern 
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manner suggestive of a familiarity with the theoretical distinctions made in the 
literature. For instance, most were able to indicate that leadership only 
emerged in consequence of there being willing followers. This occurred 
notwithstanding the fact that, as mentioned above, few had any such 
familiarity. 102 
Second, focus group l°3 sessions held at all three locations corroborated 
the views offered during individual discussions, but generally went further in 
addressing the relevant variables involved in the leadership equation. These 
sources in combination made it clearly apparent that Agritest employees found 
it quite easy not only to identify leadership, but to differentiate it from other 
styles of supervisory practice. One reason for this turned out to be the fact that 
many staff members held a fascination for or preoccupation with the topic. 
They engaged in close and critical observation of supervisory practice on a day-
in day-out basis, often comparing notes during tearoom discussions concerning 
the respective styles of the various supervisors. Indeed, in many of the informal 
discussions to which I was party, the observations offered vis-a-vis the 
attitudes and behaviours of the various supervisors under discussion were 
invariably in line with rmi own. 104 
might be unrepresentative. It was not. Similarly low levels of understanding were 
recorded during all such sessions. 
102 During my three-year investigation, I encountered a total of six Agritest employees who 
had had any experience of business studies literature. Moreover, in all but one of these 
cases, the degree of familiarity was but superficial. 
103 The so-called 'focus group' interview is a much-used social research technique in the 
Australian organisational environment. Conducted properly, it involves a group of 
approximately fifteen participants exchanging views on a given topic under the moderation 
of an external facilitator. During the three-year study, I used separate focus group sessions 
to canvass views on (a) the nature of leadership, (b) how well Agritest managers displayed 
leadership ability, and (b) the scope, nature and meaning of ethics. For a discussion of the 
focus group interview technique, see Chapter 9 of Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 
(6 th edition), (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1992). 
04 The reader should not take this as a patronising statement on my part. What I am trying 
to convey is the fact that their views, invariably uninformed by any type of theoretical 
study, generally coincided with those of a student of leadership practice. 
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But perhaps the most pertinent finding in this regard relates to a tacit 
categorisation of the fifty-three supervisory personnel into one or other of three 
groups. Each individual supervisor at Agritest was adjudged to be (a) a Real 
Leader (b) an OK Boss, or (c) a Waste of Space. 1°5 Regarding this latter 
category little needs to be said. As the designation suggests, to be considered 
a 'Waste of Space' means to be a supervisor without redeeming qualities, one 
whose mere physical presence alone was adjudged an inappropriate use of the 
ground being taken up. For those unfamiliar with Australian culture, the 
language used here is instructive insofar as it reflects the inherent irreverence 
of the national psyche, an irreverence that is particularly conspicuous in respect 
of the general attitude to formal authority. Eight supervisors at Agritest were 
assigned to this unprepossessing category, which if somewhat insignificant in 
absolute terms takes on a more concerning profile when viewed in percentage 
terms. The best way to gain an understanding of the full extent of the perceived 
vacuity of this style of managerial supervision is to explore the manner in which 
the other two categories came to be differentiated. 
3.343 Distinguishing Real Leaders from OK Basses 
Real Leaders can be distinguished from OK Bosses on two grounds. 
They were seen to establish strong bonds with subordinates, and were viewed 
as reliable helpers and coaches. Within the Agritest culture the most distinctive 
feature of those considered Real Leaders was an empathetic and caring attitude 
in respect of their subordinates. They appeared both able and willing to identify 
with and respond to the psychological needs of others, that is, they seemed in 
touch with their motivational, emotional and related needs. To demonstrate this 
capacity they needed to show, at least occasionally, something of their own 
"humanness". This necessitated showing, for example, some sign of their own 
105 Let me remind the reader that these three supervisory designations came from Agritest 
staff. The exact differentiation came in the latter part of the second year of the study when 
focus group sessions were being conducted. 
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vulnerability in respect of what was going on around them, together with a 
sense of their personal hopes or fears for the future. Moreover, they had to be 
able to demonstrate the depth of their caring and concern for the wellbeing of 
subordinates. The latter learn more readily, accept directions, and at the same 
time feel more personally secure and committed, when the leader displays this 
type of concern and commitment. 
By contrast, OK Bosses were seen to show empathy and caring, but only 
up to a point. Their lack of depth in this respect was reflected in two specific 
tendencies. One was a proneness to show or express emotion in a bleating way 
without seeming to possess an ability to channel it into some purposeful or 
assertive response. The second was evident in the tendency, seen in many, to 
show their care and concern for subordinates while "things were going OK", but 
to allow this to become severely diluted in the face of external demands. 
A widespread manifestation of this took place during the two post-
takeover periods when strong pressure came on from corporate headquarters to 
elevate productivity and reduce costs. Many of those in the OK Boss category 
were seen to "show their true colours" at this juncture. The extent of their 
concern for others' wellbeing became noticeably weaker. They seemed unable 
to reconcile competing demands. Real Leaders, however, seemed able to 
promote the legitimate call for greater personal effort from subordinates while 
maintaining the same level of sensitivity and compassion for them, especially in 
these more stressful times. In summary, both Real Leaders and OK Bosses 
would typically display an empathetic and caring attitude to subordinates on a 
day by day basis. The distinguishing feature was the consistency and reliability 
of the former in never wavering from true commitment to these values. 
On a related dimension both Real Leaders and OK Bosses displayed a 
pattern of holding strong views on what needed to be done. Both would espouse 
active personal conviction towards the achievement of these ends, which in turn 
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were typically seen by subordinates as worthwhile and relevant. Indeed, both 
would typically work hard and persistently in their pursuit and lead by personal 
example. Again the difference manifested itself in relation to degree of 
conviction and depth of courage. When confronted by adversarial forces those 
categorised as OK Bosses tended to buckle under their weight, often moving to 
behaviours that were inconsistent with the espoused position, including 
excessive bossiness, sulking, testiness, et cetera. In these situations they 
tended to demonstrate stronger allegiance to the primacy of their own personal 
agendas-self-protection, self-promotion, self-aggrandisement, self-protection, 
et cetera-than to the democratic values to which they were overtly committed. 
They were seen to lack the courage of their convictions, whereas the Real 
Leader generally was not found lacking in this regard. Along similar lines, the 
latter was seen to display consistently high levels of professional honesty. This 
manifested in four main ways. 
First, they were courageous in and adroit at ensuring that the legitimate 
needs and concerns of all categories of stakeholder received appropriately 
balanced attention. Organisational managers typically must serve the interests 
of several stakeholder categories, and typically these interests are not 
conveniently and felicitously aligned. For instance, shareholders are looking for 
maximisation of profit; employees are looking for long-term employment 
security and maximisation of income; banks are looking for evidence of ability 
to service loans; customers are looking for the best possible deal and superior 
service levels. It often takes great skill on the part of a manager to ensure that 
some reasonable form of alignment is being brought to bear. In this respect, 
the Real Leader could be seen from time to time to take a position not obviously 
in the best short-term interests of subordinates. When they took such a 
position, however, they would take the time to explain the reasons for it. OK 
Bosses for their part were much more likely to align themselves, at any given 
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point in time, with the stakeholder capable of wielding the greatest amount of 
influence over their own personal best interests. 
A second manifestation of the professional honesty of the Real Leader 
occurred in respect of strategies selected to achieve nominated goals. Typically 
Real Leaders would not allow ends to justify means, especially in respect of the 
particular manifestation of this encapsulated within Kant's Categorical 
Imperative. 106 This was less frequently the case with OK Bosses, who were 
more prone to manipulate or deceive when self-interest came into conflict with 
professional objectivity. Third, Real Leaders could typically be counted on to 
give credit willingly to subordinates for either individual or group achievements. 
More important, perhaps, was their commensurate tendency to accept 
culpability on behalf of the group when, for instance, targets were not met. OK 
Bosses, in contrast, were more flexible and inconsistent in respect of the credit-
blame trajectory. The fourth and final way in which the display of professional 
honesty was observed to vary between Real Leader and OK Boss revolved 
around the sharing of information. For their part, Real Leaders generally 
seemed unconcerned about the prospect of losing personal power in virtue of 
sharing information to which they were privy. They seemed quite happy to trust 
the integrity and sense of responsibility and confidentiality of their subordinates 
with such information, showing no apparent concern regarding how the act of 
sharing might in some way diminish or threaten their personal power base. OK 
Bosses again showed much less resolve and consistency in this respect. They 
could from time to time be seen to withhold information altogether, or to 
106 An expression of Kant's Categorical Imperative is "Act so that you treat humanity, whether 
in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.": (Two 
qualifying comments are needed, however. First, this is not the only version. Kant himself 
also offered this alternative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can, at the same 
time, will that it should become a universal law." Second, while the author considered these to 
be substantively similar, subsequent interpretations are, by no means, in agreement on this. 
For a discussion of this point, see D. J. O'Connor, A Critical History of Western Philosophy, 
(New York, NY: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 308-313 
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release it in a controlled or contrived way, when doing so would serve their own 
personal best interests. 
In summary, it might be said that while OK Bosses and Real Leaders 
could both display many of the same characteristics, the former tended by and 
large to give mixed messages. They typically showed less consistency in the 
manner in which they lived out their espoused values. When short-term 
expediency or personal self-interest came into conflict with espoused positions 
or group wellbeing, the former tended to take precedence over the latter. Not 
so with Real Leaders, who rarely if ever were seen to compromise themselves in 
this way. In respect of this important differentiation platform, the Agritest 
investigations identified one further significant finding. Rank and file employees 
were prone to become fatigued by the behaviours of OK Bosses. The constant 
need to be vigilant about their motives and tactics served to sap their energy, 
enthusiasm, and ultimately their sense of commitment to those individuals. 107 
Both the motives and behaviours of Real Leaders in contrast required no such 
second-guessing. In consequence, their subordinates had more psychic energy 
available to put into purposeful, value-adding activities. 
Let me remind the reader of the claim made earlier to the effect that 
Real Leaders can be distinguished from OK Bosses on two grounds: the extent 
of the psychological bonds established with subordinates, and the latter's 
perception of them as reliable helpers and coaches. Thus far I have examined 
the evidence supporting the first of these. It is time now to turn to the second. 
It will come as no surprise to be told that Real Leaders were invariably seen as 
willing to provide technical on-the-job support to subordinates, particularly 
when the latter were under pressure to meet performance deadlines and so 
1°7 It is interesting, in relation to this point, that some individual respondents said they 
found it less tiring working for the Waste of Space than the OK Boss, the former being 
nothing if not predicable, albeit in unsavoury ways. 
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forth. Likewise it would be unsurprising to discover that Real Leaders were 
willing to coach subordinates in the sense that a football coach works with 
players, honing individual skills and fostering teamwork. In fact, at Agritest 
those classified as OK Bosses often did both these things. 
The manner in which subordinates ultimately drew the distinction 
between the two is most telling, however, and goes a long way towards shaping 
an outsider's understanding of how true leadership was perceived in that 
context. One way of grasping the essential difference is to think of OK Bosses 
as liking the fact that subordinates were dependent on them: on their 
knowledge, their superior technical skills, their broader base of experience, their 
stronger personal power base, et cetera. 1°8 In contrast, Real Leaders seemed 
keen on promoting the autonomy and self-sufficiency of subordinates, on 
emancipating them from any undue form of dependency on themselves or each 
other. Indeed, whereas OK Bosses tended to view subordinates as important 
but by and large instrumental cogs in the system, Real Leaders saw them first 
and foremost as individual human agents. In consequence of this different 
fundamental perception, they tended to view the coaching agenda as one 
established primarily around a need to develop their subordinates as people 
rather than as functionaries, as human beings with individual needs based on 
their unique patterns of individuality. 
One way in which this difference in primary perception (as unique 
individual versus instrumental cog) manifested itself was via the manner in 
which Real Leaders tended to fade into the background while at the same time 
remaining totally cognisant of the psychological economy around them. They 
unobtrusively stayed connected with the problem-solving challenges facing their 
subordinates, knowing as if by instinct when to step in with advice or other 
forms of assistance. OK Bosses on the other hand were typically much less 
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attuned to these psychological subtleties, often falling into traps like over-
coaching, meddling, or taking charge prematurely and thus disempowering 
subordinates. 
3.35 Re-interpreting leadership in light of these findings 
The opportunity to observe supervisory practice in a systematic way over 
an extended period of time, and in circumstances so marked by the effects of 
large-scale organisational change, provided a remarkable window into the 
nature of leadership. Being involved in the process of phenomenological 
enquiry - where actual leader-follower relations were experienced firsthand - 
facilitated arrival at a depth of insight not matched during my prior excursions 
into the literature. Two conclusions can be drawn at this stage about 
organisational leadership in the context of my overall argument. The first 
serves the important purpose of providing that argument with a stronger sense 
of justification than might otherwise have been the case. Stated simply, the 
Agritest experience succeeded in demonstrating the extent to which effective 
leadership matters, especially in circumstances characterised by the turbulent 
forces of change. 
In saying this, I am drawing specifically on the distinction made by the 
Agritest community between Real Leaders and OK Bosses. When times are 
tough, pressures mount and stress levels soar. Individuals struggle to cope as 
the cumulative effects of exponential change are experienced. They invariably 
turn to their supervisors for guidance, support, encouragement and example. 
When these are forthcoming, it has the not inconsequential effect of lessening 
the burden, albeit often at a purely psychological level. But, as was made clear 
at Agritest, a large part of what leadership is about concerns the psychological 
economy obtaining between supervisor and subordinate. 
108 It has to be said that in many cases the OK Boss would give freely of these gifts. 
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My second conclusion builds on the previous point, insofar as it involves a 
teasing-out of the nature of this psychological economy. Let me remind the 
reader that the Agritest study served to show, to a degree not made explicit for 
me by the literature, that leadership can be distinguished from other modes of 
supervisory practice in virtue of two main characteristics. These were (a) the 
nature of the psychological bonding between the parties and (b) the degree to 
which the supervisor is willing and able to act as coach and mentor. Let me now 
extend this analysis beyond the point arrived at earlier. 
I believe the claim can viably be made that willingness to follow arises in 
response to worthiness to lead. To offset a possible objection regarding the 
stating of a truism, the matter needs further exploring via the question of what 
gives rise to worthiness to lead. My experiences at Agritest suggest that two 
principal variables come into the equation: confidence and trust. The idea of 
having confidence in one's supervisor was a regularly raised parameter in 
discussions concerning the difference between Real Leaders and OK Bosses. 
When asked to expand on this, respondents often spoke in terms such as 
"feeling comfortable with" the supervisor because of her obvious abilities. A 
variant on this was a reference to her as someone with a "commonsense" or 
"no nonsense" approach. 
Further delving brought to light a more specific explanation. When 
pressed, it seemed that validating supervisors in respect of being confidence 
inspiring had a lot to do with their perceived levels of technical competence. 
The notion of "technical" in this respect had two dimensions to it. In the first 
instance it was used in reference to the specific work being conducted by the 
team in question. One scientist said of his immediate supervisor, whom he 
classed as an OK Boss, "He's a nice guy and we all like him, but Jeez, he's a 
hopeless scientist. There's really no point in asking his opinion on anything 
technical". The other meaning of "technical" related to the technicalities 
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associated with managerial work, of which the following response was 
illustrative. "He has no idea how to prepare our business plans and budgets. 
We get into strife regularly with the brass over this. The problem is that it 
reflects badly on all of us." Another example of lack of confidence in a 
supervisor's perceived managerial competence can be seen in the following 
reference to poor capacity to coordinate and monitor: "She always gets the 
rosters messed up. And then, when she eventually gets them out, she's dismal 
at getting us to keep to them." 
Interestingly, however, a third area of competence considered "non-
technical" also came to light. This was the perceived ability of Real Leaders to 
communicate well with subordinates. When explored further in personal 
interviews, this turned out to have three components to it. In the first instance, 
and very importantly, effective communicators were considered to be "good at 
really listening to what I have to say". On probing precisely what this meant, 
the picture became perfectly clear during one particular interview. The 
respondent said that she often encounters people who do one or other of three 
things. They either (a) listen with judgement, (b) listen with cynicism, or (c) 
listen with envy. This was her way of saying that they did not really "hear" 
what she was saying. They missed her intended message because her words 
were being filtered through the listeners' various mental paradigms. 1°9 These 
can be thought of as unconsciously held assumptions, preferences, ideological 
biases, emotional biases, and so forth. As such, they go unchallenged by the 
individual concerned who, by definition, is unaware of holding them. While 
judgement, cynicism and envy were the specific factors pinpointed by my 
respondent, it is not difficult to identify various others which would similarly 
result in the corruption of a listener's ability to hear the intended message. 
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Listening with anger, resentment, contempt are further examples that 
immediately spring to mind. On reflection, then, I came to the conclusion that 
effective listening might be described as the ability of the manager to hold a 
balanced perspective in respecting the validity of a subordinate's point of view, 
irrespective of whether in agreement or not with it. In this sense, it might be 
further concluded that it amounts to a willingness to listen non-judgmentally 
and with empathy. 
A second indicator of effective communication ability, in some respects an 
extension of the first, related to the manner in which Real Leaders seemed able 
to encourage subordinates to be forthcoming on a range of issues. On one 
occasion this was described in the following terms: "Something I like about 
Francine (her supervisor) is that she's quick on the uptake. If something is 
bothering one of us in the department, all we have to do is drop a slight hint. 
She has this great ability to make it easy for us to spell it out to whatever level 
of detail is necessary. Even if this involves an implied criticism of her, she 
makes it easy for us to say what's on our mind." 
This capacity was seen to involve not only an ability to commence by 
listening non-judgmentally and with empathy, but the further ability, via 
appropriate questionning technique, to elicit more information. It was 
interesting to note that the additional information thus elicited often provided 
the listener with insights into the emotional as well as cognitive consciousness 
of the subordinate. 
Regarding the issue of performance-related communication, Real Leaders 
were seen to keep subordinates informed on how they were doing. They 
seemed comfortable in providing either positive or complimentary feedback on 
109 Refer to Kuhn's discussion of paradigms in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, 2nd edition, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970. See in particular 
pp. 43-51. 
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the one hand, but also in drawing attention to concerns about inadequate 
performance. Moreover, they tended to raise these concerns at an early stage, 
thus obviating the more embarrassing and traumatic side effects of drawing 
attention to poor performance when "things had gone too far". An interesting 
and, for me, unexpected characteristic of these effective performance 
communicators was their apparent willingness to take as well as give feedback. 
"My department head encourages me to tell her how well or otherwise I think 
she's performing in her role as my boss. She says that in the same way that I 
have responsibilities to be a good employee, she has responsibilities to be a 
good boss." This sort of openness to reciprocal feedback was very much at 
variance with the more standard experience within Agritest. The majority of 
managers and supervisors did not invite feedback on their own performance. 
When questionned as to why this was, by far the most common answer 
approximated to, "To be honest, I've never really thought about asking for 
feedback." This, in itself, was insightful, suggesting not so much an 
unwillingness to accept feedback as a total lack of recognition of why being 
willing to ask for it might contribute to the communicative relationship with 
subordinates. 
Real Leaders within the Agritest culture thus characterised themselves as 
people capable of inspiring confidence in their subordinates, confidence that was 
grounded in a range of competencies displayed by them. Related to this, but 
comprising a different set of forces, was their ability to inspire trust. This turns 
out to be an unsurprising finding when looked at in light of the emerging 
literature on leadership ethics. Ciulla, for instances, argues that ethics is not 
just a peripheral dimension of leadership; rather, it lies at its very heart. She 
provides a hint as to what she means by this in further asserting, "A good way 
to learn about leadership is to examine how trust is earned and given within a 
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leadership community. no As we shall see, trust is indeed central to my overall 
argument. But, as Solomon and Flores correctly point out, discussions about it 
tend to be replete with cliches and platitudinous exhortations, but notably 
lacking in the provision of any substantive insight into its nature or scope. In 
an attempt to avoid falling into the same trap, I will provide a more 
comprehensive account of the nature of trust in Chapter 4. 
3.4 Invoking Literary Licence 
3.41 Introduction 
I adopt the term 'literary licence' to refer to the idea of seeking meaning 
and understanding through devices such as myth, archetype and metaphor. I 
do this for two reasons. First, such devices can be important in getting at the 
emotional elements involved in ethics and leadership. Second, they are 
common means employed by people to understand and interpret their own life 
experiences. 
Unlike scientifically grounded empirical evidence that points directly to 
meaning and comprehension, literary devices generally do so in an indirect way. 
Indeed, certain philosophers have long seen merit in the method and used it to 
good effect. In introducing Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and 
Literature, Nussbaum for instance says: 
... there are some views of the world and how we should live in it—
views, especially, that emphasize the world's surprising variety, its 
complexity and mysteriousness, its flawed and imperfect beauty-that 
cannot be fully and adequately stated in the language of conventional 
philosophical prose-a style remarkably flat and lacking in wonder-but 
only in a language and in forms themselves more complex, more 
allusive, more attentive to particulars."' 
110 Joanne B. Ciulla, Introduction, in Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of Leadership, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. xv-xix. 
I" Martha Craven Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature, (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 3. pp. 102-103. 
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In the paragraphs that follow, I intend to invoke all three devices 
mentioned for the purpose of further exploring the nature of managerial 
leadership, towards the eventual end of understanding it sufficiently well to 
draw out its ethical intricacies. 112 I start with what I believe to be an instructive 
metaphor. 
3.42 The metaphor of ecological literacy 
As we saw in §3.2, the Agritest study gave a palpable face to various 
realities of organisational work life in this country at the present time. For 
present purposes let me remind the reader of just two of these. We noted (a) 
the extent to which the modern workplace environment is being shaped by the 
impact of rapid and recurring change, and (b) the extent to which the 
contemporary managerial ethic is in thrall to an ethic of economic rationalism. 
This has prompted some observers to invoke the metaphor of ecological literacy 
for the purpose of drawing attention to the need for a certain reform of 
managerial and leadership consciousness. 
Natural ecosystems that have not been compromised distinguish 
themselves in virtue of an ability to flourish over time, while simultaneously 
serving a life-giving or life-affirming purpose. They achieve this by allowing all 
participating subsystems to flourish in turn. Now consider the idea of the work 
organisation as a ecosystem. In this metaphor, the organisation, as a totality, 
is made up of various interdependent subsystems. Thus, the technological 
subsystem is dependent on (a) the research and development and (b) the 
capital funding procurement and budgetary subsystems. The manufacturing 
subsystem is dependent on the technological subsystem. 
112 Another contemporary philosopher who values metaphor for purposes of ethical 
enquiry is McCollough. See, for instance, his segment, "The Metaphor as Model", in Thomas 
.E. McCollough, The Moral Imagination and Public Life: Raising the Ethical Question, (Chatham, 
NJ: Chatham House Publishers Inc., 1991), pp. 102-103. 
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The finance and accounting subsystem is dependent on the information 
management subsystem. (The list of illustrations for a modern complex 
organisational entity is way too long to attempt to present in its entirely.) But, 
of course, all organisational subsystems are dependent on the human 
subsystem. 
Now consider the situation at Agritest. While a programme of relentless 
change was being conducted over an extended period of time (e.g. several 
changes of owner, the introduction of systems of performance management and 
quality control, et cetera), senior management was simultaneously engaged in a 
process of "bogus empowerment" 113 . Agritest employees, however, were not 
stupid. They understood what was taking place and responded by becoming, in 
line with Lambkin's suggestion, both passive and conformist in outlook. 114 The 
company was being driven by a philosophy of unchallenged economic 
rationalism. No suitable critique was forthcoming from members of senior 
management because they remained oblivious to the nature and extent of the 
problem. Meanwhile, rank and file employees were feeling the deleterious 
effects, but remained silent in consequence of a passive and conformist outlook 
born out of an accumulating and deep-seated cynicism. 115 
113 This is the term used by Ciulla to describe those instances of corporate rhetoric that seek 
to convey to employees the feeling of being licensed to express themselves fully and 
completely while on the job. Meanwhile, the norms that constitute observable management 
behaviour are clearly at variance with the rhetoric. Typically, in such situations, two 
outcomes can be predicted: (a) the employees are not fooled; (b) they become even more 
cynical or demoralised than they might otherwise have been. See Joanne Ciulla, Leadership 
and the Problem of Bogus Empowerment, Joanne B. Ciulla (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of Leadership, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. 63-86. Ciulla's notion of "bogus empowerment", in this 
respect, is akin to what Willmott refers to as "corporate culturism". See Hugh Willmott, 
Strength is Ignorance; Slavery is Freedom: Managing Culture in Modern Organizations, Journal of 
Management Studies, 30:4, 1993, pp. 515-552. 
114 K. Lambkin, The Hegemony of Rationalism and its Influence on Organizations, ALAR Journal, 
Vol. 3, (1), 1998, pp. 3-18. 
115 Within the Australian corporate idiom (which will be discussed in more depth in 
Chapter 5, the irreverent term for this process is the "BOHICA management style", 
where BOHICA stands for 'Bend over, here it comes again!' 
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The situation may be summarised by saying that in failing to see the 
organisation as an ecosystem, senior management missed certain key 
indicators. They failed, as Passfield notes, "... to acknowledge 
interdependencies, the centrality of relationships, the impact of negative 
feedback loops on morale and spirit, the need for diversity and the capacity to 
recycle human creativity into more productive pursuits." 115 Moreover, when 
there is the suffocating reality of economic rationalism in combination with 
bogus empowerment, one inevitably ends up with a damaged ecosystem. As 
Lambkin suggests, one outcome is likely to be the marginalisation of human 
qualities such as "... spirit, common sense, doubt, perception, faith, emotion, 
intuition, experience; and a denial of our most important instincts — the 
democratic, the practical, the imaginative." The antidote that is needed is that 
of 'ecological literacy'. 117 
Capra defines ecological literacy in the following terms. "Being ecologically 
literate, or 'ecoliterate', means understanding the principles of organization of 
ecological communities (i.e. ecosystems) and using those principles for creating 
sustainable human communities." 118 He goes on to argue that at least four key 
principles are involved. The first involves keeping in mind the inherent 
interdependence of the constituent subsystems; to see the challenges to be 
faced in 'win-win' terms. The second holds that as all human communities are 
made up of webs of relationships, to nourish the community is to nourish the 
constituent relationships. The third points to the cyclical nature of ecological 
maintenance, in the sense that nutrients are continually in motion. The outputs 
of one subsystem act as food for another. There are no waste products or 
116 Ron Passfield, The Challenge of Ecological Literacy, keynote presentation to ATICCA '98 
(national conference of the Australasian Tertiary Institutions Commercial Companies 
Association), 1998, p.2. 
117 Ibid., p.6. 
118 Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life: A New Synthesis of Mind and Matter, (London: Flamingo, 
1997), p.289. 
101 
rejects in nature). Finally, ecology respects and values the notion of diversity, 
as this is the factor that produces richness and sustainability. 
In light of the above, it might be suggested that ecological literacy is a 
quality needed for effective organisational leadership. To understand why this 
is so, consider Lambkin's suggestion to the effect that economic rationalism is 
based on what he terms a "deficit mentality'". 11g This is the term he uses to 
indicate the idea of an 'either-or' mentality. Thus, for me to win, you have to 
lose. For me to be perceived as successful, you must be deemed a failure. A 
deficit mentality also manifests as an obsession with certainty, haste and 
efficiency; a fixation with specialist knowledge, control, structures, 
quantification, and with the supremacy of the intellect over emotion and 
instinct; and a denial of history and essential human qualities. But we know 
from Agritest that this kind of deficit mentality management led to ecological 
breakdown. By definition, therefore, something different is needed to produce a 
different outcome. 12° 
3.43 Archetypes 
3.431 Introducing the notion 
Archetypes may be thought of as patterns of instinctual behaviour that 
are contained in and representative of what Jung called the collective 
unconscious. This is an idea not dissimilar from that of the Platonic Form. Just 
as. for Plato, every horse we encounter in the natural world is but an imperfect 
representation of the ideal Form, horse, so it is with archetypes. What we 
encounter in actual world of human affairs are but individual representations of 
original patterns or models of how people respond to life. The word archetype 
119 K. Lambkin, The Hegemony of Rationalism and its Influence on Organizations, ALAR Journal, 
Vol. 3, (1), 1998, pp. 3-18. 
120 The reader will recall the discussion of Blank's "natural laws" theory in §2.34. I draw 
attention to this because his suggestion that leadership can be understood by reference to 
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is derived from the Greek arche, meaning original or primordial, and tupos 
meaning imprint or image. Thus, we might say that archetype means an 
imprint of the original. 121 
The language of archetypes is the language of symbols, and it is 
symbolism that imbues them with their power. A word or an image is symbolic 
when it points to something beyond itself, that is, beyond its obvious and 
immediate meaning. Thus, from the work of Freud, Jung, Adler and other 
leading continental exponents of depth psychology in the early part of the 
twentieth century, we know that archetypal images become manifest at the 
personal level in dreams, visions, and fantasies. At the collective level, they can 
be glimpsed in tradition, metaphor, liturgy, ceremony, ritual, rites, folklore, 
fables, legends, religion, occult, epics and sagas, mystery cults, fairy tales and 
the like. 122 
The general concept can readily be illustrated by referring to the age-old 
notion of the warrior archetype. This depicts what is nowadays colloquially 
referred to as the 'macho man'. 123 In the managerial realm in contemporary 
Australia, this archetype remains alive and well. It is immediately recognisable 
the notion of a 'dance', is suggestive of someone with a grasp of what is here being referred 
to as ecological literacy. 
121 For McBride, archetype means primordial image or form. See T. McBride, The Dream 
Time of the Aborigines and Present Day Australia with Special Reference to the Role of the 
Healer. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, C.G. Jung Institute, Zurich, 1979. O'Connor 
(1985) views archetypes as the dispositions to act, into which people pour specific 
images from life experiences, from birth through to death. See P. O'Connor, 
Understanding lung, Understanding Yourself, (North Ryde, NSW: Methuen, 1985). 
122 See, for instance, the account given in J. Houston, The Art and Science of Human 
Transformation. A workshop conducted at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, 
sponsored by the Institute of Cultural Affairs, April 1990. 
123 The warrior archetype, as we shall see later in the chapter, is typically associated either 
with males, or more subtly, with the masculine dimension of the psyche. In the last twenty- 
five years, however, the feminist movement has given spawned some changes in this 
respect. "Zena — The Warrior Princess" is an expression of this. 
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in the feisty, authoritarian, aggressive boss who is constantly "in your face". 124 
While these characteristics suggest a negative persona, the warrior is typically 
respected on account of his fearlessness in the face of adversity, ability to 
thrive under stressful conditions, and often a strong empathy for those whom 
he considers to be weak and downtrodden. As Passfield points out: "The warrior 
is renowned for his capacity to follow battle plans, focus on achievements that 
have external value, and dismiss anything that smacks of weakness or 
vulnerability. /425  For their part, in their interpretive commentary on the 
application of the famous Homeric myth to the practice of modern 
organisational leadership, Latemore and Callan depict Odysseus as someone 
who is the embodiment of the virtues of courage, persistence, and relentless 
commitment to the achievement of his goals. As they say: "Modern 
interpretations of the heroic leader often show an individual who fights the 
dragon, wins the treasure, and returns home triumphant." 126 
There are, of course, times when these unabashedly 'manly' traits may 
be entirely appropriate. For instance, when things are predictable and stable, 
or when there is a need for quick performance turn-around, strong, decisive 
leadership tends to become appropriate. 127 But, as was amply demonstrated at 
Agritest, in times of change, unpredictability, ambiguity and cultural 
ambivalence, the warrior mentality, on its own, is neither sufficient nor 
appropriate. Something more, rather than something else, is needed. I28 To 
understand what needs to be added, it is useful to turn to the heroic archetype. 
124 Associated with this are various organisational aphorisms such as: (a)"It's my way or the 
highway"; (b) "Hey, if you don't like the heat, get out of the kitchen"; "Nice guys finish 
last". And so forth. 
125 Ron Passfield, The Challenge of Ecological Literacy, keynote presentation to ATICCA 
'98 (national conference of the Australasian Tertiary Institutions Commercial 
Companies Association), 1998, p.6. 
126 Latemore and Callan, 2000, p.3. Add ref. 
122 Refer to Coleman. 
128 While this represents my own experience, not only at Agritest, but in many other client 
situations, a corroborating account can be found in Cairnes. See M. Cairnes, Approaching the 
3.432 The heroic archetype 
To examine this, let us turn to what is arguably the most well-known of 
all traditional accounts, that of Homer's account of the Odyssean hero and 
heroine. In the Odyssey, Homer gives an account of Odysseus' journey home, 
having led an attack against his enemies at Troy. 129 During the twenty-year 
saga that follows, Odysseus finds himself confronted by most of life's 
quintessential human challenges. For instance, he must face up to the fear and 
terror he feels when threatened by the powerful and vengeful Cyclops. He must 
deal with temptation at several levels: the advances of the nymph Calypso; the 
allure of the Sirens encountered during his visit to Hades; and the possibility of 
a hedonistic but ultimately meaningless life offered on the idyllic isle of Aeolia. 
In addition, he must dig deep to figure a way past the twin threats of the 
monster Scylla and the whirlpool, Charybdis. 
In terms of how he handles these challenges, Odysseus's response can 
be interpreted on at least two levels. In respect of the first, we see behaviours 
corresponding very much to the warrior profile discussed above. And, of course, 
this profile can be interpreted so as to fit comfortably with the philosophy of 
economic rationalism. After all, it views the marketplace as a battlefield, the 
competition as the enemy, and strategy formulation in terms of pinzer 
movements and capturing the territory. Nevertheless, while extolling these 
virtues as heroic, Homer manages subtly to mask, from a merely superficial 
reading, an additional message. This suggests that such virtues often conceal a 
fundamental commitment to patriarchy, force, control, and a purely 
instrumental view of the value of human relations. 
Corporate Heart: Breaking Through to New Horizons of Personal and Professional Success, (East 
Roseville, NSW: Simon and Schuster, 1998). 
129 Homer, The Odyssey, translated by Robert Fitzgerald, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1961). 
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As with the authors of all great literature, Homer's depth of insight into 
the human condition allows for the possibility of much more than mere 
superficial level interpretation of an obvious message. While the Odyssey can 
indeed be interpreted at the level suggested above (there is, after all, 
bloodshed aplenty and an apparent emphasis on winning), there is a great deal 
of complexity associated with both the characters in the drama as well as with 
the story per se. As Latemore and Callan (Ibid: p2) point out: "It is clear that 
Odysseus is not a typical "grunt". There is nothing simple about Odysseus 
(Ulysses). He differs from the typical warrior hero, such as Hercules. Rather, 
Plato regarded Odysseus as a polutropos, that is, a person who displays 
versatility and complexity." (Original underlining.) To get a clearer idea of 
what a more well-rounded archetypal structure might look like - what might be 
termed a polutropic characterisation - let us consider how one author has 
enlarged the profile beyond the virtues associated with the warrior. 
According to Pearson n° , the heroic may be thought of as represented by 
four distinct archetypal manifestations: warrior, king, lover, and magician. 
These represent four distinct but complementary aspects of our humanness: 
courage, worldliness, sensibility, and wisdom. Moreover, we each possess 
elements of all four. Interestingly, two (courage and worldliness) are seen to 
represent the masculine part of human nature, and two (sensibility and 
wisdom) the feminine. Thus, the admonition to develop all four should be 
interpreted as a statement supporting equality of the genders. Having already 
dealt with the warrior, let us examine the other three. 
The 'king' in each of us represents the ability to see things holistically, to 
see the 'big picture', to take the 'helicopter view'. Kings have acquired the 
experience to know that it is not sensible to jump to hasty conclusions. 
130 Carol S. Pearson, Awakening the Heroes Within: Twelve Archetypes to Help Us Find Ourselves 
and Transform Our World, (San Francisco: Harper, 1991) 
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Likewise, they recognise the validity of other perspectives, and dismiss them 
only with the benefit of careful evaluative scrutiny. Odysseus learned about 
'king' nature during his encounter with Scylla and Charybdis, when 
resourcefulness and common sense were needed to make hard choices, to steer 
himself, as it were, between a rock and a hard place. Moreover, as Latemore 
and Callan (Ibid: 3) put it, the worldliness of the king can be called upon to tell 
the warrior "... when to attack, when to retreat and when to form alliances." 
The 'king' is also the respecter of ideals, including those of fair play, honesty, 
honour, and respect for 'the other'. Odysseus discovered the 'king' during his 
encounter with good-living and morally righteous Phaeacians. 
The 'lover' nature in each of us represents, in its most transparent 
manifestation, so-called 'feminine' traits like sensibility, sensitivity, sympathy, 
empathy, and a capacity to express one's feelings. This is the part of himself 
called forth by Odysseus' encounter with the bewitching Sirens of Hades. At a 
slightly deeper and more opaque level of manifestation, this is the ability within 
us to live life to the full, to find joy and optimism in every circumstance, even 
the dull and mundane. This was part of his lesson on Aeolia. The 'lover' in 
leaders is what gives them their ability to promote authentic relationships, to 
foster collaboration, team spirit and a sense of belonging; and, this is what 
gives them their ability to build high-trust communities. 
Finally, our common 'magician' nature, represented by Odysseus' 
encounter with the cunning sorceress Circe, speaks to the human capacity for 
wisdom. This can be thought of as the outcome of a distillation process that 
includes components of information gathering, knowledge accumulation, and 
reflection on one's own experiences and those of others. The magician knows 
that the world is full of ambiguity, ambivalence and paradox, but is comfortable 
with those conditions. The reason for this is that the magician possesses the 
necessary complexity of character to recognise that life is rarely lived at the 
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polarities, but instead at varying points along the continuum. Thus, the leader 
as magician knows when to be mentor, coach, facilitator or director, and knows 
when it is appropriate to step back and allow others to emerge into leadership. 
But Odysseus discovered something else during his encounter with Circe. 
He discovered the value of time spent in solitude. This is where reflective 
ability can be cultivated, away from the hustle and bustle of the many other 
demands that keep the warrior, lover and king preoccupied with their passions, 
their predilections, their projects, their hopes, and their fears. 
3.5 Re-interpreting Leadership 
What can be discerned about the nature of leadership in consequence of 
the richer picture presented by the two humanities-centred streams of enquiry 
pursued above? 131 While potentially many individual suggestive insights could 
be nominated, they can be slotted into two separate groupings for purposes of 
facilitating the present analysis. First, leadership is clearly about the special 
ability possessed by some managers (the co-called Real Leaders from Agritest) 
to forge strong and lasting emotional bonds with their constituents. Second, it 
is more a 'mindset' than the possession of specific qualities or the ability to 
demonstrate certain behaviours. Let us examine each in turn. 
3.51 Leadership and emotional bonding 
The traditional literature characterised leadership as essentially about 
the ability of one person (the leader) to influence others (the followers), in non-
coercive ways, such that the latter would willingly follow the lead and example 
of the former. (Bass sums this up with the suggestion that, at the end of the 
131 I use the term "richer" here to convey some idea of the more thought-provoking insights 
produced, as compared to the somewhat arid and formulaic picture portrayed in the 
specialist O&M literature. 
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day, leadership is a "social-influence process". 132 ) In the managerial context, 
this was seen to have much to do with the sort of vision or goal to which the 
leader was palpably committed and the means chosen to achieve it. The ethics 
of leadership, on this view, can be uncontroversially reduced to the extent to 
which both the vision and strategies chosen could be designated as morally 
problematical or otherwise. With few exceptions (those referred to in Chapter 2 
as the 'systemic' models, most of the O&M works tend to reduce the social 
influencing process to groupings of traits or behaviours. As I conceded at the 
time, this perspective on the nature of leadership is not an invalid one. But it is 
partial or incomplete. This is especially so in light of the extent to which the 
emotional bond between subordinates and their managers was seen to be a 
determining factor in decisions about which of the latter would make it into the 
category of Real Leader. 
Leadership, on this view, has little to do with charisma, charm, style, or 
even capacity to excite and inspire. Instead, it has a lot to do with the ability to 
build bridges, give hope, to build a community to which individuals feel they can 
belong, to support and facilitate, and to provide principled example. This is 
about emotional bonding because, at a very simple level, followers feel 
comfortable, motivated, secure, connected, and safe in such an environment. 
And, such feelings are nothing if not important manifestations of emotional 
responsiveness. 133 
132 Bernard M. Bass, The Meaning of Leadership, in J. Thomas Wren, (ed.), Leader's Companion: 
Insights on Leadership Through the Ages, (New York: The Free Press. 1995), P.  38. 
133 A good account of the extent to which this is the case can be seen in Justin Oakley, 
Morality and the Emotions, (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 6-37. It should be pointed out, 
however, that there is more to human emotion than the purely affective or feeling 
component described here. But, for present purposes, it is enough to say that these 
subjective feelings are clearly part of emotional experience. 
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3.52 Leadership as a 'mindset' 
I drew attention in Chapter 2 to the fact that the O&M tradition likes to 
view itself as part of the social scientific tradition, often with over-reliance on 
the scientific element. As such, I concluded, in addition to an over-reliance on 
the hypothetico deductive method of enquiry, it also tends to produce some 
sterile and formulaic representations of its various constituent topics. When the 
topic under review is an aspect of organisational work or life that readily lends 
itself to this paradigm, then there is no problem (e.g. efficiency measurement, 
variance monitoring, and so forth). But when the topic is the emotion and 
value-laden field of leader-follower relations, then these kinds of 
representations can appear facile and out of place. 134 Moreover, in its pursuit of 
scientific or quasi-scientific answers, the tradition has also tended to produce 
listings, again as seen in Chapter 2. Indeed, it is difficult to avoid scientific-style 
outcome representations when the philosophy and methodology employed are 
that way inclined. 
The methods employed in this chapter — those employed within the 
humanities tradition — necessitate no such intellectual gridlock. Instead, the 
insights gained enable me to suggest leadership be viewed in an entirely 
different way, that of leadership as mindset. What I mean by this can be 
summarised as follows. The real world of supervisor-constituent relations, as 
was amply demonstrated at Agritest, is not one replete with predictability and 
clarity. On the contrary, it is more akin to a frog than a bicycle, as Mant points 
out. 135 It tends to be more adequately characterised by ambiguity rather than 
134 While much of the traditional O&M literature has been this way inclined, there are 
exceptions. The systemic models discussed in Chapter 2 are examples. So is the work of 
some isolated authors. Zaleznik, for instance, sees leadership as based on a compact that 
binds those who lead with those who follow into the same moral, intellectual and 
emotional commitment." See Abraham Zaleznik, The Leadership Gap, Academy of 
Management Executive, (4, 1), 1990, p. 12. 
135 Alistair Mant, Intelligent Leadership, (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1997), pp. 51-62. 
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clarity, difference rather than sameness (gender, ethnicity, education level, et 
cetera), the unexpected rather than the predictable (e.g. the second Agritest 
take-over hot on the heels of the first). 
To be somebody capable of surviving and prospering in such a world, 
and in particular to be somebody capable of influencing others in such an 
environment, it is necessary to be adaptable enough psychologically to cope 
with the ambiguity, the difference, and the unexpected. And to be such a 
person typically requires the ability to 'see things' in a certain way. In fact, I 
would argue that the Agritest Real Leaders consistently showed an ability to see 
things both inclusively and expansively. In other words, being a leader 
amounts to possessing what I call an inclusive-expansive mindset. 136 
To possess an inclusive-expansive mindset is to be someone with high 
levels of empathy, to have the ability to 'put yourself in the other person's 
shoes'. To possess it means to be someone who typically is willing to 'include' 
rather than exclude others as a primary response, especially those who are 
different from the subjectively determined norm. At a fairly basic level, this 
means an ability to dispense with arrogant, self-indulgent delusions of 
grandeur. (Not one of the PhD level scientists at Agritest made it into the ranks 
of Real Leaders. A key reason was their perceived unwillingness to identify with 
- in some cases, even associate with - any staff member other than those 
holding similar qualifications. 137 ) To possess an inclusive mindset is to be 
demonstrably willing to give others, as one's primary response, the benefit of 
136 In making this point, I am working from both intuitive and informed perspectives. 
Intuitively, most people would readily accept that how we see things is determined by our 
underlying mindsets (worldviews, assumptive models, weltanschauungen, are alternative 
words used). But, for a theoretical vindication of this point, from an educational 
psychology perspective, see Jack Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning, 
(San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991), pp. 37-63. 
137 Members of this group typically take their morning break together at a trendy local 
coffee-house, even though there is an on-site canteen that everybody else is expected to use. 
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the doubt. To possess it means an ability and willingness to suspend judgement 
and not jump to hasty conclusions. (For instance, one Waste of Space manager 
at Agritest was known to summarily dismiss any job applications from 
Queenslanders, on the basis that "they're all lazy bastards up there".) To 
possess an inclusive mindset is to be able to see possibility where others see 
limitation. 138 
Part of the effectiveness of those holding the inclusive-expansive 
mindset is associated with the complementary nature of their good qualities, or 
virtues. For instance, while it is easy for some individuals to be naturally 
assertive and forthright, and for others to be by nature empathetic and caring, 
it takes a special sort of individual to be capable of consistently demonstrating 
both in tandem. Some managers find it easy to detach from emotional 
engagement and to offer a highly objective and cool-header analysis of the 
'facts'. Others, in contrast, can immediately appreciate the psychological forces 
at play in a dispute and leverage this insight to de-escalate an otherwise 
emotionally explosive situation. Again, it is much less common to find the 
manager who can combine an appropriate degree of detached cool-headedness 
with adequate psychological sensitivity, plus a propensity to act in a balanced 
manner. But these are the sorts of qualities that characterise the kind of 
person others are willing to follow. 
The claim, assuming it is reasonable, that to be considered a leader is to 
be someone who consistently demonstrates the ability to see things in an 
inclusive-expansive way, and then to act on accordingly, is a far-reaching one 
Moreover, it was unheard of during my period at Agritest for anyone outside this group to 
be invited to join it on such occasions. 
138 In an interview with journalist Polly LaBarre, management specialist Peter Koestenbaum 
talks about the importance to leadership of the capacity for spaciousness. He views this as 
the ability to have ample room for the ambiguities of the world, for conflicting feelings, for 
contradictory ideas. His use of this term is not dissimilar to my idea of the inclusive- 
for my overall argument. As this argument requires arriving at a defensible 
position on what it means to possess ethical sensibility, then the inclusive-
expansive thesis must be accommodated within it. 
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expansive mindset. See, Polly LaBarre, Have You the Will to Lead? in Fast Company, edition 
of 30 November, 2000. 
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Chapter 4 
Unravelling the Ethical Intricacies 
4.1 Introduction 
4.11 Key tasks 
The reader will recall from Chapter 1 that my primary concern in this 
essay is describing how to design and implement a programme to elevate the 
levels of ethical sensibility among the ranks of Australian managerial leaders. 
In the intervening chapters I have explored the nature of leadership through a 
variety of lenses. In discovering that much of what the traditional O&M 
literature has to say on the topic is only marginally useful to my overall 
argument, I was forced to employ a humanities-centred enquiry process to 
bring the topic into clearer conceptual focus. This enabled me to arrive at the 
conclusion, at the end of Chapter 3, that leadership is perhaps best understood 
as a form of 'mindset'. It is now time to deal with the question of what is 
meant by ethical sensibility in light of such a characterisation. More 
specifically, what should we take it to mean, in contemporary Australia, for an 
organisational manager to possess and/or display appropriate ethical sensibility 
in discharging the leadership component of the role. 139 In working towards 
this end, I will keep in mind an important secondary assignment, namely, 
attempting to gain some preliminary insights into the relevant developmental 
implications. 
'" I remind the reader of the description provided in §1.12 (Chapter 1) showing the 
classical breakdown of managerial work into the four domains of planning, organising, 
coordinating, and leading. And the fact that it is only the last of these in which we are here 
interested. 
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4.12 The prima facie complexity of the ethical domain 
The account offered in the previous two chapters provides strong 
suggestive evidence supporting the claim that managerial leadership is a highly 
complex notion when viewed from the perspective of its ethical implications. 
Even more compelling is the evidentiary support available in the growing, if as 
yet inchoate, literature on leadership ethics. One way of attempting to draw 
together the disparate pieces in the puzzle is to examine the competency 
structure of managerial leadership. 
By 'competency structure' I mean the collective of individual 
competencies that constitute actual leadership work. Towards this end, I bring 
to the reader's attention one such profile developed at Agritest, the outcome of 
one specific component of the overall investigative process. 14° This model 
holds that the effective practice of leadership can be encapsulated within a six-
component structure, as follows: 
There are five identifiable application competencies: 
ci Providing focus and direction 
ci Building effective teams 
ci Facilitating individual and group motivation 
ci Leading the process of change 
ci Handling conflictual situations 
Each of these is in turn underpinned by the core competency of: 
ci Effective interpersonal negotiation 
Given the conceptual complexity associated with leadership per se, it is 
hardly surprising that a corresponding amount of complexity might be expected 
in the leadership ethics literature. In fact, it throws up a confusing array of 
disparate variables, among them questions of duty, obligation, trust-building, 
140 The background to and constitution of this model will be described in detail in Chapter 5. 
trustworthiness, virtue, vice, charisma, the common good, power, motivation, 
emotion, role modelling 141 , to name but some. In fact, I believe that an 
important caveat needs to be drawn to the attention of the unsuspecting 
student exploring this literature for the first time. It derives not so much from 
the sheer miscellany of variables involved, and their disparateness. Rather, it 
has to do with the fact that many of them are conceptually problematical in 
their own right. By this I mean that in tackling them, presumably in the hope 
of clarifying one's understanding of the ethics of leadership, one often ends up 
with the waters somewhat muddied. Examining the roles respectively of 
charisma, power, and human emotion can have this effect. Let me expand 
briefly on the three concepts in support this claim. 
4.121 Charisma 
It is virtually impossible to find an O&M account of leadership that does 
not attempt to convince the reader of the importance of charisma as a quality 
needed for its effective practice. For instance, much of the discourse in 
respect of the "great man" theory tends to rely heavily on the fact that such 
outstanding individuals have or had 'charisma'. Discussions of Churchill, 
Napoleon, even Hitler, often follow this pattern. In the contemporary context, 
arguments about Bill Clinton's leadership qualities often get reduced to 
discussions about his charisma. 
While I do not doubt the existence of charisma as a quality possessed by 
some individuals, I retain serious reservations concerning its relevance to a 
discussion of leadership, not to mention the ethics of leadership practice. To 
illustrate the nature of this reservation, let me draw attention to the notion of 
'celebrity status'. 
141 Gini refers to this as "the witness of another", in language perhaps a little in line with 
the philosophical vernacular. See Al Gini, Moral Leadership and Business Ethics, in Joanne B. 
Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of Leadership, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), pp. 27-46. 
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To have 'celebrity status' means, when you reflect on it, little more than 
being famous on account of being famous. It seems like a good thing to 
possess, but its foundations are conceptually slippery. Indeed, to have 
celebrity status suggests nothing about the moral status of the individual. It 
certainly is not a quality that one can unreservedly associate with people of 
high moral principles. In fact, some murderers, rapists, and corrupt 
government and industry figures acquire the status. It might be said, in 
consequence, that 'celebrity status' is a morally vacuous notion. 
This short account of the way I perceive the concept of celebrity status 
can be thought of as reflecting my views on charisma. While the concepts are 
not related per se, I believe they both share the characteristic of being 
vacuous, certainly in respect of ethical discourse. Leaving aside the question of 
whether or not charisma is relevant to a discussion of leadership ethics (which I 
clearly think it is not), I would claim that it says little or nothing about an moral 
make-up of an individual agent, under any circumstances. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned, it often comes up in texts on leadership analysis. As such, I claim, 
it serves only to 'muddy the waters' for those in search of conceptual clarity. 142 
Moreover, as we have seen, professional philosophers with an interest in 
managerial leadership, all see it as a morally laden enterprise, involving, as it 
does, the need for consideration of the reasons why one person freely chooses 
to follow the example of another. 143 
142 I am not alone on this matter. Solomon, too, wishes to have no truck with it in the 
leadership context, likewise considering it to be a morally vacuous notion. See, Robert 
Solomon, Ethical Leadership, Emotion, and Trust: Beyond "Charisma", in Joanne B. Ciulla, 
(ed.), Ethics: The Heart of Leadership, (Westport, CT; Praeger Publishers, 1998). In particular, 
see pp. 94-98. 
143 Let me remind the reader that Ciulla sees leadership in the following terms: 
"Leadership is not a person or a position. It is a complex moral relationship between 
people, based on trust, obligation, commitment, emotion, and a shared vision of the good." 
Ciulla in her own Introduction to Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of Leadership, 
(Westport, CT; Praeger Publishers, 1998), p. xv. Another philosopher, Al Gini, sees it as 
follows: "Leadership is a power- and value-laden relationship between leaders and 
followers/constituents who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes and 
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4.122 Power 
Another individual concept in leadership ethics that has significant 
inherent complexity is power, and the use/abuse thereof. Gini is one 
philosopher who grapples with this topic, arguing: "All forms of leadership must 
make use of power. The central issue of power in leadership is not, Will it be 
used? but rather Will it be used wisely and well." 144 This latter question is 
sufficient, on its own, to keep a bevy of philosophers busy with subsidiary 
problematic questions to do with the nature of what constitutes and wise and 
good use of power. The word power comes from the Latin, posse. Among its 
meanings are the capacities to influence, to change, to effect, to bring about. 
Leaders, as we have seen, clearly do all of these. But it is the manner in which 
they achieve their desired outcomes and effects, through others, that give rise 
to contentious issues. 
Straight-out malevolent dictatorial leadership is the least of concerns for 
the ethicist in this regard. The ethical question is here quite simple. To use 
personal or positional power, in a dictatorially malevolent way, is never going to 
be ethically defensible. The complexity arises, as it often does in organisational 
settings, when such power is wielded in subtle or camouflaged ways. For 
instance, the manager who drops a hint to his female subordinate that her 
propensity for career advancement will be influenced by the degree of her 
willingness to perform sexual favours, is guilty of such a moral indiscretion. 
Another example of questionably ethical power dynamics involves what Ciulla 
calls "bogus empowerment". 145 
goals." See, Al Gini, Moral Leadership and Business Ethics, in Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: 
The Heart of Leadership, Westport, CT; Praeger Publishers, 1998, pp. 34-35. 
144 Ibid., p. 38. 
145 Joanne B. Ciulla, Leadership and the Problem of Bogus Empowerment, in Joanne B. Ciulla, 
(ed.), Ethics: The Heart of Leadership, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), pp. 63-86. 
One version of this, not uncommon in Australia during the 1990s, 
involves senior-level 'leadership' rhetoric as follows: "This organisation 
considers people to be its first and most important asset. As such, we value 
and respect the individual capacity for creativity and innovative thinking. We 
want each of you to use that capacity to shape the future of our organisation." 
Meanwhile, back in the world of actual day-to-day management practice, what 
one sees is an altogether different picture. Instead of managers actively 
leading by example in respect of the 'empowerment' of individual subordinates, 
they act instead to restrain, or at least discourage, individual innovativeness. 
At the end of the day, not all empowerment programmes are either instigated 
or directed by managers with bogus or malevolent intent. But, as Ciulla points 
out, in order for this not to happen, those managers must be "... sincere and 
authentic". I will discuss the nature of these qualities further in Chapter 5. 
4.123 Emotion 
According to Wilson (2001), the topic of human emotion sits side by side 
with consciousness as one of the most impenetrable and controversial topics 
considered within both philosophical and psychological enquiry. 146 It continues 
to resist efforts to secure any form of unified theoretical framework, and 
remains largely refractory to attempts to arrive at the ultimate definition. One 
reason for this resides in the fundamental mind-body dichotomy that continues 
to bedevil much of the discourse in the disciplines of both psychology and 
philosophy. In consequence, there are theories that broadly derive from the 
evolutionary trajectory comprising animal-past to human-present, emphasising 
a necessary physical basis for emotions. In contrast, there are theories that 
disclaim any such continuity, suggesting, in consequence, that emotions should 
be grounded within cognitive rather than physical structures. 
146 Bruce Wilson, Emotional Experience. Unpublished Masters Dissertation, University of 
Tasmania, 2000. 
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An especially interesting manifestation of this duality can be seen in the 
Western philosophical tradition. There are philosophers, on the one hand, who 
view emotions as no more than disruptive or destructive forces that invade our 
lives, serving no other purpose than that of compromising and inhibiting our 
attempts to be the purely rational agents we are supposed to be. In contrast, 
there are others, from Aristotle in ancient Greece to Solomon in contemporary 
North America, who take the view that emotions enrich our lives, 
psychologically and morally. They argue that behavioural responses resulting 
from the engagement of both heart and head - from the interplay of emotion 
and cognition - tend to prove optimal in most situations. 
By and large, it can be said that there are two generic contexts within 
which the term emotion is used in the contemporary anglophone world. The 
first is as an all-encompassing designation that covers any of a number of 
subjectively experienced inner states. These may be felt as pleasant or 
unpleasant, good or bad, desirable or undesirable; but all are subjective, with 
an ontological status governed by nothing more systematic than some sort of 
cultural consensus. This is the context within which I might say that I am 
feeling sad, lonely, angry, disgusted, excited, joyful, and so forth. The second 
covers the various streams of scientific enquiry that seek out physiological, 
cognitive, anthropological, or environmental bases for the subjective uses 
employed in the former context. Of the two, it is the latter that causes most 
confusion. Each definition seems to come in the form of a mini-theory, and the 
plethora of resultant positions seems to offer precious little theoretical 
converge. Notwithstanding this, it is possible to suggest that theoretical 
investigations by and large revolve around four factor sets: (a) instigating 
stimulus; (b) psycho-physiological correlation; (c) cognitive assessment; and 
(d) motivational force. 
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In order for an emotion to occur, there needs to be an instigating 
stimulus. This can fall under one of two generic categories. An exogenous or 
external stimulus represents a circumstance, event or occurrence that happens 
outside oneself. The individual then interprets and attributes a meaning to the 
event, which determines a resultant "feeling" accompanied by a range of 
physiological changes. The latter in turn act as an impulse to action. Thus, as 
I walk along a bush track during an Australian summer, the sudden appearance 
of a snake in my path initiates the following response. I interpret its presence 
as a threat to my physical safety. I become agitated, start sweating and 
hyperventilating, and experience sudden palpitations (accompanied by an 
elevation of blood pressure). Then, dependent on whether fear promotes a 
phobic (flight) or counter-phobic (fight) impulse, I either run away or grab the 
nearest stick to beat the reptile away. In contrast, an endogenous stimulus 
comes from within in the form of a thought sequence, a memory recall, or an 
episode of imaginative speculation. Thus, what starts out as a simple reverie 
about an event that occurred during a holiday to Copenhagen in 1974, turns 
into the onset of deep sadness when I recall that on returning home my mother 
unexpectedly passed away. The more I allow myself to dwell on this latter 
recollection and to re-create my feelings at the time, the more intense will be 
the emotional experience. (By and large it is fair to say that most people enjoy 
feeling pleasant emotions such as contentment, joy, optimism, but often try to 
avoid others like loneliness, worry, and grief.) 
The physical symptoms described in the above example constitute one 
expression of the meaning and relevance of so-called psycho-physiological 
correlation in emotional response. As Porges points out, psycho-physiologists 
see themselves as systematic investigators of mind-body relations. 147 In the 
context of emotionality they concentrate their attention on two generic 
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categories of reaction that occur in response to the instigating stimulus. The 
first involves what might be termed the macro perspective, involving systems-
level investigation of reactions occurring within and between the central 
nervous system and the autonomic nervous system. Falling under this category 
are those reactions that tend to be readily identifiable by the subject 
experiencing the emotion, and indeed by those observing the subject in the 
throes of that reaction. For instance, were you to observe me encountering the 
snake, you would readily notice obvious signs of agitation, including the 
sweated brow, fearful facial look, involuntary regressive movement, and so 
forth. The second reaction category involves the micro perspective. Here they 
focus on minute intra-brain activity not revealed via any outward signs. 
Interactions stimulated between the thalamus and hypothalamus constitute an 
example of this type. It is perhaps noteworthy that the psycho-physiological 
dimension in the study of emotion, on account of its greater susceptibility to 
empirical scientific investigation, may appear less contentious than others 
highlighted here. Not so, according to Wilson, who provides ample evidence to 
suggest that there is at least as much divergence of opinion within this sub-
community of specialists. 
The cognitive assessment component considers a range factors that 
affect the subjective nature of emotional responsiveness. High on the list is 
recognition of the fact that one's interpretation of a given situation will 
determine, to a significant degree, the specific emotions aroused and the extent 
of their potency. Thus, if confronted by precisely the same snake in a glass 
cage at the Reptile House of Melbourne Zoo, my emotional response will be 
altogether different from that experienced on the walking track. 
1 " S. W. Porges, Orienting in a Defensive World: Mammalian Modifications of our Evolutionary 
Heritage; A Polyva gal Theory, Psychophysiology, 32, 1995, pp. 301 -317. 
The fourth and final dimension identified here relates to the motivational 
force implicit in the notion of emotion. That an emotion can motivate action is 
an entirely intuitive proposition requiring little theoretical justification. The 
onset of acute anger generally manifests as an act of speech, of retaliation, of 
physical attack, and so forth. The intuitive connection can, however, be 
theoretically grounded by simply noting the Latin derivation of the word 
emotion. It comes from emovere, which translates as to move, to excite, to 
stir up, or to agitate. 148 Thus, the onset of an emotion, particularly a potent 
one, typically has the effect of stimulating or motivating responsive action. 
4.124 Concluding comments 
In this section I have attempted to show that the ethical domain of 
managerial leadership is a complex field of enquiry, even when the nature of 
managerial leadership per se is quite narrowly and carefully circumscribed. 
This was done by drawing attention to just three of the many individual 
variables involved in the overall intricate matrix of interacting forces. Complex 
as the picture appears to be at this juncture, it becomes even more so with the 
juxtaposing of these individual factors on to the leadership competency 
structure shown in Figure 4.1 above. This leads one to conclude that, for 
practical purposes, it is important to find a way of making the overall picture 
less complex and impenetrable, as movement is made towards formulating a 
definitive conceptualisation of what is meant by ethical sensibility. 
Before tackling this via the identification of a suitable unifying theme, 
there is one further introductory task that needs to be undertaken, that of 
pointing out the difference between simple and difficult moral choices. 
198 A supporting account of the Latin root can be found in Arthur S. Reber, The Penguin 
Dictionary of Psychology, (London: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 234. 
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4.13 Focus on difficult ethical discriminations 
I have made it clear already in this chapter that I in restricting myself to 
leadership practice, I am consciously excluding from consideration any 
attention to the ethical intricacies of the other three components of 
management work: planning, organising, and coordinating. I wish to narrow my 
focus further by eliminating from consideration all those cases where the ethical 
judgements that have to be made are simple and straightforward in nature. 
To illustrate what I mean, consider the case of the chief executive officer 
(CEO) of a chemical research corporation that operates in the field of biological 
agents. It is a leadership task to ensure that the corporation has a suitable 
strategic vision. Suppose the CEO were to articulate it as that of doubling 
revenues and earnings, within a two-year period, by tapping into lucrative 
opportunities associated with the sale of biological warfare capabilities to 
international terrorist organisations. Few would argue with the claim that such 
a vision is deeply flawed from a moral perspective. It should not require a 
great deal of consideration on the part of the CEO to arrive at such a 
conclusion. As Kekes points out, in such a case, the average person can 
reliably depend on nothing stronger than his or her moral intuitions. 149 
But what of a less clear-cut situation? Take the case of the respective 
CEOs of two construction corporations, each about to articulate a corporate 
vision around opportunities associated with major humanitarian-agency funding 
for the building of hospitals in third-world countries. CEO #1 nominates his 
vision in the following terms: "Let's get in, build the assets as quickly and 
efficiently as possible, so we can get out of these hell-holes in double-quick 
149 He makes this point during a discussion of the difference between simple and complex 
moral discriminations. I will return to consider Kekes' work in greater detail in Chapters 6 
and 7. His conception of what constitutes complex moral choice is especially relevant in a 
world of fast-paced change. See, John Kekes, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1995). 
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time, with as large a profit margin as possible." In contrast, CEO #2 nominates 
her position as this: "My vision is for each of us to feel that we've left behind an 
enduring legacy of our individual efforts, which in turn are the result of the 
special knowledge and skills we are fortunate to possess. Indeed, my further 
hope is for that legacy to be by way of well-constructed hospitals that 
contribute to improving health-care standards for these underprivileged 
people." 
It is instructive to examine the difference between the two statements in 
terms of ethical implication. I believe most observers would be drawn to 
conclude intuitively that the second option represents the more ethical or 
ethical-sounding choice. But it is not quite so clear-cut when tackled from the 
perspective of what the Western philosophical tradition has to say. Within this 
tradition, there has always been a divergence of scholarly opinion as to the 
nature and scope of the ethical domain. (Some say that the territory can 
justifiably be characterised as a hot-potch of disagreement. 150 ) By way of 
introduction, and for purposes of expediting closure on the current stage of the 
argument, let us consider just three broad categories of ethical construction 
readily identifiable within Western philosophy. 
The first is a school of thought, associated most famously with 
Immanuel Kant, which holds that the morality of an action is not determined by 
its outcomes or consequences, but instead by the intentions behind it. More 
specifically, Kant argued, the morally appropriate intention is that of doing 
one's duty. A choice or action is adjudged ethical, therefore, if done from the 
perspective of wanting to do one's duty or fulfil one's legitimate obligations. 
Viewed from this perspective, it is unclear if choice #2 is, in fact, more ethically 
defensible than #1. While #1 has a harsh ring to it, there is no evidence to 
150 See, for instance, the first chapter in Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. (2nd Edition), (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). 
suggest that the CEO in question had any intention other than that of fulfilling 
the company's duty by way of its contractual obligations. 
Nevertheless, we suspect, from the words used, that the CEO's vision 
constitutes and ethically questionable choice. The reason lies in an important 
distinction intended by Kant. This draws attention to the fact that an agent 
may act in a manner that is outwardly in conformance with his duty, but 
nevertheless done from a camouflaged position of self-interest. Thus, CEO #1 
really is only interested in making as much profit as quickly as possible, not in 
ensuring his company fulfils its contractual duties and obligations. He is, 
arguably, acting more from a sense of commercial or personal prudence than 
that of duty. 151 But we cannot be sure of this. 
Contrast this with the position suggesting that the ethical course of 
action is the one delivering the best package of beneficial outcomes for the 
most number of people. (The various forms of utilitarianism, associated with 
such figures as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill fall into this category.) 
Leaving aside the obvious vexations associated with trying to agree on (a) the 
nature of what constitutes a 'beneficial outcome', (b) what constitutes 'best', 
and (c) how to assess the number of affected beneficiaries, the basic question 
of what constitutes the more ethical option is, in this instance, just as 
controversial as with the Kantian model. There is no obvious reason why #2 
generates more overall utility than #1. 
Now, let us contrast the above two ethical models with a third. This 
holds that the most defensible course of action is the one demonstrating or 
implying the greatest expression of personal virtue, a position perhaps most 
151 For a helpful discussion of this aspect of Kant's views on morality, see Roger Scruton's 
discussion in Roger Scruton, Kant, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
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famously associated with Aristotle and other Greeks of the same period. 152 The 
bothersome question of precisely what constitutes the nature of personal virtue 
notwithstanding 153 , it is only on applying this model to the two options under 
review that we can say, with some confidence, that #2 appears preferable to 
#1, on the basis of something other than purely intuitive grounds. 
It is to this latter type of case, where the question of what constitutes 
the most ethically appropriate leadership response is a complex, difficult, or 
challenging one, that I now wish to restrict myself. 
4.14 Towards a unifying theme 
In order to arrive at a plausible interpretation of ethical sensibility for 
managerial leadership purposes, I believe it is necessary to come to terms with 
the complexities described above. Failing to do so will likely cause the entire 
project of attempting to foster such sensibility, in the real-world context, to be 
transferred to the 'too hard basket'. (The reasons for this will become 
abundantly clear when we encounter the 'hard-nosed decision-maker' later in 
the chapter - see §4.4.) 
Of the various themes associated with the notion of leadership ethics, 
one stands out as especially noteworthy for my purposes, namely, trust. As 
part of the explanation for this choice, I begin by drawing attention to the work 
of German sociologist, Niklas Luhmann. Of particular interest to my enquiry is a 
discussion he undertakes in Trust and Power. Specifically, it relates to his claim 
that trust, in its broadest interpretation as confidence in one's expectations, is a 
"basic fact of social life". What he means by this can be summarised in the 
following way. We each exercise a certain amount of judicious discretion in 
respect of decisions regarding on whom we decide to bestow our trust, and to 
what degree. He argues, however, that it would be inconceivable to live a 
152 See, for instance, Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
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normal human life in the absence of any capacity for giving trust. As he puts it, 
"... a complete absence of trust would prevent [him] even from getting up in 
the morning. [He] would be prey to a vague sense of dread, to paralysing 
fears." 154 He goes on to say that such a condition would in fact preclude the 
possibility of being rationally distrustful, since any propensity for the latter 
would, by definition, assume a capacity to trust at least someone, sometime, 
which, by definition, has been discounted. On the basis of these foundational 
commitments, Luhmann goes on to argue that what he calls the "necessity of 
trust" can be taken as the correct and appropriate point of departure for the 
derivation of rules for proper conduct, for ethical maxims based on natural 
laws. While this is by no means an uncontroversial platform, it does serve the 
useful purpose of introducing a discussion as to the moral nature of trust. But 
as mentioned, Luhmann is primarily a sociologist. So, for my purposes, it is 
necessary to turn elsewhere to ensure validation for my choice. 
Given that moral philosophers have always been interested in 
cooperation between people, it is surprising, according to Baier, that they have 
paid so little attention to trust. She argues that neither Plato, in his conception 
of the philosopher king, nor Aristotle in his of the wise man, seem to place 
much importance on the degree to which either ideal personage is virtuously 
trustworthy. Nevertheless, she herself goes to make explicit the moral basis of 
trust, thus endorsing its legitimacy for inclusion in my current argument. 155 
She positions trust, not as a pre-requisite or necessary foundation for morality 
and a moral life, but rather as the epitome or culmination thereof. In other 
153 This topic will be taken up in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
154 Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, translated by Howard Davis, John Raffian, and 
Kathryn Rooney, (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1979). 
155 Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, in John Deigh (ed.), Ethics and Personality: Essays in 
Moral Psychology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 11-40. 
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words, for Baier, trust is essentially a moral notion because to become moral 
means to become trusting and trustworthy. 156 
A further source of relevant support for my decision to endow trust with 
a central role in a platform of ethical development can be found in Bok. She 
considers trust to be the essential component of any moral psychological 
environment conducive to human interests. As she puts it: "Whatever matters 
to human beings, trust is the atmosphere in which it thrives." 157 
Having addressed the issue of there being an adequate moral 
foundation to trust, I now offer three specific reasons for selecting it as a 
suitable unifying there for an effective ethics of leadership. To begin with, I was 
in a position to observe, at first hand, its pivotal role at Agritest. As the reader 
will recall, the existence of trust in the relationship between manager and 
subordinate was a principal determining factor in the latter being designated a 
Real Leader as opposed to merely an OK Boss. 
Then there is its prevalence as a theme in the literature, together with a 
number of hints as to its axial importance. Ciulla, for instance, offers two 
relevant examples, saying: (a) "A good way to learn about leadership is to 
examine how leaders give and get trust." And (b) "Trust has taken over from 
authority as the modern foundation of leadership." 158 Another philosopher 
with an interest in the ethics of leadership, Robert Solomon, sees it as 
fundamental to all interpersonal relations and as the "emotional core" of the 
156 Baier builds her position on that of Kolnai, who says: "Trust in the world, unless it is 
vitiated by hairbrained optimism and dangerous responsibility, may be looked upon not to 
be sure as the very starting point and very basis but perhaps as the epitome and 
culmination of morality." See, Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, in John Deigh (ed.), 
Ethics and Personality: Essays in Moral Psychology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), pp. 11-40. 
157 Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, (New York, NY: Pantheon 
Books, 1978). 
158 Joanne B. Ciulla, Introduction, in Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of Leadership, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. xvii. 
leader-follower relationship. 159 Bowie lends further weight, adding: 
"Management theorists have discovered trust. At the 1996 annual meeting of 
the Academy of Management, I believe there were more papers on this topic 
than any other - and most of those papers were not in sessions sponsored by 
the Social Issues in Management Division (where most business ethicists 
reside), but rather in mainstream sessions on strategy and organizational 
behavior. 160 
This fits with my own experiences in Australian consulting circles. Trust 
has become a 'hot topic'. But, to borrow Ciulla's phrase, members of the 
Australian business community (consultants, practitioners, management 
scholars, and so forth) quickly run out of steam when discussion extends 
beyond facile exhortations about either the importance of trust or the critical 
need to build more of it. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the only authority on 
trust regularly quoted on the local scene is Francis Fukuyama. The problem 
with this, as I will show later in the chapter, is that his account falls well short 
of what is required for serious philosophical enquiry into the role of trust in the 
in an effective ethics of leadership. 161 
A final reason for nominating trust for pivotal consideration relates to 
the fact that, as we shall see later in the chapter, the particular interpretation I 
argue for is one that allows for the relationship between trust and other 
relevant variables to be appropriately articulated. Chief among these are 
power, charisma, and emotion, each of which, as I mentioned above, are 
59 Robert C. Solon-ton, Ethical Leadership, Emotion, and Trust: Beyond "Charisma", in Joanne 
B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of Leadership, (Westport, CT; Praeger Publishers, 1998). See, 
in particular, pp. 98-104. 
160 Norman E. Bowie, Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective, (Malden, MA; Blackwell 
Publishers, 1999), p.30. 
16 ' Notwithstanding this reservation, some aspects of Fukuyama's interpretation will be 
leveraged to good effect later in my overall argument. For a summary account of 
Fukuyama's thesis on trust, as it applies to this essay, see §4.23 following. 
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among those topics that contribute to the complexity associated with the 
ethical domain of leadership. 
Before proceeding, let me draw attention to one further observation by 
Ciulla. She argues that a better appreciation of the nature of ethics and the 
ethical will tend, in turn, to engender a better understanding of the concept of 
leadership. As she puts it: "Leadership scholars know quite a bit about the 
psychology of leadership but very little about the moral implications of the 
relationships associated with leadership." She backs this up by presenting 
leadership as "... a complex moral relationship between people, based on trust, 
obligation, commitment, emotion, and a shared vision of the good." 162 In this 
chapter I wish to go one stage further, arguing that trust lies at the heart of not 
only a deeper understanding of leadership, but ultimately at the heart of its 
effective practice. 
It s true to say that the traditional O&M literature on leadership per se 
has not always paid a great deal of explicit attention to the centrality of trust. 163 
It is nonetheless reasonable to suggest that it is considered an implicit 
component of effective leadership in most plausible leadership theories, notably 
those designated earlier as falling into the systemic category. Thus, for 
instance, the ability of the leader to contribute to the fostering of trust is a 
tacit, if not explicit, feature of servant-leadership and transforming 
leadership. 164 The suggestive evidence thus points to the need for a more 
thorough investigation of the topic, and it is to this task that I now turn. 
162 Joanne B. Ciulla, Introduction, in Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of Leadership, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. xv. 
163 The reader will recall that in the accounts given in Chapter 2 of the various 'reductionist' 
theories of leadership, trust-building and trustworthiness were indeed mentioned, but only 
as individual items included in lists of representative traits or behaviours. 
164 The concepts of 'systemic' leadership theories in general, and the particular 
characteristics of the servant-leadership and transforming models, were all discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
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There are certain topics that can cause problems for the inexperienced 
research student on account of possessing one or both of two specific 
characteristics. The first relates to what may be termed their pan-disciplinary 
presence in the literature, and the second the maintaining of what I call a 
certain kind of seductive appeal. In tackling such topics, the student is apt to 
end up with a great deal of intellectual satisfaction, but also a raft of logistical 
problems in the form of too much information to be assimilated, too much time 
consumed, general heuristic overkill, et cetera). Trust is one such topic. It has 
been the subject of much investigation in the social sciences as well as the 
humanities. It pops up as a regular topic of enquiry for social psychologists, 
developmental psychologists, ethical philosophers, classicists, management 
theorists, sociologists, anthropologists, and no doubt others with whose work I 
am unfamiliar. And it possesses a great deal of inherent intellectual appeal. 
While the capacity to recognise trust in this light, and thus to anticipate 
the potential hazards, in itself goes a long way towards obviating them, they 
can be further side-stepped by commencing one's analysis with a clear and 
unambiguous agenda in mind. For my purposes, this is accomplished via the 
up-front articulation of two specific aims. The first is to present an account of 
trust that validates its selection for the pivotal role I am affording it. The 
second is to present the account in a manner that enhances readers' 
understanding of the role trust plays in an adequate ethics of leadership. 
4.2 Trust 
4.21 Introduction 
In this section I explore the nature of trust by conducting three overall 
tasks. As it is a widely used word in everyday conversation, and especially as it 
has become somewhat of a 'buzzword' in the Australian corporate vernacular, I 
begin, in §4.22, by looking at everyday use of the term. I then proceed, in 
§4.23 and §4.24 respectively, to describe the current theories by (a) 
Fukuyama, and (b) Solomon and Flores. 
4.22 Trust in vernacular usage 
Following a method favoured by Wittgenstein, I commence this analysis 
of trust by examining some of the ways in which the word 'trust' is used in 
common speech. Doing this serves two useful purposes. It assists in 
organising one's thinking in respect of coming to terms with a complex topic, 
and it throws up a range of issues that require some reflective consideration in 
order to achieve satisfactory understanding. There are many ways in which the 
word trust gets used in the everyday anglophone vernacular, some of which are 
clearly more relevant to the present argument than others. 165 Let us examine 
some of the more important of these. 
4.221 Trust as entrusting 
Consider the statement: "I have complete trust in Allah." This amounts 
to what is primarily an expression of faith, representing not only belief in the 
Islamic deity, but perhaps a wider acceptance of the existence of gods of 
individual preference. A related expression comes in the form of: "We have to 
trust the Pope's ability to make the right decisions because he is, after all, 
Christ's vicar on earth." In this statement we have the proffered affirmation of 
a church leader's trustworthiness that is underwritten by a certain respect for 
role or title, and appeal to tradition - what Giddens has called the "formulaic 
notion of truth". 166 This form of trust is generally experienced as a robust and 
tenaciously guarded emotional condition. It is important to recognise, however, 
that trust of this sort need not be rational, in the sense that supportive 
165 I discount, for present purposes, use of the word in a technical context, where such terms 
as trust companies or trust deeds have specific meanings in professions like law and 
accounting. 
166 Anthony Giddens, as quoted in Miles Little and Michael Fearnside, On Trust, 
Occasional paper. (Sydney, NSW: The Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, 
Department of Surgery, University of Sydney, 1997). 
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empirical proof may be neither available nor deemed necessary. Baier points 
out that this interpretation of trust rose to philosophical prominence with 
Aquinas and other Christian moralists during the Middle Ages. 167 (Indeed, there 
is an opposite side to the coin, suggested by the statement: "You know, I just 
don't trust politicians." This suggests, by dint of what Little and Fearnside 
would call its "perlocutionary force", a certain ideological basis that is just as 
lacking in rational grounding as the previously mentioned trust in the Pope's 
ability to make right decisions. 168 
Consider another statement: "As Americans, we feel we can trust 
President Bush to defend our homeland." Topical at the time of writing, the 
implication here is that Americans subscribing to this view have a certain kind 
of confidence in their President. Indeed, the statement suggests that President 
Bush can, with some high degree of predictability, be relied upon to take 
whatever actions are necessary to ensure the country is adequately defended. 
Moreover, he is being invested, albeit tacitly, with certain discreet virtues, for 
instance courage, reliability, stamina, and righteousness. 
A similar type of meaning can be seen in the following statement: "I am 
more than happy to trust myself to the care of Dr. John Smith, our family 
physician." Implicit in this is my confidence in him, or perhaps more correctly, 
in his professional acumen, where certain specific qualities or valued goods will 
be subsumed under the heading 'professional acumen'. 169 Examples would 
include such factors as his clinical competence, his network of appropriate 
referral contacts, a solid reputation in the locality, an affable bedside manner, 
167 Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, in John Deigh (ed.), Ethics and Personality: Essays in 
Moral Psychology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), P.  13. 
168 Miles Little and Michael Fearnside, On Trust. Occasional paper, (Sydney, NSW: The 
Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, Department of Surgery, University of 
Sydney, 1997). 
169 Note that this distinction, between trusting a person qua person, and trusting in his or 
her professional expertise, is an important one to which I will return later in the chapter. 
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his ability to put patients at ease, and so forth. This particular interpretation of 
trust derives, according to Baier, from the Socratic dictum that no person is 
ultimately self-sufficient. We depend on others for certain valued goods, 
whatever they might be. In this case, I am expressing my allegiance to Dr. 
Smith on account of his capacity to provide valued goods outside my own scope 
to administer to myself. Baier designates this type of trust as belonging to the 
"three-part predicate" variety: A trusts B with valued thing C. 17° 
From my perspective, each of the above examples of use of the word 
'trust' can be placed into the category of entrusting one's own welfare or 
wellbeing to another. Whether the principal motivation for that willingness 
resides in the trusted individuals per se, or in their capacities or acumen, the 
fact is that other persons have chosen to entrust themselves to their care. 
4.222 Trust and character 
In the previous examples there was, inter alia, an implied attribution of 
virtue to the trusted person. President Bush was seen as reliable, courageous, 
determined; Allah as merciful; Dr Smith as competent, sincere, caring, and so 
forth. This brings to mind a further type of colloquial usage, albeit one in which 
the constituent virtues are less easy to identify, because the insinuation is more 
holistic in nature. Consider the assertion: "I would trust Mary with anything." 
This clearly implies something more than the preceding expressions of trust. 
It, in effect, declares that Mary is to be respected on account of possessing a 
virtuous disposition or character. 171 
A related way in which the word is employed is one in which the relevant 
declarations contain an element of qualification. Consider the following 
170 Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, in John Deigh (ed.), Ethics and Personality: Essays 
in Moral Psychology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 11-40. 
171 This should be reminiscent of the point discussed earlier in the chapter concerning the 
virtue-based platform of Aristotelian ethics. This is a topic I will take up in greater detail in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
statement: "My new boss seems like an OK guy and certainly knows what he's 
talking about technically. However, while I trust him technically, I don't quite 
trust him, if you know what I mean." This should alert the reader to the need 
to take care to distinguish between having confidence in a person's abilities, 
and otherwise trusting her as a person. It also hints at a further insight, 
namely, that the presence or absence of trust are not absolute and mutually 
exclusive conditions. Instead, affirmations of trust or distrust are scalar. Trust 
has magnitude without having direction and, as such, can be qualified or 
measured by adding adverbs and adjectives. "I sort of trust him", "I'm not 
sure we can altogether trust last month's sales results", are examples of what I 
mean by this. 172 
One final example of colloquial usage, in which the relation between 
trust and character is clearly evident, can be seen in the following statement: 
"Bill Clinton was an effective President, a charming fellow, and basically a 
decent and compassionate human being, but I wouldn't trust him with my 
daughter." What we have here is an indication of some grounds for concern 
against a general backdrop of favourable impressions. More specifically, the 
implication is that while I trust Clinton in some respects - for example, in 
respect of his ability to manage the economy, to feel suitably compassionate 
towards the poor, and so forth - I have reservations about his commitment to 
marital fidelity. This hints at the possibility of some sort of foundational 
deficiency in his make-up that prevents one from fully trusting the man, what is 
commonly referred to as a 'character defect'. I will return to this point later in 
the chapter. In the meantime, I will draw attention to one further example of 
where character intersects with trust, this time with the notion of truth-telling 
also involved. 
172 The 'scalar' nature of trust is discussed by Solomon and Flores in Robert C. Solomon and 
Fernando Flores., Building Trust in Business, Politics, Relationships, and Life, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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Consider the following attempt by a corporate executive to 'sell' a 
subordinate on the benefits of transferring to a new location: "Joe, Melbourne 
is a great city and the entire move will work out really well for you and your 
family. Just trust me on this." 
Here we have the executive seeking Joe's agreement to the transfer on 
the basis of an appeal to some implied or tacit truth known only to the former. 
Perhaps more so than with any of the previous observations about trust, this 
one most readily establishes the link between trust and truth. Reinforcing this 
connection, one can consider the statement: "Joe long since ceased to trust his 
boss, because of his penchant for constantly telling lies." Confidence in the 
truthfulness of claims made by others is clearly a factor in our deciding whether 
or not to invest trust in them. 
4.223 Trust and the expression of hope 
A somewhat different sentiment to any of those implied in the foregoing 
accounts is captured in the statement: "I trust you will soon overcome your 
injuries and be back to full fitness." What is clearly being offered here, on one 
level, is an expression of personal goodwill - assuming the statement is being 
made sincerely. I would claim, however, that something else is involved, 
namely, an expression of hope. This brings yet another nuance of meaning to 
the term trust. It should be noted, however, that the manner in which hope is 
present in this particular example is suggestive of its attendance, albeit less 
obviously, in some of the earlier illustrations. For instance, in expressing my 
trust in President Bush to defend the homeland, I am also hoping it will happen 
if and when the need arises.'" 
A final example introduces the additional notion of trust being extended 
towards a 'thing' as opposed to a person. Consider the statement: "I trust the 
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QE II as a reliable, safe and enjoyable way of travelling between Southampton 
and New York." This use of the term identifies, as its object, the renowned 
ocean-going liner. As we saw earlier, we again have the notions of confidence, 
expectation, and hope being tacitly subsumed within the single term, trust. 
What the person making this claim is perhaps more accurately saying is: "I 
have confidence in this ship for the journey in question - confidence in its 
safety record, its comfort and amenities, and its reliability in departing and 
arriving on schedule. Moreover, I certainly hope that this voyage will not prove 
to be exception." 
4.224 Reflections on the examination of trust in vernacular usage 
The above discussion suggests to me that an appropriate way of 
analysing trust is to view it as manifesting in two distinguishable forms. The 
first is as an expression of one's confidence in the reliability, capability, and 
credentials of someone or something else; the second as a special feature 
restricted to the domain of inter-subjective relations. Regarding the first of 
these, it might be said that in order for the subjects to be willing to invest their 
trust in a person (Dr. Smith) or a thing (the QE II), the object will need to have 
earned that trust in some way. Dr. Smith will have done so in virtue of his 
medical degrees, his years of experience, complemented perhaps by certain 
personal characteristics such as his promptness in responding to calls, his 
confident demeanour, and his obvious clinical skills when treating patients. The 
QE II will have achieved it in virtue of its safety record, the many testimonials it 
receives from previous passengers, and in general on account of its 
"reputation". In this latter regard it should be noted that promotional 
campaigns (PR events, advertising, editorial publicity and so forth) are often 
intended to, and indeed succeed in, engendering a sense of trust in the 
targetted recipients. Thus, I could clearly express my trust in the QE II, and 
173 This implication of a strong emotional undertone to the notion of trust will be addressed 
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genuinely possess that sense of trust, without ever having personally travelled 
on her. In consequence of her trustworthy reputation, I decide to invest my 
trust and travel on her. 
The second form of trust is that restricted to inter-subjective relations. 
By this I mean that the platform on which trust is given and/or earned is that of 
the relations obtaining between people. While more than two people may be 
involved in such a platform, I will restrict myself to simple pairings for 
explanatory purposes. The distinction I wish to draw here can be understood 
by considering the following statement: "I trust Fred Johnson as a top-quality 
auto mechanic who is more than capable of fixing my car. However, I don't use 
him because he's completely unreliable; he makes compromises he doesn't 
keep, and tells blatant lies." What I am doing in this construction is making an 
important distinction between Fred as a technician and Fred as a person. 
Specifically, I might say that he is trustworthy as a mechanic but untrustworthy 
as a person. In drawing this line I am implying that he possesses virtuous 
qualities in one realm but not in the other. 
To begin with, it is clear that trust, as used in everyday language, has to 
do with expectation. Moreover, it contains at least three additional strands of 
connotative meaning. It has to do with faith and commitment, insofar as it can 
indicate allegiance to a tradition, a belief system or ideology, or some other 
system of formulaic knowledge. It is likewise clear that expressions of trust 
convey a sense of the confidence felt by the person trusting in the one trusted. 
Indeed, felt confidence can be directed towards an object (the QEII) as well as 
a person. Affirmations of trust are also seen to express a sense of hope or 
optimistic expectation on the part of the one doing the trusting. 
in more detail later in the chapter. 
These three manifestations of trust seem to share a number of things in 
common. For instance, they raise the question of whether trusting someone 
amounts to something more than mere reliance on them. They likewise raise 
at least the possibility of there being a 'gap' of some kind between truster and 
trusted, a gap born out of perceived differences in such factors as education, 
skill level, experience, capabilities, reputation, achievements, and so forth. 
This observation raises a subtle but nonetheless significant point in respect of 
the moral complexity of trust, namely, the extent to which trust is bound up 
with human vulnerability. More specifically, my investing of trust in Dr. Smith 
places me in a position of relative vulnerability in so far as the act of trusting 
implies a range of expectations on my part that, in dint of either his ill will or 
some other inadequacy, he might fail to meet. 
But thinking about trust as an active ingredient in determining the 
quality and texture of inter-subjective human relations that involve the sorts of 
variables mentioned above (expectation, faith, confidence, hope, and so forth) 
serves the purpose of highlighting an important insight from my perspective. 
This is the fact that while trust is intimately but not necessarily involved in 
human interrelationships, its existence, per se, does not render the relationship 
a moral one. As Baier correctly points out, there can be immoral as well as 
moral trust relationships. 174 First instance, you and I may well 'trust' each 
other - albeit in a minimalist sort of way - in the context of coming together to 
plan and execute an armed bank robbery. While recognising this point about 
the contingent nature of trust in human relationships, I would nonetheless now 
like to argue for a dismissal of all minimalist conceptions when thinking about 
the role trust plays in managerial leadership ethics. 
174 Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, in John Deigh (ed.), Ethics and Personality: Essays in 
Moral Psychology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 11 -40. 
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To explore why this is so, it is appropriate to draw attention to recent 
work by Solomon and Flores. To facilitate an expeditious account of the 
relevance of this to my overall argument, it is appropriate to begin by providing 
a brief review of the key points of their thesis, then turning to a form of 
contextualised interpretation. 
4.23 The Fukuyama thesis 
In Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, Fukuyama, 
writing as a political scientist and social commentator, makes a cogent case for 
the importance of trust as a form of "socio-political glue". In dire need of more 
of this glue, he contends, is contemporary Western civil society. In support of 
this position he shows how two critical played themselves out during the course 
of the twentieth century. On the one hand there was the emergence of a potent 
economic order built around the emergent phenomena of corporatism and 
globalisation. On the other there was the emergence and growth of a new 
socio-cultural phenomenon, rampant individualism. 
Corporatism is the term used by social commentators to refer to the 
arrival during the twentieth century of the giant corporation. In virtue of their 
size, complexity and power, these behemoths quickly demonstrated themselves 
capable of exerting inordinate influence, indeed control, over not only the lives 
of individuals (employees, consumers, citizens), but whole communities and 
societies. Some indication of the nature of this phenomenon is captured in the 
well-documented fact that the annual revenues generated by many of these 
large corporations (Microsoft being a prime example) greatly exceeds the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of many third-world nation states. 
Distinct from corporatism, but allied to it, is the phenomenon of 
globalisation. This is the term used to describe the virtual 'shrinking' of the 
world. New technologies in information processing, communication, and 
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transportation have combined to bring about a situation where business is 
being conducted on a global scale with apparent ease and transparency. Less 
than fifty years ago children, even in so-called developed countries, would have 
reacted with awe at the prospect of speaking by telephone to someone on a 
different continent. Nowadays the phenomenon of globalisation means that a 
lawyer dictating a letter in London can have it typed and back on her desk for 
editing and signature within minutes, notwithstanding the fact that the typing 
has taken place in Hong Kong. Thus, globalisation refers to the virtual 
diminution of the world. While this phenomenon can be seen to convey certain 
benefits, at least to certain stakeholders, it also has its drawbacks. Thus, for 
instance, while it is relatively easy nowadays for certain individuals or 
institutions to establish business operations just about anywhere of their 
choosing, the manner in which they do so can easily ignore cultural and social 
norms in the host community. 175 
The second of the two forces, the emergence of an ethic of 
individualism, represents a potent socio-cultural phenomenon that has gripped 
Western society during the twentieth century. Here we have the notion of 
individual agents coming to believe that, in virtue of their material prosperity, 
they carry no responsibilities in their lives over and above those they freely 
choose to assume. Within this ethic, appeals to traditional values, whether 
religious, ethnic, spiritual, or cultural are abandoned on the grounds that they 
are no more than forces that retard the prospects for individual progress and 
full personal emancipation. 
175 Excellent illustrations of what I am here referring to can be found in: (a) Richard E. 
Sclove, Democracy and Technology, (New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 1995); and in (b) 
Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology, 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
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Against this backdrop Fukuyama begins his analysis of trust by viewing 
society as made up of several constituent social layers, starting with the family 
unit and extending through various intermediate entities including businesses, 
voluntary associations, educational institutions, clubs, unions, media, charities 
and churches. Holding these layers together is a "glue", which is his primary 
metaphor for trust. It is a composite made up of the knowledge, values, 
norms, beliefs and virtues obtaining in the given social layer. Thus, he argues, 
the significance of trust resides in the fact that that it (a) holds together each 
individual layer, and (b) goes further to bind the respective layers one to the 
other. He defines it as "...the expectation that arises within a community of 
regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, 
on the part of other members of that community." It is useful here to note his 
qualification to the effect that trust is more than mere expectation of regular or 
predictable behaviour, for this may be dishonest or in other ways non-virtuous. 
It must be an expectation of honest, cooperative and ethically defensible 
behaviour. Encompassed within this conceptualisation of trust are norms that 
can range from what he refers to as "deep value questions" concerning matters 
like justice or the nature of God, through to those pertaining to purely secular 
considerations, such as standards of professional behaviour within different 
spheres of professional life. 
Notwithstanding the qualification inserted by Fukuyama regarding the 
nature of the expectation, I believe the flaw in his understanding of the 
meaning of trust revolves precisely around this attempt to restrict its meaning 
to psychological event of expectation. As I will show in §3.23 upcoming, trust 
is a much richer notion. 
But this deficiency in Fukuyama's overall thesis is by no means a fatal 
one, as it does not invalidate what is perhaps its most compelling contribution. 
This involves his account of the notion of "spontaneous sociability", something 
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he claims to be one particular expression of Durkheim's notion of "organic 
solidarity". 176 This is the term he employs to describe the capacity of 
individuals, operating outside the strictures of formal organisational or other 
social boundaries, to form mutually beneficial, cooperative and cordial relations. 
When enclaves of spontaneous sociability exist within broader social 
boundaries, such as those circumscribing a work group or business 
organisation, something he refers to as "social capital" begins to build up. In 
economic and accounting terms, capital items are found in the balance sheet of 
a business organisation, representing the accumulated value of shareholder 
funds invested therein. Fukuyama's notion of social capital does not appear in 
the balance sheet, but would represent, analogously, the composite value of 
collaborative human effort and creativity invested in the business. Thus, social 
capital is, according to Fukuyama "...a capability that arises from the prevalence 
of trust in a society or in certain parts of it. And, as the amount of social 
capital accumulates in the "balance sheet" of that society, it spawns not only 
greater productive potential but also an increase in civil and moral 
consciousness. 
The nature of the cause and effect chain that begins with the formation 
of trust and ends in civil and moral enrichment is of particular interest to my 
enquiry. There are two principal reasons for this. The first relates to the fact 
that, whether or not his position is ultimately tenable, taking the time to study 
and evaluate its constituent arguments does contribute insights that enrich 
one's understanding of role trust can play in the operation of effective human 
communities. The second and perhaps more important reason for my interest 
relates to a pragmatic concern. 
176 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, (London: 
Penguin Books, 1995), pp. 27-29. 
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At this stage, suffice to say that assuming his cause and effect reasoning , 
is robust, then it has the potential to assist me with formulating a plausible 
answer to a crucially important question. This is the one that inquires whether 
corporations might or should invest time, money and other limited resources in 
development programmes that aim to cultivate enhanced ethical sensibility on 
the part of those with leadership roles to play? I will return to this topic in 
Chapter 5. 
In summary, then, I have identified within the overall Fukuyama thesis 
two particular issues of relevance to my project. One relates to the matter just 
discussed. The other involves what I consider to be the limitations associated 
with his definition of trust as "...the expectation that arises within a community 
of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared 
norms, on the part of other members of that community." It is to a more 
comprehensive discussion of the latter that I now turn. 
4.24 The Solomon-Flores thesis 
4.241 Inadequate conceptions of trust 
During the course of their overall argument, Solomon and Flores make a 
range of claims as to the nature of trust and the developmental challenges 
relating to its systematic cultivation. (Indeed, they conclude their Introduction 
with a series of twenty-seven 'dot-points" intended to present, in precis, what 
they acknowledge to be the "...somewhat against-the-grain vision of trust we 
promote in this book." 177 It is, of course, neither practical nor appropriate to 
attempt a review of all twenty-seven elements in the limited space available 
here. 
177 Robert C. Solomon and Fernando Flores, Building Trust in Business, Politics, Relationships, 
and Life, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 13- 15. 
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Instead, I will focus on what is arguably their central thesis, around 
which all other claims tend to settle. This is the account presented of what 
they term "authentic trust". As a lead-in to articulating the meaning of this, 
they begin by outlining what they consider three widely held misconceptions: 
trust as a commodity, simple trust, blind trust. 
A prevalent misconception about trust, they suggest, involves viewing it 
as 'stuff', often in the form of a commodity that can be traded or negotiated. 
Among offending metaphors in this regard would be trust (a) as a form of social 
glue 178, (b) as a medium or conduit, (c) as a prevalent atmosphere, (d) as a 
cohesive bond, and so forth. Indeed, they claim that the unhelpful nature of 
this misconception is sometimes accentuated through viewing the commodity 
as binary in nature. It either exists or it does not. As we shall see below, this 
sort of black-white dichotomy is very much at variance with their preferred 
conception which views trust, especially in its authentic expression, as a social 
practice that is both scalar and dynamic in nature. Such a conception holds no 
room for the commodification of trust, nor for attempts to describe it in terms 
of such limiting properties as risk, dependency, predictability, and so forth. For 
Solomon and Flores, discussions of trust are likely to be much more productive 
when engaged in by moral philosophers rather than actuaries. 
A second misconception involves something they call simple trust. This 
they conceive as akin to the sort of trust that children have in their parents. 
Thus it is "untroubled, unthinking and taken for granted". 179 By way of further 
explanation of what they mean, they liken it to 'first love'. First love, although 
generally felt as an intense and pleasant emotional experience, rarely lasts. The 
sixteen-year-old declares undying love to her boyfriend, accompanying it with a 
178 In this respect, Solomon and Flores disagree with a key part of the Fukuyama thesis. 
179 Robert C. Solomon and Fernando Flores, Building Trust in Business, Politics, Relationships, 
and Life, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 54. 
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statement such as "I've never felt like this before.' She probably has not felt 
like that before, but this is hardly surprising given her age. She will no doubt go 
on to proclaim similarly immature vows to several other partners before coming 
to the equally immature conclusion that "all guys are bastards", whereupon her 
capacity for this sort of "love" is irreparably damaged. Is this a bad thing? 
Does this mean she is to suffer some lasting psychological damage? In respect 
of the former question, the answer is almost assuredly not. The disappearance 
of something immature, fake, or inauthentic, as Solomon and Flores correctly 
point out, generally opens up the possibility of something better taking its 
place. Regarding the latter, we can say that getting over the pain associated 
with realisations of this type falls squarely into what the person in the street, 
not to mention the professional counsellor, correctly describes as "part of parcel 
of simply growing up". 
But what is occurring in this scenario is nonetheless very much a 
psychological dynamic. Simple trust, as conceived by Solomon and Flores, 
operates largely in the domain of affect. More specifically, it is a manifestation 
of inability, in the case of the sixteen-year-old girl, to regulate the inappropriate 
transferencem of childhood emotional perspectives into those of early 
adolescence. As such, it is a normal part of the psychological maturation 
process. The real concern begins when the transference bridges into full-blown 
adulthood, and more poignantly into one's middle and later years. 181 
For Solomon and Flores, a third inadequate conception falls under the 
label blind trust. This is seen as the consequence of an inability or 
180 1 use the word "transference" here in its technical psychological sense. This refers to the 
carrying forward by individuals of emotional states, appropriate to one period in their 
development, to later periods in which the same states are now inappropriate. See, for 
instance, the explanation given M. Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled: The New Psychology of 
Love, Traditional Values, and Spiritual Growth, (London, UK: Arrow Books, 1990), pp. 48-52. 
181 Further examination of the notion of psychological maturity is provided in Chapter 4 
during the discussion of emotional intelligence. 
147 
unwillingness to take into consideration evidence suggesting that trust ought 
prudently to be withdrawn, or at least moderated in some way. In this sense, it 
might be argued that it is a less naïve form of misconception than that giving 
rise to simple trust. Unlike its simple cousin, blind trust is more likely to be the 
result of a deficiency in the rational domain. Individuals displaying it typically 
suffer from a form of cognitive dissonance, whereby they recognise the 
evidence but refuse to act on it. Instead, they stubbornly cling to a total 
unqualified trust in the object of trusting, generally another person. Solomon 
and Flores correctly suggest that this kind of trust is often the result of a 
previously held deep distrust now being converted into a form of recalcitrance 
at the other extreme. 182 
While more could be said about what Solomon and Flores consider key 
misconceptions concerning the nature of trust, the above brief description 
provides an adequate introduction for present purposes. Moreover, it serves to 
set the scene for an examination of their central alternative thesis, namely, 
what constitutes true or "authentic" trust. 
4.242 The concept of authentic trust 
One of the more compelling claims made by Solomon and Flores, and 
certainly one that falls into the category of "against-the-grain", is the 
suggestion that trust is best viewed as a social practice amenable to cultivation. 
182 An interesting example of precisely this form of psychological reversal was in evidence 
at one point during the Agritest study. Sally, a scientist working in one of the laboratories, 
was known to have had little trust in one particular work colleague, a peer level scientist. 
Company folklore did not identify the reason for this, at least not to me. However, I was 
certainly aware of the rift. During the latter stages of my study, the individual in question 
was promoted to the role of Department Head, thus becoming Sally's new boss. For 
inexplicable reasons, and with almost immediate effect, she was seen to invest inordinate 
trust in her new manager (a male). When presented with evidence that he had clearly been 
guilty of a breach of departmental confidentiality, she responded in a manner that amazed 
her colleagues, especially those that had been aware of the previous relationship. Instead 
of condemning the blatant breach, Sally was seen to concoct explanations as to why the 
More specifically, it is a social practice constituted by the sort of inter-relational 
dynamics generally found in human communities. Such communities are 
typically governed by norms and values, which in turn ensure, inter alia, that 
their constituent social practices are lived or carried out in measured and 
mature ways. Thus, in the specific case of the social practice that is trust, 
there is no room within this form of community for the naivete that marks its 
simple expression, or the peculiar form of cognitive dissonance associated with 
its blind manifestation. Instead, they argue, one encounters an on-going 
process of creating, giving, maintaining and sustaining trust that constitutes its 
true or authentic nature. 
Seen from this perspective, it seems that Solomon and Flores consider it 
better to think of trust as a virtue-rich concept rather than a virtue per se. 
Members of a community of trust live out their lives in a manner reminiscent of 
the way of the ancient polity. A polity was a setting where strong personal and 
institutional bonds served to create and maintain an atmosphere that allowed 
individual members to live, love, learn, and flourish in a spirit of mutual 
cooperation, respect and harmony. But for a polity to work, it was necessary 
for its members to be sufficiently virtuous to enable them to make and keep 
commitments to each other. 
By way of further explanation of their thoughts on authenticity, Solomon 
and Flores make the clever move of suggesting that one should think of trust 
more as verb than noun, and that one views its associated dynamics from this 
perspective. This manoeuver serves the additional purpose of giving them a 
platform on which to argue that one's capacity to give trust is just as much a 
virtue as one's own trustworthiness. (It is often the case that the only virtue 
apparent breach in fact gave no grounds for concern. It was as if the contrary evidence 
simply did not register with her. 
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automatically associated with trust, is the latter. We now find the former also 
coming into play.) 
Authentic trust, according to Solomon and Flores, is a cultural 
phenomenon shaped by more than just individual psychological attitudes or 
dispositions. It is not the case, for instance, that introverted types are less 
likely to be trusting or worthy of trust than extroverted types, nor that sensates 
are less likely than intuitives. 183 This is an important consideration when 
reflecting on the role, played by trust, in the context of leadership practice. 
Leadership too, as we saw in Chapter 2, is a relational and social phenomenon. 
(The reader will recall the aphorism: "You can't be a leader without willing 
followers".) Trust, on this account, is important to leadership not only in the 
limited sense that prospective followers need to be trusting in order to follow 
willingly, which is certainly the case. Rather, we can extend the reflective 
horizon to include the proposition that effective leadership will, inter alia, be the 
sort of leadership that builds levels of mutual trust, within the relevant 
community. But subsumed into the notion of mutual trust is not only the virtue 
of being worthy of the trust of others, but also the virtue of being willing to 
trust those others. 
Both the inauthentic forms, simple and blind trust, involving as they do 
an unreflective attitude to trusting, invariably manifest in the binary form 
indicated earlier. They either exist or not, are given in totality or not at all. 
With authentic trust, however, the agent exercises a certain judgement as to 
the how much trust to invest in a given set of circumstances. 
183 I refer here, purely for illustrative purposes, to two of the four main distinctions offered 
in the Jungian rubric of human personality difference. For a good account of these, see 
John Welch, Spiritual Pilgrims: Karl Jung and Teresa of Avila, (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 
1982), pp. 69-71. 
While the disposition required for authentic trust is one of being willing 
to be trusting, depending on signals presented by the object (person) the agent 
moderates the level to be invested in line with an assessment of the degree of 
trustworthiness of the intended recipient. Thus, trust, in its authentic 
expression, is reflectively scalar. Given the agent's capacity to discern the 
relevant signals, a further indication of authentic trust will be the extent to 
which the level invested may change over time. The mature trusting agent 
may determine, in light of feedback, to alter the level either upwards or 
downwards. In this sense, authentic trust is not only scalar, but also dynamic. 
The term reflective optimism is one of my own choosing, employed for 
the purpose of describing another feature of authentic trust as postulated by 
Solomon and Flores. Consider the following scenario by way of explanation. 
John, the manager of a given work unit, is faced with the choice of either 
trusting or not trusting a subordinate, Fred, in respect of an important 
upcoming project. In the process of making the choice he recalls a set of 
circumstances from a number of years previously where Fred demonstrated 
himself to be untrustworthy in a similar situation. Now suppose John 
consciously decides to invest his trust in Fred on this occasion, even though 
available evidence would readily permit him to withhold it. Solomon and Flores 
assert that, far from reflecting a form of naive stupidity, John's decision in this 
instance most probably reflects the kind of sanguine outlook on human nature 
that is characteristic of the emotionally mature individual. In effect, what John 
is doing is deciding that a positive, affirming gesture on his part will, on the 
balance of probabilities, evoke a reciprocal gesture by Fred. He is thus 
exercising reflective optimism. 184 
184 While in agreement with Solomon and Flores in respect of this dimension of authentic 
trust, I would however introduce a caveat. In order for John's trusting gesture to be seen as 
such and, more importantly, to be acted on in the desired manner by Fred, he may need to 
call on certain communication skills to complement his sanguine perspective on human 
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The sanguine, invigorating, and life-giving qualities with which Solomon 
and Flores associate the notion of authentic trust, stands in sharp contrast to 
the "actuarial" perspective in which negative considerations like risk, 
dependency expectations, limitation, and probability play central roles. 
Consider those manager who subscribe to the view: "I refuse to trust anyone I 
don't know, because chances are you just get disappointed, or worse still, 
stabbed in the back." Such individuals inevitably see trust as something that 
confines or limits their world. Paranoia is never life-affirming, and it either 
reflects, or will contribute to, a narrow conception of human goodness. 
Authentic trust, when considered from this particular perspective, is something 
that must be grounded in self-reflective examination. Solomon and Flores 
correctly point out that one's capacity to trust others is an extension of one's 
own sense of self, or more explicitly, one's capacity to trust oneself. It is 
clearly more than a purely instinctual response. This is a topic to which I will 
return in Chapters 6 and 7. 
nature. Suppose John's first overture to Fred on the matter is: "Fred, I'm delighted to tell 
you I've selected you to work on Project X." And suppose Fred's immediate response 
comes in the form of the sardonic but unspoken thought: "Gee, this guy has a short 
memory. He must be pretty stupid to trust me again." What we have here is an immature 
attitude, which, if played out to the fullest extent in terms of Fred's subsequent behaviour, 
is likely to result in disappointment for all concerned. The reason is that the attitudinal 
maturity, or what in Chapter 4 will be called the emotional intelligence, being shown by 
John in making the gesture is of a higher order than that of which Fred is capable. By way 
of contrast, suppose John's opening salvo had been in the form: "Fred, I've to assign you 
to Project X because I both trust you and have confidence in your ability to do a good job. 
You'll realise that it would have been easy for me to overlook you for this opportunity, but 
I particularly want you to do it. I will, of course, be holding you accountable for the 
outcome. How do you feel about the prospects of tackling it, and what can I do to help if 
you decide to take it on?" What we have here is an example of a much more skillful 
communication style, where precisely the same offer is made to Fred but in a manner that 
charges him to consider more carefully his response. 
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4.3 Ethical Competence 
4.31 New insights 
My examinations of the foregoing accounts of trust - by Fukuyama on 
the one hand and Solomon and Flores on the other - have been purposefully 
curtailed for reasons of space limitation. While they are not intended to 
present the respective authors' views on the subject in their totality, they 
nonetheless serve the purpose of providing sufficient insight for me to draw 
pertinent conclusions. These can be conveniently categorised in the following 
manner. Fukuyama's work is helpful for two principal reasons. First, he 
presents an interpretation of trust that I found interesting but wanting, correct 
and insightful in some respects but deficient and incomplete in others. This 
motivated me to reflect more deeply on the subject, and to engage a wider 
literature. Second, his thoughts on the manner in which trust can act as a 
catalyst for social and cultural development are especially relevant to my 
overall argument, for reasons which I will develop more fully in Chapter 5. 
For its part, the work of Solomon and Flores is helpful on several levels. 
Indeed, most of the themes developed in the upcoming §4.3 are grounded in 
their findings. But there is one standout feature to which I wish to draw explicit 
attention. In providing a richer and more expansive account of the nature of 
trust than that offered by Fukuyama, they identify, with greater perspicuity 
than would otherwise have been the case, the critical links between trust and 
an effective ethics of leadership. Expanding on this point, notice that whereas 
Fukuyama's thesis presents trust as a somewhat sterile and torpid actuarial 
notion involving expectations, risk assessment and probability, Solomon and 
Flores present it as a vibrant construct, deeply rooted in the ebb and flow of 
human inter-subjective contact. As such, it is rich in both psychological and 
ethical implication. They consider the essence of trust to be found more in the 
active process of trusting than in the evaluation of trustworthiness. This is not 
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to say that appropriate engagement of the head is not needed to complement 
feelings centred in the heart. Indeed, their notion of authentic trust can only 
exist when both our cognitive and affective psychological capacities are 
engaged in tandem. 
Another critical insight from the Solomon and Flores thesis relates to 
their view of trust as a social or cultural dynamic within which a community can 
grow and flourish. 
As mentioned earlier in my argument, the small coterie of professional 
philosophers interested in leadership ethics all draw attention to the importance 
of trust - Gini, Ciulla, Solomon, Bowie, to name but some. But no to date has 
gone as far as Solomon and Flores in hinting at, if not explicitly stating, how it 
fits in to an effective ethics of leadership. For this reason, I have been able to 
leverage their account of trust to forge one significant insight of relevance to 
my own overall argument. In fact, it has enabled me to identify, as essential to 
the practice of effective managerial leadership, a capacity that I have chosen to 
name psycho-ethical maturity. In the next chapter I will spell out precisely 
what this is and why I consider it so important. 
4.32 From sensibility to competence 
I have been using the term 'ethical sensibility' since the beginning of the 
essay to refer to the generic capability required by organisational managers in 
order to discharge effectively the moral domain of their leadership roles. But I 
now wish to draw attention to a concern I have harboured, since the outset, in 
respect of this. In short, to speak of 'sensibility' is to employ a term that is 'out 
of sync' with the prevailing corporate vernacular in this country. It is not a 
term in common use. It carries connotations of an older, and perhaps more 
refined, time in Australian history. For some, it also carries connotations of a 
form of aesthetic appreciation with which the cut and thrust corporate world is 
by and large out of step. In 4.4, we will encounter the hard-nosed decision-
maker, a person who, in many ways, can be taken to represent the antithesis 
of the 'sensitive new age guy'. 185 
My argument, accordingly, is for the need to replace the term with 
something more in keeping with the Australian corporate idiom. My alternative 
of choice is 'competence'. 186 This is a word in everyday use in corporate 
Australia, and for this reason, will resonate culturally in a way that sensibility 
would not have. Moreover, it is what I call a 'hard' word, and as such, much 
beloved of those in corporate management roles. What I mean by this will be 
clear to the reader if I suggest that other 'hard' words or terms include 
measurement, performance, appraisal, win, kick-ass, productivity, and so forth. 
My intention here goes beyond questions of semantics. It has to do with 
ensuring that the chances of getting the required message across to corporate 
decision-makers are in no way compromised by making silly mistakes. As we 
shall see, beginning in the next section and throughout Chapter 5, the degree 
of difficulty in getting this sort of project off the ground is high enough without 
contributing unthinkingly to its early downfall. 
4.33 Conceptualising ethical competence 
I believe a case has been made for nominating trust and trust-building 
as central themes for purposes of progressing my overall argument. For this, I 
185 Popular Australian mythology of the 1990s saw the emergence of the sensitive new age 
guy, or SNAG for short. Because he supposedly represented a sort of modern-day 
"Renaissance Man", he might have been expected to possess some old-fashioned 
'sensibility' of the type here being contemplated. 
186 The only philosophical objection I can anticipate to use of the term 'ethical 
competence' in this respect might come from Bert Dreyfus. In What is Moral 
Maturity? A Phenomenological Account of the Development of Ethical Expertise. (An 
occasional paper presented at Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia, 1996), 
he argues persuasively for a developmental hierarchy in which ethical competence 
comes behind ethical proficiency and ethical expertise in his preferred pecking 
order. 
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am primarily indebted for the insights derived, either directly or indirectly, from 
the work of Solomon and Flores. I am now in a position, by dint of these, to 
suggest that ethical competence can be thought of in quite a specific way. 
To set the scene for this argument, it is appropriate to remind the 
reader of an explicit position I took in Chapter 1. In pointing to the various 
perspectives one can take in dealing with business organisations, I nominated 
mine as that of viewing them essentially as 'human communities'. More 
specifically, I began my analysis by explicitly choosing to view the modern 
business organisation as a community of stakeholders, each with their own 
agendas, needs, concerns, expectations, and aspirations for the future. At the 
time, I took this position for no better reason than that of attempting to narrow 
the field. To conduct a meaningful analysis of organisational and managerial 
leadership ethics is demanding enough without adding to the complexity by 
failing to nominate one's preferred perspective. 
In the intervening pages, however, I have come increasingly to value 
this intuitively chosen commencement perspective. The metaphor of the 
organisation as a community turns out to be anything but an original one on 
my part. Many others have seen fit to employ it to good effect, in ways either 
directly or indirectly associated with managerial leadership and its related 
ethical domain. For instance, in summarising his argument on organisational 
ethics and the good life, Hartman, in likening the good organisation to a good 
community, says asserts that the good organisation/community is one that "... 
will protect autonomy, preserve the commons, and encourage moral progress." 
He goes on to add that, "Such an organization supports its participants' search 
for the good life, seeks consensus among people with different values, creates 
significant overlaps between morality and self-interest, and reduces the 
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possibility of brainwashing". 187 Likewise, it will be recalled that Rosen included 
community as one of his eight principles of leadership. 188 And, as we saw in 
§4.22 above, the metaphor was also central to the work of Solomon and Flores. 
The felicitous employment of the metaphor of the 'organisation as a 
community', now leads me to think of leadership as a cultural economy in 
which there is the leader, the individual stakeholder, and the community per 
se. This can be thought of graphically as shown in Figure 4.2. 
With this in mind, I suggest that an ethically competent leader is 
someone with the capacity to judge rightly, in concrete decision-making 
situations, what course of action needs to be taken to foster and maintain 
relations within the leadership community. 
I will add to this preliminary outline in Chapters 6 and 7. But firstly let 
us deal with a major potential adversary. 
187 Edwin M. Hartman, Organizational Ethics and the Good Life, (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), pp. 184-5. Not surprisingly, his reference here to "brainwashing" 
is intended to convey a similar sort of idea to that covered by Ciulla under the heading of 
"bogus empowerment". 
188 Robert H. Rosen, Leading People, (New York: Viking Press, 1998), pp. 21-22. The original 
reference came in Chapter 2. 
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4.4 Encountering the Hard-nosed Decision-maker 
I began the essay by advising the reader that my overall aim in this 
project was to design a feasible process for the systematic fostering of ethical 
competence (as I am now calling it) among organisational leaders. Further, I 
made it an explicit introductory task to point out that my approach would be 
unapologetically and resolutely pragmatic. I argued that fine theory alone 
consistently fails to sway senior level decision-makers, in this country at 
least. 189 
Thus far in the overall argument, I suggest that I have accomplished 
two overarching tasks. First, I have demonstrated that closer scrutiny needs to 
be paid to the challenge of developing the ethical sensibility levels of those in 
corporate leadership roles in this country. Second, I have described, in this 
chapter, what I consider constitutes a plausible account of ethical sensibility in 
that context. The reader might reasonably anticipate that my remaining task, 
given the overall project objective set out in Chapter 1, would be that of 
offering a thorough description of what an appropriate and robust 
developmental syllabus might look like. 
While this is indeed the case, I believe it needs to be couched within a 
particular framework, what might be called a thoroughly pragmatic one. Let 
me describe precisely what I mean by this by introducing the hypothetical 
figure of the hard-nosed decision-maker. 
189 It should be said that it is not unheard of for such individuals occasionally to devote 
some time to take in a 'breakfast seminar' at which some member of the philosophical 
community might talk on corporate or organisational ethics issues. What is rare in the 
extreme is for any of them to commit to in-house development programmes. For the 
Australian context, contacting the St James Ethics Centre in Sydney will lead to quick 
verification of this claim. As will speaking to any University-based academic philosopher 
who has attempted to penetrate the corporate world with a consultancy proposal. 
Professor Jeff Malpas at the University of Tasmania is one of the few Australian-based 
academics to have had any success in this realm, but he too will readily attest to the degree 
of difficulty associated with achieving it. 
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Much of this chapter has been devoted to showing that appropriate 
ethical sensibility, in the context of managerial leadership, boils down to 
possessing the capacity to cultivate, on a consistent basis, what I have termed 
a high-trust community. 
Moreover, I argued that the manner in which trust is to be understood is 
akin to the expansive interpretation recently offered by Solomon and Flores. 
Notwithstanding the plausibility of these arguments, the question of motivation 
of corporate decision-makers must be considered. My experience as a 
participant in the corporate world suggests that vast the majority of those 
individuals who need to be convinced of the merits of investing in leadership 
development programmes, fall into a predictable mold. I call this the hard-
nosed decision-maker. 
Certainly in respect of the contemporary Australian context, the hard-
nosed decision-maker can reliably be characterised as male, middle-aged, 
tertiary educated (generally in engineering and/or a business discipline), and 
highly outcome-focussed and results-oriented. Moreover, in considering 
investment decisions, he is likely to be largely dismissive of appeals to any 
value other than economic rationalism. It can reasonably be assumed that he 
himself will lack the type of ethical sensibility discussed above. How, then, is 
he likely to react to a proposal suggesting the need for a development 
programme focussed on the cultivation of the capacity to foster and maintain 
high-trust work communities, even when that need can be demonstrated to 
exist? The simple answer, as many in-house Human Resource specialists and 
external consultants will attest, is that he is likely to be unreceptive and 
dismissive. Notwithstanding the strength of the supportive argument, 
concepts such as ethical sensibility, trust, and community-building will fall 
outside his prevailing investment paradigm. But this does not mean that every 
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proposal addressing such concepts is doomed to failure. What it suggests, 
however, is that any such proposal, in order to stand a realistic chance of 
succeeding, must be presented in a manner that takes account of, and pays 
due respect to, that rationalistic paradigm. It is to the preparation of such a 
proposal that I turn my attention in Chapter 5. In doing so, I will deal not only 
with matters of cosmetic packaging, but also with the more substantive 
question of what sort of normative ethical model needs to be in place to 
underwrite the overall programme. 
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Chapter 5 
The Business Case 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued for an interpretation of ethical 
competence as a consistent capacity for building and maintaining high-trust 
work communities. Towards the end of the chapter, I drew attention to an 
important caveat to be faced by the applied ethicist wishing to expedite the 
systematic cultivation of such a capacity in the cut and thrust setting of a 
contemporary Australian business organisation. In summary, this states that 
while developmental models that are theoretically robust and normatively 
credible are necessary conditions for achievement, they are not sufficient in and 
of themselves. They also need to be culturally feasible within the intended 
corporate environment. To accentuate the importance of this point, I drew 
attention to a hypothetical figure I referred to as the hard-nosed decision-
maker. 
As the person with the authority to sign off on the commissioning of 
development programmes, he (it is likely to be a 'he') is the one to be 
convinced of the merits of authorising the necessary investment and 
commitment of corporate resources. And, I cautioned, he is unlikely to be 
swayed by any type of reasoning except that falling within his prevailing 
rationalistic paradigm. For the ethicist wishing to pursue this type of 
developmental initiative, therefore, the first challenge to be overcome is that of 
presenting an investment proposal that does not conflict with that dominant 
paradigm. The central argument of this chapter is built around the claim that 
one way of achieving this is to embrace the prevailing corporate idiom. 
The notion of idiom is most readily associated with language learning. 
Each language or dialect contains its own idiomatic platforms: patterns of 
speech or phrasing employed by native speakers.'" The sense in which I will 
here use the term idiom is somewhat broader in its scope than this, but 
nonetheless readily identifiable from it. To speak of the Australian corporate 
idiom indeed includes accepted patterns of language usage. (Thus, for 
instance, in the previous chapter, I argued on precisely these grounds for 
changing the notion of ethical sensibility to that of ethical competence.) But it 
is also to refer to those rules, norms and values that make up the entire 
accepted corporate culture. For purposes of advancing my overall argument 
along these lines in the present chapter, I will seek to ensure idiomatic 
compliance by paying attention to three further components of the prevailing 
Australian corporate idiom. These are: (a) the use of 'hard-centred' conceptual 
models; (b) the provision of hard evidence to support soft-sounding claims; 
and (c) a deference to pragmatism. 
My basic aim in this chapter can therefore be summarised as showing 
how adherence to the corporate idiom can assist with both the preparation and 
delivery of the sort of business case needed to convince the hard-nosed 
decision-maker. 
5.2 Selecting a Suitable Model 
5.21 The basic idea 
In the Preface to their well-respected anthology on the mechanics of 
organisational change, Quinn et al suggest that the strategic decision-making 
process is typically characterised by... 
... novelty, complexity, and openendedness, by the fact that the 
organization usually begins with little understanding of the decision 
situation it faces or the route to its solution, and only a vague idea of 
190 For instance, as a native English speaker, I would say, "It's just dawned on me that..." 
instead of, "I've just come to the realisation that..." 
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what that solution might be and how it will be evaluated when it is 
developed. Only by groping through a recursive, discontinuous 
process involving many different steps and a host of dynamic factors 
over a considerable period of time is a final choice often made. 191 
Consideration of the implications of this statement led the authors to 
arrive at an important conclusion. Of all the attributes required by managers 
and leaders in the complex world of the organisational workplace, the "... most 
indispensable is judgment (their italics) because it is the integrator which 
guides and controls all the others. Therefore, we are making it the central focal 
point for our book". 192 They go on to suggest that one of the ways in which 
the ability to make sound strategic judgements can be facilitated is through the 
use of robust conceptual models. Several of the subsequent chapters then offer 
the reader a range of such models. (The reader will note that the reference to 
"judgment" by the authors will have served to place a 'hard edge' legitimacy on 
the models they subsequently offer.) 
The applied ethicist, unfamiliar with the prevailing Australian corporate 
idiom, will be tempted to view the challenge of systematically building improved 
ethical competence as mainly a technical one. 193 The corporate insider, on the 
other hand, would most likely view it as primarily a process of strategic 
organisational change. As such, and following the advice of Mintzberg et al, the 
entire project can be planned and ultimately executed with the aid of an 
appropriate change model. Accordingly, to begin the current project by placing 
it within the parameters of such a model would be to show evidence of 
idiomatic sensitivity. 
191 James Brian Quinn, Henry Mintzberg, and Robert M. James, The Strategy Process: 
Concepts, Contexts, and Cases, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall International, 1988), 
p. XV. 
192 Ibid., p. xi. 
193 Moreover, she is likely to interpret the word 'technical' in one or both of two ways: (a) 
technical in the philosophical theory sense vis-a-vis selection of normative ethical 
framework, and (b) selection of the appropriate pedagogical and heuristic platforms for 
teaching adults in the workplace. 
I now briefly describe one of these, the much-favoured 7-5 Framework. 
The description that follows serves two purposes. First, it provides those 
readers unfamiliar with such models with an explanatory overview. Second, it 
offers a background against which I can argue for the specific model employed 
in my project. My selection of the 7-S Framework for this purpose is based on 
its being both well-respected and widely-used by practitioners in the fields of 
organisational change and organisational development. It enjoys this popularity 
for three reasons: (a) it is easy to understand conceptually; (b) it can be 
readily adapted to particular circumstances; and (c) it has produced good 
results in actual organisational conditions. 
The authors (Waterman, Peters, and Phillips) validate their model on the 
premise that much of the demonstrated failure in the leadership of strategic 
change is due to over-reliance by planners on the intersection of just two 
critical variables: (a) structure and (b) strategy. While these are indeed of 
central importance, they argue for the benefit of considering them as part of a 
wider inter-connected network of seven variables. For purposes of offering a 
heuristic aide memo/re, they contrive to alliterate the naming of the elements, 
as presented in Figure 5.1. 
Let us now briefly examine both the meaning and composition of this 
model.'" 
194 Robert H. Waterman, Jr., Thomas J. Peters, and Julien R. Phillips, The 7-S Framework, in 
James Brian Quinn, Henry Mintzberg, and Robert M. James ((eds.), The Strategy Process: 
Concepts, Contexts, and Cases, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall International), pp. 
271-276. 
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• Systems SUPERORDINATE GOAL 
Strategy 
Fiaure 5.1 The 7-S Framework 
(Adapted from Peters, Waterman and Phillips) 
Structure 
Structural considerations, according to Waterman et al, are important 
because it is through them that adjustments can be made to ensure that tasks, 
duties, responsibilities, authority levels, and other delegations are optimally 
allocated between available positions and individuals. Moreover, it is via 
consideration of structure that appropriate emphasis and coordination can be 
brought to bear on forces that might otherwise be mutually conflicting or 
mutually disruptive. Thus, the authors clearly had in mind the obvious 
organisational application of the term structure, namely, the manner in which 
roles, responsibilities, and reporting lines are specified. 
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Strategy 
By "strategy" the authors mean the actions and options that are open to 
organisational decision-makers as they attempt both to meet and anticipate the 
challenges presented to it by its operating environment. 195 A broader 
interpretation relates to the overriding pattern of actions to be adopted, 
following appropriate consideration of alternatives, for the purpose of 
systematically pursuing some particular, duly specified end or goal. This 
alternative formulation is not inconsistent with the original, but does permit a 
more expansive interpretation in terms of potential usage. 
Systems 
The authors define "systems" as the processes and procedures, both 
formal and informal, through which organisational work actually gets done. 
From their portrayal, and supported by complementary insights from the 
literature, it can be seen that systems lacking efficacy simply do not get the 
intended job done. 
Those lacking effectiveness tend to be inappropriately directed (i.e. an 
otherwise useful process being applied to the wrong objective). Those lacking 
efficiency may get the right job done, but do so at too high a cost. 196 
It is important to note that the authors, in their exposition of the model, 
seem to appreciate the distinction between the two adjectival cognates of the 
word 'system', namely, systemic and systematic. 
195  Because of the focus of so much of O&M scholarship in the mid to late 1980s, and the 
particular preoccupation of the authors, the "environment" to which they are specifically 
referring is that of globalised competitive commercial business. 
196  An interesting analysis of organisational systems, and their effectiveness, that extends 
the Waterman et al treatment, can be found in Peter Checkland and Jim Scholes, Soft 
Systems Analysis, (Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 1990). See especially, their 
"systems evaluation model" described in pp. 25-42. 
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The former suggests the inherent connection or inter-relation between 
otherwise distinct variables. Their appreciation of it can implicitly be seen in 
the graphical representation of the model, where the interconnecting lines 
indicate that all sub-systems, or nodes, are related to each other as well as the 
central coordinating goal. Likewise, in so far as the model presents a 
methodical arrangement of variables, it can be said to illustrate the notion of a 
systematic or well-organised formulation. 
Style 
The way the authors use the term "style" is to point to a critical 
difference they see between "the basic personality of a top-management team" 
and "the way that team comes across to the organization". Finding the right 
'style' of behaviour, as opposed to pattern of rhetoric, is important, they argue, 
because subordinates may listen to what managers say but tend to believe and 
be influenced by what managers actually do. Central to the distinction they 
make between personality and style is their belief that it is relatively easy to 
control and modify the latter in response to particular situations, while the 
former is far less adjustable. 
Staff 
"Staff" is the term used in the model for 'people', and 'people 
considerations'. The authors claim that their predilection is ... "to broaden and 
redefine the nature of the people issue". 197 In particular, they seem keen to 
make a distinction between the human dimension of change planning as 
represented in their use of 'staff', and its structural counterpart. Moving Fred 
to Department X may make sense in terms of structural adjustment, but (a) 
was it done with appropriate consultation, (b) is Fred happy about it, and (c) 
might it adversely or otherwise affect relations within the department? 
197 Waterman et al, op. cit., p. 274. 
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This very brief exposition of what is entailed by "staff" is all that is 
offered by the authors. It might well be argued that its brevity is somewhat at 
odds with the avowed importance they are attributing to the notion. 
Nonetheless, it serves the purpose of reminding the change planner that 
serious consideration should be given, but often is not, to the human 
dimension. 
Skills 
Under the heading "skills", Waterman et al have largely corporatised the 
meaning of the term to refer to what have elsewhere been called the "core 
abilities" of the organisation. They claim that in the process of planned 
organisational change, the organisation often needs to learn and then apply a 
new suite of skills. While the question of whether or not a business 
organisation can, per se, possess skill is a moot point, their inclusion of the 
heading in the model is nonetheless useful. It serves to remind the planner to 
take into consideration the range and complementarity of skills available within 
a given situation, and to do so in a way that does not confuse the availability of 
skills with either staffing or structural issues (as per the authors' definitions of 
these terms). 
Superordinate Goal 
Finally, we come to the seventh "S" in the formulation, that of the 
"superordinate goal" towards which the change process is being directed. Here 
that we encounter an interesting feature of the model. The authors use the 
term 'superordinate' to point to the need for a goal grounded in something that 
transcends the purely instrumental values normally associated with an ethic of 
economic rationalism. Experience validates, and workplace motivation theories 
endorse, the proposition that the spirit, imagination, and creativity of workers 
are not typically ignited by goals that focus on variables such the maximisation 
of stockholder wealth, or earnings before interest and tax. In contrast, when a 
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vision is shaped around a more all-encompassing ideal, it can have a much 
more potent motivational impact. 
Consider the case of an owner-contractor trying to build enthusiasm 
among the workforce for a project involving the building, during winter months, 
of a new hospital. Articulating the project goal as that of getting the hospital 
built on time, so that the half-dozen or so financial investors can reap the 
greatest financial reward (higher profits because of no invocation of penalty 
clauses), is unlikely to fire up the hourly-paid workforce. One should not be 
surprised if great enthusiasm for the project is not in evidence. Re-casting the 
project goal as that of getting the new hospital built, as quickly as possible, so 
as to improve healthcare provision in the local community, may have a different 
motivational impact. Stated this way, the project may well engender 
enthusiasm, emotion, and commitment on the part of workers and other 
stakeholders. 198 
198 The power that resides in visions of this sort, notwithstanding the propensity for 
ethically questionable emotional manipulation, is widely acclaimed in the literature, and is 
seen to underwrite not only superior operating performance, but also the successful 
navigation of organisational transitions. 
By way of illustration of the power of this sort of goal articulation, see, for instance, Joel 
Arthur Barker, Future Edge: Discovering the New Paradigms of Success, (New York, NY: 
William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992). See, in particular, pp. 15-20. 
In making this point, I recognise that this form of reasoning is not unproblematic for those 
philosophers interested in the question of moral motivation. It might be argued, for 
example, that the astute goal-setter may be tempted to frame the goal in such terms as to 
ensure that, ultimately, the interests of financial investors (of whom he or she may well be 
one) are best served. Whether or not this is the case, my argument is based around the fact 
that if a greater rather than lesser number of stakeholders are committed to a project, 
because they believe in the worthiness of what it is intended to achieve, this is an ethically 
good thing. 
The fact that the originator of the idea, or the framer of the articulated vision, may have 
had purely self-interested motivation in mind, is essentially beside the point in terms of the 
wellbeing of others. The perspective from which I hold this particular view is eudaimonistic 
(related to the intrinsic merit of human wellbeing per se) rather than utilitarian (the greatest 
amount of good to the greatest number). For a good overview of the issues involved in 
questions of moral motivation in a modern organisational context, see the exchange of 
views between (a) La Rue Tone Hosmer, Why Be Moral? A Different Rationale for Managers, 
Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 4, April 1994; and (b) the reply by Shaw and Corvino. The 
ethical questions associated with manipulative practices, of the sorts raised in the Hosmer- 
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5.22 Evaluating the applicability of the 7-5 Framework 
An important strength of the model is recognising that conceptually 
independent variables, in situations pertaining to human affairs, should be 
considered as potentially likely to affect one another. Thus, while a plan worked 
out by strategists may be flawlessly logical and theoretically robust, its actual 
implementation in a given workplace situation may be problematic. There may, 
for example, be lack of personal commitment to it on the part of key 
individuals, or they may subscribe to values that are at variance with those 
nderpinning its intent (staff factors). Its effective coordination and 
implementation may be compromised in virtue of poor communication channels 
between those in key roles, or in virtue of a lack of adequate facilities or 
facilitation (structure factors). Work procedures currently in place may be 
inadequate in supporting what the strategy demands by way of efficient action 
(systems factors). 
The diagrammatic presentation of the model (Figure 5.1) makes clear, 
perhaps more persuasively than a purely textual treatment, that the authors 
wish to convey a sense of the inherent interconnectedness of all the constituent 
forces. Failure to consider any one of them, either independently or in relation 
to each other, can result in a well-conceived strategy failing to meet its 
intended function of facilitating realisation of a superordinate goal. Because of 
this, the framework deals with the need for the sort of systemic perspective 
argued for earlier. 
Shaw and Corvino exchange, are explored further in Hugh Willmott, Strength is Ignorance; 
Slavery is Freedom: Managing Culture in Modern Organizations, Journal of Management 
Studies, 30:4, 1993, pp. 515-551. 
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The account given of Superordinate Goal highlights the important 
connotation of meaning intended by the adjective "superordinate". The model 
is valuable in bringing this particular point to the forefront of the planner's 
consciousness. Further, in giving an explicit account of the nature of the 
mutual relationship between the Superordinate Goal and Strategy components, 
the model offers important pointers on how best to bring a sense of shared 
vision, focus, and direction to the project design. In addition, the array of 
variables discussed under the headings of Staff, Skills, Structure, and Style, is 
sufficiently comprehensive to suggest what needs to be included at the level of 
content specific programme design and early implementation planning. 
Against this account, however, an important area of concern needs to be 
highlighted. This relates to the definitions given by the authors to some of the 
component variables. Let me illustrate with some examples. As mentioned 
earlier, they see "structure" as relating specifically to considerations of formal 
organisational design, thus affecting the nature and definitions of roles, 
responsibilities, delegations, et cetera. Restricting myself to purely this 
interpretation would cause me to miss potentially important infrastructural 
considerations, notably in respect the structure of syllabi (as discussed ahead). 
In discussing "skills", the authors limit themselves to what I consider an overly 
restrictive aspect of the wider notion of competency. In a later section I will 
demonstrate that in addressing normative competency profiles, the planner 
recognises that the ability to perform a job well (or any life task for that 
matter) is as much dependent on knowledge and attitude is it is on skill. 
Finally, their definition of" style" as limited to pinpointing a distinction between 
personality and attitude does not, in my view, give adequate enough 
expression to what the term might connote in strategic organisational change. 
As I will show in a later section, the notion of style can be applied equally as 
well to matters of process as to those relating to human responses. 
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All things considered, however, I believe these limitations pose no 
serious threat to the potential relevance and benefit of using the 7-5 
Framework to guide the conceptual design of my project. In response to being 
aware of them, I propose merely to employ an idiosyncratic interpretation of 
the model. The interpretation chosen is grounded in my consulting experiences 
in general, but more particularly in the choice of other change methodologies 
employed at Agritest. 199 
What I have always found useful about this model, when using it during 
consulting assignments, is not so much the actual definitions given to the seven 
variables by the authors. Rather, I have been attracted by the manner in 
which it connects the variables in a systemic way, suggestive of the fact that 
each has the potential in turn to affect all others. I have also found it 
appealing on the grounds that selected alternative meanings can be given to 
the variables, without detracting from its overall usefulness. It is to the 
deployment of this latter interpretive flexibility that I now turn in order to apply 
the model to my project. 
5.23 Applying 7-5: a first iteration 
Let us begin on familiar ground by declaring that the overall coal of the 
project, as already identified, is that of raising standards of ethical sensibility 
among those with managerial leadership roles in this country. Moreover, let us 
say that the superordinate purpose associated with this relates to the fact that 
199 Part of the idiosyncratic nature of the approach I am adopting lay resides in choosing to 
interpret the meaning of the seven variables in a flexible way. I put the reader on notice, 
therefore, that, in certain instances, the selected interpretation will differ from the original 
intended by the authors. I justify this move on the argument that conceptual models in the 
arena of organisational change planning are useful only in so far as they contribute to the 
expeditious formulation of relevant plans. As there are several meanings that can plausibly 
apply to terms such as strategy, staff, systems, et cetera, and as these do in fact differ from 
one organisational situation to another, then it is important for the user to exercise 
discretionary flexibility in its application. 
organisational stakeholders in general can be expected to benefit from higher 
rather than lower levels of such sensibility. 
As a first iteration of the overall strateay to be adopted to achieve this 
end, let us state that whatever approach is adopted must be well thought out, 
clearly articulated, and systematic. But, in addition, there must be flexibility 
during implementation to allow for needed changes in light of prevailing 
circumstances. (The obvious rationale for this is that complex processes of 
organisational change rarely succeed otherwise, largely in response to the 
inevitable onslaught of Murphy's Law. 20° 
From a style perspective, a first-up choice is that of ensuring that all 
aspects of the proposed programme should be seen to fit comfortably with the 
prevailing corporate idiom, as discussed earlier. Among other considerations, 
for the Australian situation, this means that following the systematic process 
demanded by the nominated choice of strategy, cannot be achieved at the cost 
of too much formality. (The reflections of the current chapter bear testimony 
to adherence to this style profile.) 
In respect of the systems heading, the commencement position is that 
of ensuring that a robust planning model is being employed, in response to the 
fact that the project has been positioned as one of strategic organisational 
change. (This decision requires no further comment at this stage, as it has 
already been explained above.) 
A first interpretation of the staff category would lead one to think in 
terms of perhaps three separate categories of personnel. The first relates to 
selection for participation in the programme. It would seem obvious that this 
would normally be expected to include all those holding managerial roles 
(bearing in mind the top-down consideration mentioned earlier). A second 
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relates to the selection of external consultants to conduct and coordinate the 
development programme, requiring consideration of questions such as, What 
sorts of credentials are being sought? From where can the appropriately-
credentialled individuals be sourced? A third category for consideration here 
relates to the role of internal facilitator/coordinator. Which staff members are 
most appropriately qualified to work with the external consultants in respect of 
logistical planning, programme monitoring, and so forth. 
Under the heading of skills, the obvious candidate for inclusion is the 
question of precisely what proficiencies need to be taught and learned in order 
to affect the level of ethical competence of those participating. What range of 
capacities is a person with an adequate level expected to demonstrate? 
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Finally, from a structure perspective, let us state that the process of 
competence raising must be a top-down one. By this I mean that those 
managers at the most senior levels of the organisational hierarchy will be the 
first to participate in whatever programme eventuates. The reason for this 
should be obvious. The programme would achieve little credibility among and 
commitment from participating managers if their own superiors were seen to be 
outside its ambit of coverage. 
It is obvious that the analysis attempted here is inchoate, being limited 
in both content detail and analytical sophistication. Yet it does offer the project 
planners a starting point by way of identifying and discriminating between the 
key variables involved in the change process, even if as yet clearly superficial 
and rudimentary. It can be monitored and regularly updated, as needed. 
(Indeed, this kind of flexibility is precisely catered for under the Strategy 
heading above.) Moreover, as we shall see below, once the first iteration has 
been completed, second-phase evaluations tend to give rise to specific re- 
200 The so -called 'Murphy's Law' was explained in Note 47, Chapter 1. 
formulations, and eventually to a clarified picture. This can be illustrated by 
observing how closer scrutiny of the 'skills' component served to illuminate the 
current project. 
5.24 Refraining skills as 'competencies' 
My main purpose in this section is to show that much can be achieved 
by reframing the notion of skills into the distinct but related category of 
'competencies'. More specifically, I will show that two main benefits can be 
derived for the purposes of my overall argument: (a) a distinct movement 
towards greater idiomatic compliance, and (b) arrival at a comprehensive 
framework of proficiencies associated with the notion of ethical sensibility. Let 
us begin by taking a look at the generic notion of competence. 
"Competence" is a word much loved in contemporary Australian 
business circles. It has a 'hard' ring to it, thus providing its appeal to the tough 
and uncompromising types who generally run our business organisations, or 
more aptly, to our HNDM. It is good to be considered competent in your field. 
During the 1990s, the entire infrastructure of organisational workplace training 
in this country got re-defined in terms of "competency based training", lending 
further imputed legitimacy to the notion. 
What, then, does it mean to be a competent medical practitioner, a 
competent lawyer, a competent hair stylist, a competence actor, et cetera? It 
is reasonable to assume that most of us want to be competent at what we do, 
notably in those areas of our lives we consider especially important. As a 
theoretical topic, competence has been studied within various disciplines, and 
O&M studies is no exception. Generally, within this domain, competence is 
viewed as comprising three components. First, there is propositional 
knowledge of relevant facts. Second come the practical skills needed to carry 
out the constituent tasks governed by those facts. Third is the attitudinal 
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maturity to cope with the exigencies of applying the relevant knowledge and 
skill under a variety of contingent circumstances. Not least among these will be 
the challenge of coping with unwarranted and unexpected adversity. 
To illustrate this construction of competence, consider the practice of 
"putting" in the game of golf. On the present account, what differentiates the 
competent from incompetent player will fall under one or other of three 
parameters. First, a player would be deemed incompetent if she did not know 
the relevant rules relating to this aspect of the game. These would include the 
explicitly strict regulations relating to the marking of one's ball when it lies on 
the opponent's 'putting line', the replacement of the ball upon removing the 
marker, the ensuring against 'shoving' rather than stroking the ball towards the 
hole, and so forth. A player may know all the relevant rules perfectly well, 
however, yet not have the necessary skill or aptitude to stroke the ball 
consistently with the required pace, to read correctly the contours of the green, 
and so forth. Such a player would also be considered incompetent, albeit for 
different reasons. 
A third dimension of competence, attitudinal maturity, is a more slippery 
notion. It expresses itself as a particular mix of often-complex psychological 
responses that need to be present to meet the demands of any given set of 
circumstances. The reader who is a golfer may well recall standing over a 
three-foot putt on the last green during a tense Saturday afternoon four-ball, 
with nothing more at stake than a little pride and the usual small wager. You 
need to sink the putt to win the game. This can be precisely the moment when 
a variety of unwanted physical and/or psychological demons come out to play, 
disrupt your concentration and cause you to miss what you would normally sink 
nine times out of ten. The sudden manifestation of sweaty palms, a bead of 
perspiration at the corner of the eye, a bout of palpitations, are well-known 
examples of such physical demons. 201 The sudden spectre of a similar-length 
putt missed on a previous occasion is another well-known and unwelcome fiend 
on such occasions. The point is that a player who consistently displays a 
tendency to miss such crucial putts - simple ones ordinarily well within her 
scope - will ultimately be adjudged incompetent by her peers. In the 
Australian vernacular, she will be known as a "choker" - someone who falters 
or "chokes" when the chips are down. 
Another example of how attitudinal maturity may let down an otherwise 
competent golfer can be seen in the following. To putt well, it is necessary to 
read correctly the contours of the green. Putts rarely go in a straight line from 
putter to hole. While the ability to read such contours correctly is a skill, and 
while a given player may possess it, she may be nevertheless be someone who 
has difficulty controlling her impatience to get on with the game. In 
consequence, she tends to avoid what she sees as the tedious task of "lining 
up" her putts. The reader will no doubt have seen professional players on 
television squatting behind the ball and, using the putter as an alignment 
device, making an assessment as to whether the path to the hole will be 
straight or subject to some curvature. It is noteworthy that professional 
players rarely if ever fail to make the necessary effort to do this, even with 
short putts. By the same token, there are many "Saturday afternoon golfers" 
who tire of this after a few holes. The lesson here is a telling one. Psychological 
discipline in the form of attitudinal maturity is essential to the achievement of 
competence in golf, in many other aspects of the game than just the putting 
component discussed above. No doubt the same could be said of most sports. 
201 While these are "physical" responses, they are nonetheless grounded in psychological 
forces. Arguably, therefore, all forms of "demon" encountered in this particular situation 
are ultimately psychological in nature. 
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On the above view, it is argued that competence can be thought of as 
the state of having the requisite knowledge and skill, together with the requisite 
psychological disposition, to achieve good standard performance on a 
consistent basis. But then there is the more challenging two-pronged question: 
What constitutes requisite knowledge and skill, and what constitutes an 
adequate psychological disposition? Before turning to this important question, 
let us explore how the notion of leadership competence can be reduced to a 
profile of specific constituent competencies. 
5.25 A competency profile for effective leadership 
5.251 Background 
The reader will recall that my three-year involvement at Agritest had 
two separate but related dimensions to it. The first involved the provision of 
certain organisation development services, administered in my role as a 
professional management consultant. The second involved using this work as 
the platform for a phenomenological study of the nature of managerial 
leadership. As my understanding of leadership grew, it became apparent that 
certain specific competencies could be identified as essential to the its effective 
practice. While articulation of the competency profile was initially undertaken 
for the purpose of guiding the organisation development work, it became 
apparent during the process that it had equal relevance to the research project. 
With no more insight into the nature of managerial leadership than that 
provided by the O&M literature, it would of course be possible to highlight 
certain specific competencies required for its effective practice. For instance, 
managers need to be able to communicate effectively with subordinates in 
order to demonstrate leadership. Likewise, they need to demonstrate 
competence in the art and practice of engendering a motivating atmosphere in 
their constituencies. For the purpose of promoting maximum internal 
ownership in a leadership development programme at the time on the drawing 
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board for Agritest managers, I undertook a series of Focus Group sessions 202 on 
the topic: Specific Leadership Competencies. At the beginning of each session, 
I explained its relevance with the observation that, as those participating would 
be the ultimate beneficiaries (or victims) of the resultant training programme, 
we had better jointly ensure that we concentrate on the 'right' competencies. 
To set the scene further, but taking care not to overly prescribe the outcomes, 
I provided each group with the list of leadership definitions as shown earlier in 
Figure XX. 203 I asked them to consider these in conjunction with their own 
individual experiences as both leader and follower. 
5.252 An evolving competency structure 
Having conducted six separate Focus Group sessions each involving 
twelve participants, I worked on interpreting the results with the benefit of 
assistance by a social research specialist from the Department of Sociology at 
the University of Tasmania. We succeeded in identifying five categories of 
generic competence, each made up of several specific individual competencies. 
It is important to emphasise that in arriving at this list, part of my contribution 
to the task involved ensuring that our choices of what to include and exclude 
were consistent with the conception of leadership presented in Chapter 2 of this 
document. The five nominated categories were (a) providing focus and direction 
(b) fostering motivation and morale, (c) building the team, (d) handling 
conflict, and (e) managing the process of change. 204 It is important to examine 
briefly what each category was seen to include. 
202 Add ref. 
203 Refer back to Chapter 2. 
204  These were distilled from a larger group of more specific or particular competencies 
identified during the sessions. 
Component 1: Providing focus and direction 
At its simplest level, leaders are expected to ensure that all relevant 
stakeholders have an adequate understanding of the role and function of the 
work groups for which they are responsible. A useful refinement of this involves 
having some grasp of how the work of a specific group fits into and contributes 
to the wider organisational agenda. Related to this, but nonetheless 
representing a different competency, leaders are expected to articulate some 
sense of personal vision or aspiration that, ideally, followers will find in some 
sense inspiring. In fact, associated with the ability to do this is the further 
ability to present a vision that reflects an understanding of "what's in our minds 
and hearts to begin with". This ability of course subsumes a number of others, 
notably, knowing how to canvass the views and feelings of others. Moreover, 
effective leaders will be willing to refine their visions in line with feedback from 
stakeholders. 
Thus far the provision of focus and direction has assumed a macro 
flavour, relating to the work group as a whole. A second dimension of the 
competency is seen to exist at the micro level. In this sense, effective leaders 
are expected to ensure that individual subordinates have a sense of their 
respective roles and functions, again taking care to facilitate recognition of how 
the individual role contributes to a purposeful wider agenda. This expression of 
leadership can readily be interpreted as playing a role in defining the extent to 
which individual followers have a sense purpose and meaning in their own 
working lives. In this sense, as we shall see below, competence in the arena of 
focus and direction setting, to some extent at least, cuts across that relating to 
the fostering of motivation and morale. 
This latter cross-connection will be seen to play out further as the 
overall competency profile evolves. It is fair to say that the distinctions being 
drawn between the five generic areas of competence, and between many of 
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their constituent components, carry more weight from a theoretical perspective 
than they do as representations of everyday practicality. Notwithstanding this, 
putting effort into building the profile remained an essential part of the syllabus 
development process demanded by my professional work at Agritest. 
Component 2: Fostering motivation and morale 
A point of controversy in each of the Focus Group sessions centred on 
the question of whether or not it is possible for one person to motivate another. 
Some participants argued in the affirmative, suggesting that individual 
motivation is responsive to external stimulus. Those holding this position 
tended to extend the thesis to suggest that Real Leaders do indeed possess the 
ability to motivate subordinates. Against this was the argument that 
motivation is primarily an "inside job", as one contributor neatly put it, meaning 
that it is no more than a subjective psychological state. On this view, it is 
impossible for me, for instance, to be motivated by someone else, only by 
myself. The best any other individual can hope to achieve, for instance my 
immediate boss, is to facilitate the creation of those conditions under which I 
end up feeling optimally motivated in any given set of circumstances. While the 
Focus Group sessions rarely ended with an agreed or unified position from 
these alternatives, they generally did conclude that "feeling motivated" was a 
subjective condition. It was also generally agreed that external factors could 
indeed play some part in determining the extent of that feeling. 
Once this point was reached, the discussion turned to the question of 
what role effective leaders tended to play in the process. Responses were seen 
to indicate that at least five specific leader behaviours contribute to individual 
motivation and group morale. The first is the extent to which they are seen to 
make an effort to get to know their staff members. While it might be argued 
that this could be done by simply reading "personnel files", such an argument 
would be seen to miss the point. What is being sought here is an indication of 
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human interest on the part of the managers, reflected in the extent to which 
they would converse with subordinates in a personally meaningful way. Does 
my manager tend to know what my hobbies are? Does she know my partner 
and I have just had a new arrival in the family? Does she know my mother is 
currently in hospital, and does she seem to take in interest in her progress? 
Those considered Real Leaders at Agritest are clearly seen to have the 
interest, and to take the time, to ask these sorts of questions as a matter of 
course. Indeed, an extension of this capacity is their ability to demonstrate 
sensitivity to individual needs and preferences, or to put it more generically, to 
individual difference. For instance, the effective leader seems to sense that 
some individuals are more private than others, and, in consequence, will 
respect that privacy by not being seen to pry unduly. However, the handling of 
the private person will not extend to ignoring him or her. Instead, the effective 
leader will find a way to maintain a personal connection in a manner that is 
appropriate to the prevailing circumstances. Allied to this point is the leader's 
capacity to convey to each subordinate a sense of belonging to the group. The 
extent to which this is valued by different individuals will reflect their individual 
personality styles. Again, Real Leaders distinguish themselves through their 
ability to read these styles and respond accordingly. 
Related to all the foregoing points is another measure of the competence 
of Real Leaders, the extent to which they are seen to promote values that 
reflect the views and feelings of the workgroup. I observed a good illustration 
of this during my Agritest work. One of the Department Heads, a person 
considered a Real Leader as per their own evaluation protocol, was known 
occasionally to pose the following question in staff meetings: What are the 
things that are important to us as a group of people working in this 
department? To give an illustration of how this matter resolved itself during 
the one occasion I had the opportunity to be present at one of these meetings, 
I can describe the outcome of the discussion as follows. Team members present 
agreed, without too much difficulty, that there were, to use their own words, 
"...three values that should govern the way things operate in our department". 
These were nominated to be: "(a) respect for each other; (b) a "can-do" 
attitude in respect of client-servicing; (c) a cooperative ethic among ourselves 
in terms of sharing the overall workload, and more specifically in respect of the 
"shit jobs"." A couple of things were particularly noteworthy about the 
discussion that led to nomination of these three value commitments. 
In the first instance, it was interesting how the Department Head made 
no attempt to impose her own views on the group. She seemed more than 
comfortable simply to act as facilitator to the discussion. She did confide to me 
afterwards that in the event that a value had been promoted that she seriously 
disagreed with, she would have made known her reservations and attempted to 
influence the outcome. When I asked if she would have pulled rank to insist 
on its exclusion if needs be, her response was that she would never be required 
to do that. The reason she offered was a most telling one. She said that 
whenever the group engages in a discussion that involves some element of 
controversy, members are invariably sensible enough to ensure that the right 
decsion is made. Again, when I pressed her on whether this might typically 
involve some form of subliminal submission to her viewpoint, she answered 
that it was quite common for a different view to prevail. It struck me forcibly 
that she clearly had both confidence in the juegement of her subordinates and 
trust in them as honest and truthful people. 
Another aspect of this generic area of leadership competence relates to 
the attitude of the manager vis-à-vis working conditions in general, and 
workplace safety in particular. The Real Leader is seen to place appropriate 
emphasis on safety, security, and comfort factors in respect of subordinates; in 
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general, to take an interest in the physical as well as other dimensions (e.g. 
psychological, social, et cetera) of their well-being. 
Component 3: Building the team 
Six specific behaviours are seen at Agritest to contribute to the building 
of an atmosphere of team spiritedness and an ethic of cooperative teamwork. 
The first of these is the habit Real Leaders display of regularly convening staff 
meetings during which three things typically occur. First, the leader gives 
feedback on departmental performance and, most crucially, on what is 
happening in the wider organisation by way of new or changed policies, new 
developments generally, and what might be called general tidbits of information 
containing only curiosity value. All of these constitute pieces of information the 
leaders themselves typically receive (a) from their immediate bosses or (b) 
through their attendance at peer level meetings. (What was particularly 
noticeable at Agritest was that even though all Department Heads generally 
were made privy to the same information at the same time, not all of them saw 
fit to pass it along to subordinates. Unsurprisingly, this played no small part in 
their being slotted into the category of Real Leader, OK Boss, or Waste of 
Space.) Second, during these staff meetings, Real Leaders also distinguish 
themselves by their willingness to ask for ideas and suggestions in respect of 
how any aspect of departmental performance might be improved. Third, the 
leader is seen to listen to what is being said in response to that request, and 
moreover to take heed of the answers. The import of this latter point is best 
illustrated when viewed in contrast to a habit displayed by some of those not 
considered Real Leaders. Some Department Heads were noted for a tendency 
to ask for views and suggestions as to how things might be improved, but to 
always end up doing things "their way anyway". 
The second of the six defining behaviours under this generic competence 
sees the leader making a regular and concerted effort to ensure that 
subordinates have a clear understanding as to the nature and scope of their 
respective roles, authority levels, and areas of accountability. The rationale 
behind this feature as a contributor to team building can readily be gleaned 
from analogy with, for instance, a soccer team. Were the coach to inform each 
team member of his role in isolation from the others, it would be left to chance 
as to whether all involved eventually grasped who was supposed to be doing 
what. Much better in terms of promoting teamwork, and thereby the 
propensity to achieve desired outcomes, if the coach ensures everyone is made 
aware of who is playing where and under which specific tactical instructions. 
Again, it needs to be said that while the good sense of this injunction seems 
self-evident when presented in the context of a sports team, its practice was 
the exception rather than norm at Agritest. And indeed I should mention that, 
in my experience as a consultant, Agritest is by no means a notable exemplar 
of poor leadership practice. "Just average" would be a reasonable comparative 
evaluation. 
Allied to the above is the third defining behaviour, a propensity on the 
part of the leader to promote a spirit of mutual cooperation and collaboration 
among team members. Again the soccer analogy is instructive. If team 
members are not willing to 'work off the ball, that is, to make decoy runs and 
so forth, then life is made more difficult for others. Likewise, when the 
defenders are under pressure, it is important for forwards to drop back and 
assist. But again we notice that Real Leaders are seen not only to promote this 
ideal, but to actively contribute to it through day to day personal example. 
Allied to points two and three above, the fourth defining behaviour sees 
the leader as someone who ensures, on a continuing basis, that team members 
retain a sense of common purpose and focus. The good soccer coach is one 
who reminds team members on a regular basis that the team's overall aim for 
the season is to finish in the top four on the league table. This kind of 
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reinforcement keeps them focussed on not just the task at hand (today's 
game), but also the wider agenda that gives their on-going efforts a sense of 
purpose, meaning and significance. 
The fifth defining behaviour, of special relevance to my argument, 
centres on the finding that pinpoints Real Leaders as those who actively 
promote an atmosphere of mutual trust among team members. As this point 
carries such relevance, I probed it further during the Focus Group sessions 
when it arose. As suggested by the discussion in Chapter 3,and by way of 
clear empirical support for the views of Solomon and Flores, a request for 
people to say more on the topic of trust invariably saw the discussion descend 
into a series of cliches and somewhat vacuous statements. I learned for 
instance, (a) that "trust is really important", (b) that "I can't give you a 
definition, but I know what it is", and (c) that "look, we all know what trust is, 
so let's just move on." While these discussions, accordingly, offered little by 
way of penetrative insight into the nature of trust, they did however prove 
useful in highlighting two points. The first of these shows that trust is widely 
seen as something we feel, indicating acceptance of the reality that its nature 
involves more than a purely cognitive architecture. There is clearly an affect 
dimension to it as well. In consequence, it can be concluded that a leader who 
not only promotes an atmosphere of mutual trust, but succeeds in making it 
happen, is clearly doing something that affects the psychological economy of 
the social setting in question. The second highlighted point is the conclusion on 
the part of Focus Group participants that an essential part of the leader's ability 
to promote trust, and thereby team building, was his or her own 
trustworthiness. But not only that, in clear vindication of a key Solomon and 
Flores thesis, it was also felt that Real Leaders show a willingness to trust 
others in a way that both affirms and empowers those others. 
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Sixth and last of the factors identified was the perceived propensity of 
Real Leaders to promote team spiritedness via their encouragement of an 
appropriate amount and frequency of social contact among team members. 
The word "appropriate" was here viewed as significant. It was emphasised, in a 
manner reminiscent of what Aristotle might have said on the subject, that too 
much social contact among work mates can lead to a dissipation of on-the-job 
professionalism. On the other hand, too little tends to work against the 
collaborative and cooperative spirit identified earlier. Effective leaders seem 
able to read the "mean" that corresponds to a correct (virtuous) expression of 
this talent. 
Before leaving this generic competence area, it seems appropriate to 
acknowledge what might be seen as a criticism of the account thus far. This 
relates to the fact that much of what has just been reported under the heading 
of team building seems, on examination, to duplicate what was said earlier 
under the headings relating to (a) focus and direction and (b) motivation and 
morale. This is indeed the case. However, apart from the fact that I am 
attempting to provide here an accurate account of the proceedings of the Focus 
Group sessions and the subsequent interpretive analysis, one needs to consider 
the following. In the real world context, a leader's role cannot be felicitously 
divided into constituent tasks that follow conceptual boundaries. The work of 
managerial leadership is a dynamic activity that in addition to following a 
certain overall strategic thrust, must also demonstrate a great degree of hour-
by-hour flexibility and spontaneity. Things happen which demand a flexible 
response. It is a hallmark of the effective manager/leader that she can call on 
the necessary personal attributes to respond as needed. Moreover, it is also a 
self-evident reality that a specific demonstration of leadership might indeed 
affect team spirit as well as individual motivation. The two concepts, while 
distinguishable, are clearly related. 
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Component 4: Handling con flictual situations 
There are two broad categories in which a manager's ability to handle 
conflictual situations is important. The first comprises those situations to which 
the manager is a direct party. In this instance, she herself is a participant in 
the conflict situation. A good example would be where Department Head and 
Subordinate X are in conflict with one another about a given matter, for 
instance, the latter's work performance. The second category, every bit as 
common for most managers, involves the situation where two or more 
subordinates (or other stakeholders) are in dispute. In this instance, the 
manager is not a direct party to the conflictual situation, but nonetheless has a 
stake in ensuring its speedy and appropriate resolution. Rather than present 
the Focus Group findings in a manner that seeks to differentiate these two 
categories, thereby incurring some unhelpful duplication, I will present a single 
account. Readers can make their own assessment of which specific 
observations are most relevant to which context. 
Perhaps the first indication of competence in this sphere is simply 
willingness on the part of the manager to get involved in the dispute resolution 
process. The point was made most forcibly that Agritest managers 
demonstrate varying levels of eagerness in this respect. Some simply never 
intervene, even when a dispute has gotten out of hand. Their preferred tactic 
is to wait for one of the protagonists to refer the matter to the Human Resource 
Department, and then hope that an independent mediator gets called in to sort 
things out. Others tend to avoid involvement until things have progressed to a 
serious stage of disconnection between the disputants, thus ensuring that 
relations will be significantly aggravated by the time they enter. Real Leaders, 
in contrast, are known to be willing to become involved at the earliest possible 
time. They do, however, encourage the collaborative ethics in this respect, 
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expecting the disputants to attempt a private resolution before seeking 
assistance. But, on being asked to intervene, they willingly do so. 
Once the intervention has begun, Real Leaders are seen to demonstrate 
a range specific dispositions and competencies that facilitate the conflict 
resolution process. Chief among these is an attitude of equity and fairness 
combined with a willingness to listen to both sides before "jumping to 
conclusions" as to what the resolution ought to involve. Allied to this attitudinal 
stance is the specific competency of being able to draw the disputants out on 
the nature and extent of their individual concerns, whether undertaken 
individually or by way of a joint mediation session. This competency is seen to 
include not only an ability to ask the right sorts of questions and to listen non-
judgementally to the answers, but also the necessary empathy to indicate to 
the disputants that their positions are at least being understood and 
acknowledged. A further component of this somewhat multi-faceted 
competency is an ability to de-escalate the conflict at an early stage. 
De-escalation can operate on two levels. The first relates to factual 
assessment and, as such, is grounded, inter alia, in the cognitive or reasoning 
ability of the leader. Being able to grasp the "facts of the matter" at an early 
stage often helps the mediator to precipitate a resolution process more quickly 
than would otherwise have been the case. The second component, alluded to 
earlier, involves the leader's ability to read the emotional signals within which 
the dispute is enveloped. A leader's ability to defuse the degree to which unruly 
passions are exacerbating a dispute situation can be every bit as effective a de-
escalation medium as her ability to comprehend that facts of the situation. 
Allied to the ability to de-escalate a dispute is the capacity of the leader 
to bring the parties closer together. Again, while the obvious expression of 
resides in a process of factual rapprochement, an equally important dimension 
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is the ability to facilitate healing of emotional wounds resulting from the 
conflict. Insults may have been traded; hurtful allegation and counter-
allegation may have been made; sides may have been taken that threaten 
group harmony. Any or all of these can leave deep emotional scars that 
effective conflict handling on the part of a manager can help avoid, or at worst 
greatly alleviate. 
A final competency in respect of conflict handling crosses over the 
boundary into the domains of team building and motivation. This involves 
willingness on the part of the manager to keep those team members not 
directly involved in the conflict situation, adequately informed. Simple 
recognition of the desirability of doing this is itself an indication of a certain 
maturity on the part of the manager. When colleagues of disputants are left in 
the dark, at least undesirable outcomes can be anticipated. One is a propensity 
for half-truths and innuendoes to emerge; the other a tendency for the taking 
of sides. Neither eventuality tends to add any value to either the dispute 
resolution process or the leader's wider agenda in respect of team harmony, 
morale and so forth. 
Component 5: Managing the process of change 
The Agritest investigation, as reported in Chapter 2, made clear the 
extent to which the contemporary Australian workplace is riddled with the 
forces of change. The fifth and final area of generic leadership competence, as 
identified by the Focus Group process, involves the effective management of 
these forces in so far as they impact a given leadership community. 
Real Leaders characterise themselves via an ability not only to recognise 
the inevitability of change, but to appear comfortable in the face of the 
challenges associated with its coming to pass. This is not to say that they have 
either to like or welcome all forms of change. Real Leaders, however, are 
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rarely seen to resist purposeful change, especially when a reflective 
examination of what is in store reveals that the longer-term benefits will 
outstrip the short-term inconvenience, difficulties and discontinuities that will 
need to be faced. In this way, Real Leaders are seen to respond positively to 
the prospect of meeting the challenges head-on. 
Another expression of competence in the change management arena 
involves a proactive rather than reactive stance on the part of the manager. A 
willingness and ability to initiate needed change also plays a role. Often in 
response to feedback received from team members, as part of the 
communicative processes discussed earlier, Real Leaders will demonstrate their 
unwillingness to remain satisfied with the status quo when it is clearly not 
serving the best interests of the team. To initiate change in this manner 
generally requires as much courage as it does the capacity for judicious 
evaluation of the prevailing circumstances. 
Whether change is enforced from without or instigated from within, Real 
Leaders demonstrate empathy and sensitivity in their handling of the 
transformation process. They seem able to tell which team members needs 
gentle persuasion, which need encouragement, which need a strong, directive 
approach, and which need to be told to tone down their natural aggressiveness. 
Part and parcel of this particular competency is a willingness and ability to 
involve team members in the change planning process, which in turn requires 
knowing how to involve different individuals based on their individual needs, 
concerns and aspirations. 
5.253 Refining the Competency Structure 
By way of summary, let me remind the reader that we have arrived at 
the point where a systematic interpretation of the recorded proceedings of six 
Focus Group sessions, conducted as part of the Agritest study in 1999, led to 
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the identification of five generic areas of leadership competence. In the 
foregoing section (4.2) each of the five was further dissected to expose a series 
of sub-competencies associated with it. During the dissection process, it was 
both recognised and acknowledged that several of these sub-competencies fall 
under more than one overall competence category, but that this in no way 
invalidates the conceptual structure thus identified. 
The next question addressed pertained to what could be taken from this 
analysis for the purpose of pointing the way towards the formulation of a 
plausible strategy for systematically cultivating ethical effectiveness on the part 
of those in managerial leadership roles. As a first step in answering it I sought 
to develop further the conceptual structure already to hand. This led me to 
identify a role for what I have chosen to call the core competence of effective 
interpersonal negotiation. Precisely what I mean by "core competence" in this 
respect will become clear shortly. 
The basis of my argument, in pinpointing the axial role of interpersonal 
negotiation, lies in the claim that all five generic competency areas, thus far 
identified, share something in common. This is their reliance on the manager's 
ability to achieve outcomes (such as improved individual motivation or group 
morale, satisfactory resolution of conflict, et cetera) which depend, to a greater 
or lesser degree, on gaining the agreement of subordinates, either individually 
or as a group. How does one go about gaining such agreement, bearing in 
mind the power differential? I draw attention to the question of the power 
differential in anticipation of the objection which suggests that managers can 
rely on their positional authority or power base to "drive through" their desired 
outcomes in any given interchange with subordinates. But this is to miss the 
essence of what Real Leaders are all about. To illustrate what I mean by the 
art of effective interpersonal negotiation, let me begin by identifying a number 
of different ways in which a manager might succeed in getting another to do his 
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or her bidding. In doing this, let us acknowledge the fact that, in any such 
exchange, the manager does indeed hold the formal hierarchical ascendancy. 
In the first instance, and in line with the above-mentioned objection, the 
manager may choose to invoke this ascendant position and insist on getting his 
way. The invocation of positional authority will succeed in gaining the desired 
result on most occasions, but, I contend, only in a limited way. The limitation 
invariably manifests, sooner or later, as a form of diminished commitment on 
the part of the subordinate, born out of the reluctant acquiescence that drove 
the decision to comply. As management theorist Peter Senge correctly points 
out, there is a big difference between commitment and compliance centred 
motivation. 205 The latter is grounded in a purely rational form of instrumental 
response. By this I mean that the subordinate will recognise the "good sense" 
of being seen to comply with the boss's wishes, and thereby agree as a form of 
damage control. One major drawback associated with this response is that the 
compliant party often has to deal subsequently with the onset of a residual 
emotional reaction shaped by negative forces such as self-disgust, guilt, 
resentment, anger, and so forth. Enthusiastic commitment, in contrast to 
reluctant compliance, constitutes a form of pledge as much grounded in heart-
centred affect as head-based reasoning. 
I refer to the second method open to the manager as "simple 
persuasion". By this I mean an attempt to gain the desired response in virtue of 
a an appeal to nothing more compelling than, "Do this because it's a good 
idea!" The principal weakness of this method is that such an appeal may well 
succeed, but only because the subordinate does not wish to offend or 
disappoint the manager. 
205 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 
(London: Century Business, 1992). 
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While this is not the same as the invocation of positional authority on 
the part of the latter, it again results in a compliant rather than committed 
response. A third method of getting one's way comes in the form of subtle 
bribe. This amounts to the manager saying or inferring something along the 
lines of: "If you do as I ask, then I won't forget it during the next round of 
promotions." Nothing specific is being guaranteed here, but the implication is 
clear. While an ambitious subordinate may well be swayed by this form of 
appeal, the price the manager is likely to pay is a diminution of respect on the 
part of the others, and others in the event of the subordinate mentioning the 
arrangement to colleagues. 
The above three methods of getting the desired result do not exhaust 
the list of sub-optimal options open to the manager. They do, however, serve 
to illustrate what sub-optimal means in this context. It means winning or 
getting one's way prima facie, but failing to engender enthusiastic commitment 
on the part of the other, to the point where the heart is as much invested in the 
agreed outcome as the head. Let us contrast these methods with my suggested 
preferred option, that of effective interpersonal negotiation. This involves the 
person instigating the negotiation (in our example, the manager) entering the 
process with a particular mindset firmly in place. This might be called the Win-
Win perspective. The idea is to be prepared to make calculated concessions to 
the other party in order to achieve one's own desired outcome. This mindset, 
moreover, includes a repudiation of any form of unfair advantage-taking, most 
especially one based on an invocation, either obviously or subtly, of the power 
differential. As such, the negotiation option as here conceived constitutes both 
a philosophy and a method, in both cases grounded in an implicit appeal to 
honesty, fairness, equity, and the sanguine expectation of mutual benefit. 
On the basis of the above argument, the competency structure 
associated with effective leadership practice can be summarised in the following 
Managing 
Change 
Managing 
Conflict 
Building 
Motivation 
Providing 
Focus & Direction 
Fostering 
Teamwork 
terms. There are five generic areas of competence which, while conceptually 
distinct, nevertheless tend to impinge upon each other in terms of practical 
application. These relate to the effective handling of focus and direction 
setting, motivation and morale, team building, conflict and change. Let us call 
these the applied competencies. Underpinning each, however, and serving to 
bind them together in terms of practical delivery, is the core competence we 
refer to as effective interpersonal negotiation. This structure can be illustrated 
graphically as per Figure 5.2. 
All underpinned by... 
Effective Interpersonal Negotiation 
Figure 5.2 
5.254 Refining the Competency Structure 
As an understanding of the relevance of the process of effective 
interpersonal negotiation is such a crucial element of my argument, it is 
appropriate to examine its nature and scope in more detail. Let me do this by 
once again referring back to a specific exercise conducted at Agritest. On 
presenting the competency structure described in Figure 5.1 to members of 
their leadership development project team, I suggested as their next task the 
formulation of guidelines for conducting effective negotiation. This would, in 
turn, become a key component of the syllabus for the internal leadership 
development programme then on the drawing board. Conducting this exercise 
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as an accelerated learning project, the team consulted a range of propositional 
learning sources and combined the resultant insights with a sharing of their 
own personal experiences of the negotiation process. In due course they 
produced the guidelines contained in Table 5.1 hereunder. 
As is apparent from this table, any given negotiation situation will ideally 
be viewed, on commencement, as a process. To think of a negotiation session 
as something one casually rolls up to with a view to "winging it" is to miss the 
point. With this in mind, the Agritest team recommended a four-phase 
approach. The preparatory work is conducted before any interpersonal 
engagement takes place with the other party. Once complete, the second phase 
begins the engagement and involves dialogue during which relevant 
information is shared. 
Table 5.1 	Four-phase Negotiation Process 
Preparation Phase 
1. Identify all relevant issues and concerns 
2. Set objectives — noting ideal and minimum requirements 
3. Try to anticipate the other party's likely demands 
4. Decide what concessions you are prepared to make 
Dialogue Phase 
5. Be prepared to exchange information (facts, views, opinions, etc.) 
6. Try to shape other party's expectations to fit your objectives 
7. Try to identify other party's objectives and priorities 
8. Be attentive for signals on other party's intentions 
Framing Phase 
9. Test out assumptions via 'trial proposals' 
10. Listen carefully for in-coming proposals or other signals 
11. Learn how to trade concessions as way of gaining agreement 
Agreement Phase 
12. Summarise key points of agreement 
13. Ensure common understanding and joint acceptance among parties 
14. Formalise the agreement in some appropriate way 
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Next comes the framing process, by means of which the effective 
negotiator attempts to find mutually beneficial common ground around which a 
final agreement can be structured. The last phase serves to clarify 
understanding and bring effective closure to the process. 
At this juncture, I refer the reader back to a discussion that took place 
in Section 2.2 (Chapter 2). It was argued there that a useful way of thinking 
about the content of a given competency is to view it as consisting of three 
essential ingredients: a knowledge component, a skill component, and a 
component of attitudinal maturity. Overlaying this model on the guidelines 
presented in Table 4.1 produces an informative insight. On the basis of the 
overlay, a prima facie case can be made for suggesting that the practice of 
effective interpersonal negotiation is primarily a skill-intensive activity. After 
all, it can readily be argued that numbered points 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13 and 14 all demand significant skill components. Most of the latter, in turn, 
can be seen to fall under the generic heading of communication skills. For 
instance, activities 1, 7 and 8 require effective listening skills; 9, 12 and 13 call 
for the ability to express oneself assertively. Of the two not included in the 
skill-centred listing, activity 2 is perhaps primarily knowledge based, while 
activity 5 seems like an attitudinal factor. 
The conclusion drawn here, as to the skill-intensive nature of the art and 
practice of interpersonal negotiation, is, by no means, without evidentiary 
support. The project team, on delivering the model outlined in Table 4.1, 
arrived at precisely the same position. Moreover, during the course of my 
corporate life, I have rarely if ever heard of the practice referred to as anything 
other than "negotiation skill". A further piece of evidence can be quickly 
reviewed by referring to the promotional documentation of an international 
consulting firm that specialises in the area. As can be seen from its directory 
of services, Scotwork sees itself as being in the business of 'negotiation skills' 
development. 206 
To forestall the objection that such a citation lacks adequate academic 
credibility, let me remind the reader that the point I am trying to emphasise 
relates, not to the conceptual structure of negotiation practice, but rather to 
how it is perceived by corporate practitioners. If, then, I am to question the 
accuracy of the claim that interpersonal negotiation is primarily a skill-centred 
practice, what alternative thesis am I offering? This is the important question 
to which I now wish to turn my attention. 
5.26 Summary of key points to date 
The picture that has emerged thus far, in respect of a plausible model of 
constitutive leadership competencies, can be summarised as follows. There are 
at least five distinguishable areas of individual competency associated with the 
overall notion of competent or effective managerial leadership. I have argued 
that a common thread linking them is their reliance on a more fundamental 
competency, that which I describe as effective interpersonal negotiation. 
So long as one accepts that the constitutive sub-competencies making 
up each category tend to overlap in the actual real-world theatre of leadership 
practice, and that the boundaries employed here are useful for purposes of 
conceptual guidance only, then the model presented will appeal to the HNDM. 
It serves to show him that those presenting the model have a grasp of the 
relevant corporate idiom, part of which is a predilection to employment of 
models of precisely this sort. 
206 Corroboration of this subjective view can be seen at www.scotwork.com . Scotzvork is a 
Scottish-based consulting firm dealing exclusively in the provision of specialist training 
and other services in the negotiation arena. With successful subsidiaries operating in 
many parts of the world, including Australia, the firm is considered one of the premier 
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Importantly, it will be recalled that in the explanatory account given of 
these various leadership competencies, there were several references made to 
the fact that possessing and displaying them in turn required a certain type of 
emotional aptitude or disposition. This, in turn, is entirely compatible with the 
central conclusion arrived at in Chapter 4, namely, that ethical competence is 
all about the ability to foster, build and maintain high-trust work communities. 
But here we encounter a major obstacle in terms of contemporary 
Australian corporate culture and its prevailing idiom. Simply put, to speak in 
terms of the development of emotional aptitudes, or to speak in terms of 
learning how to development high-trust work communities, will in either case 
cause the hard-nosed decision-maker to recoil. Both language in use, and the 
proposition on offer, will offend his dominant paradigm. It might be suggested 
that one way round this would be to nominate the development focus as 
consisting in one or more of the leadership competencies per se (see Figure 
5.1). These, after all, amount to the actual components of everyday leadership 
work, and as such, are made of words and concepts that are part of the 
relevant idiom. But there is a major problem associated with this manoeuver. 
To put in place a development programme aimed at the cultivation of one or 
more of these competencies, is not necessarily to guarantee that the syllabus 
followed will, in any substantive way, address the point at which the practice of 
the individual competency intersects with its ethical implications. In fact, 
experience shows that most leadership programmes concentrate on skill 
development, not the wider notion of competency development. 
We are now approaching the point at which, I would claim, many well-
intentioned applied ethicists will come to grief in their attempts to penetrate the 
corporate world. The kind of straightforward argument that needs to be made 
players in the field. The narrative material contained in its website provides ample 
testimony to he fact that the firm clearly sees negotiation as a skill-based process. 
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is idiomatically unacceptable. For instance, what actually needs to be said is 
something along the following lines: "Ms CEO, authoritative research shows 
that, chances are, your management personnel need to work on building up 
their levels of leadership ethical competence." But, if this is said, the 
exhortation will be rejected. 
5.3 Making the 'Business Case' 
5.31 Introduction 
To make a case capable of convincing the hard-nosed decision-maker, it 
is necessary to leverage astutely, on several levels, one's grasp of the 
prevailing corporate idiom. My aim in this section is show how this is logically 
possible. To begin with, let me summarise the logic sequence already 
established. Point 1: There is a need to foster ethical competence at 
managerial leadership level. Point 2: Ethical competence has been defined in 
such a way as to require attention to the human psychological capacities 
needed for both the earning and giving of trust. Point 3: Any attempt to 
address such capacities directly, however, including any attempt to articulate 
the need in these terms, is likely to be rejected by the hard-nosed decision-
maker. Point 4: If such a direct, logical approach will not work, then perhaps 
an indirect one will. 
5.32 Towards a compelling 'indirect' argument 
The first move in compiling the indirect argument is to remind our selves 
of two seminal conclusions arrived at earlier. At the end of Chapter 3, it was 
noted that leadership can usefully be thought of as a 'mindset' that is inclusive-
expansive. Late in Chapter 4, in drawing attention to the usefulness of the 
metaphor of the organisation as a community', it was noted that leadership can 
thus be thought of as an interplay of relational forces between the leader, the 
individuals (stakeholders), and the community qua social group. While some of 
the forces referred to here are ethical in nature, many are psychological. They 
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have to do with human instinct, human intellect, and not least of all, human 
emotion. In fact, as became especially clear during our review of the Solomon 
and Flores thesis on trust-building, it is well-nigh impossible to leave them out 
of any meaningful discussion of leadership and leadership ethics. 
We have seen that leadership is about possessing the ability to build and 
maintain the type of interpersonal rapport that both sustains, and in turn is 
sustained by, a mutually respectful and trusting environment. 2" On this view, 
it is reasonable to conclude that a person capable of demonstrating such ability 
is one who possesses a range of virtuous qualities. It is certainly likely that she 
will both possess and display many more virtues than vices. This leads me to 
postulate yet another view of leadership, here introduced for the first time. On 
this, leadership can be thought of as having two dimensions, what I will call the 
instrumentalist and the essentialist. The instrumentalist view relates to all 
those treatments of leadership that deal with what the leader does. Thus, it 
includes the use of such metaphors as the leader as steward, as benefactor, as 
helper, as coach, as confidante, as teacher, and so forth; and, it also 
incorporates most, if not all, of the reductionist theories described in Chapter 2. 
I wish to contrast this with a view of leadership that asks the question, What 
sort of person, qua human agent, becomes a leader? 
To possess the personal qualities needed to engender trust, confidence, 
respect, and in general a positive emotional environment during one's dealings 
with others, necessitates a certain sort of individual. In fact, if challenged to 
put into a single phrase the sort of person likely to fit this profile, my claim is 
that many would suggest the following answer: A person of character. The lay-
person, on being asked to explain what is meant by a 'person of character', is 
likely to come up with an intuitively well-informed response. This would 
207 Refer to the arguments of both Chapters 3 and 4. 
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include, I contend, the suggestion that such an individual will be, inter alia, 
genuine, sincere, authentic, kind, courageous, temperate, caring, and humble. 
Let us suppose, then, that our project were to be re-positioned as one of 
placing the developmental focus on deliberatem character building. That is, as 
a way of building greater ethical competence in leaders, the proposal is to 
concentrate the developmental effort on character building. Would this get by 
the hard-nosed decision-maker in corporate Australia? I think not. Yet again, 
we have a concept ('character' in this instance) that lies outside the scope of 
what is idiomatically acceptable, in the sense in which I have been using the 
phrase. 
While this position remains at odds with the prevailing paradigm, I 
would nonetheless claim that we are now approaching a solid and coherent 
basis for an overall strategy. In support of this, consider the following re-
framing of our logic position. Point 1: Corporate Australia needs to give serious 
attention to the development of greater ethical competence in leadership 
practice. Point 2: To achieve this, a developmental focal point is needed that is 
relevant from a moral psychologica1 209 standpoint. Point 3: Irrespective of what 
might be idiomatically acceptable, the concept of deliberate character formation 
208 I employ the term 'deliberate' here quite purposefully. In doing so, I am following the 
distinction made by Kekes. He distinguishes between the sort of "fortuitous" character we 
end up with, in the absence of a willingness to undertake critical self-reflection, and the sort 
of deliberately shaped character that will result from purposeful, intentional cultivation. See, 
John Kekes, The Examined Life, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1988), and also, John Kekes, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1995). In the latter, see in particular his discussion from pp. 129-136. 
209 In using the term 'moral psychological', I am explicitly following the suggestion of 
Flanagan and Rorty that moral psychology can be thought as the discipline located at the 
intersection point between normative ethics and scientific psychology. See the 
Introduction in Owen Flanagan and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, (eds.), Identity, Character, and 
Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). 
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is a plausible focal point. 210 Assuming this logic chain is defensible, what is now 
needed is something that will connect it compatibly to the prevailing idiom. 
5.33 Emotional intelligence 
In this section, I will show how the recent upsurge of interest in the 
concept of emotional intelligence, and in particular Goleman's work in the area, 
can be used as the critical connecting variable in the indirect argument here 
being pursued. To begin with, let us examine what is meant by emotional 
intelligence. 
5.331 Brief overview of the concept 
Most of what we now know about human intelligence is very much at 
variance with what those of us, over the age of thirty, will recall from our 
earlier years. As a teenager in the 1960s, my understanding of intelligence 
centred on the notion of intelligence quotient, or IQ for short. Even to the 
layperson of the era, this was a straightforward enough concept, in that it 
measured 'how smart you were'. Clever kids at school were considered to have 
a 'high IQ'. They would most likely fly through high-school, go on to college or 
university, and then graduate to get a good job and earn good money. This, at 
least, constituted the popular wisdom. Much has changed, however, in the past 
thirty years in respect of the layperson's understanding of intelligence. 
Most Australian corporate managers are not formally qualified 
psychologists. Yet most Australian managers can now discuss with you the 
concept of multiple intelligence theory. Many, in fact, could tell you that it is 
210 At this juncture, I realise that we are still operating in 'non-technical' terms, 
philosophically speaking. Rather, we are working on the basis of informed 'layperson' 
logic. I will describe in detail, in Chapters 6 and 7, how this intuitive position becomes 
vindicated when underwritten by a particular expression of the ancient ethical doctrine of 
eudaimonism. 
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most famously associated with the work of Howard Gardner. 211 In a similar 
vein, most of them could now hold a reasonably well-informed conversation 
about what it means to be emotionally intelligent, and they could certainly tell 
you that the leading popular authority on the subject is Daniel Goleman. 212 
One of Goleman's main techniques, when introducing the concept of 
emotional intelligence to a corporate audience, is reminiscent of my own 
° 
opening remarks in this section. He asks participants to cast their minds to the 
identification of those old school mates who fall into the category of having 
been very smart at school, yet subsequently 'came to no good in the real 
world'. In a similar vein, he asks for identification of those who appeared 
hopeless at school, yet went on to become financially or otherwise successful in 
later life. The reason for the former, he suggests, is probably a high IQ but low 
EQ (the prevalent abbreviation emotional intelligence), and vice versa for the 
latter. EQ, according to Goleman, amounts to "... a different way of being 
smart". 
Goleman goes on to nominate five observable competencies that 
contribute to possessing and displaying a high EQ. The more of these that one 
can display, the more emotionally intelligent one is. The first is the ability to 
know one's own emotions. This amounts to being able to recognise and monitor 
one's feelings from moment to moment, as they occur. People possessing this 
capacity make personal decisions with certainty and assurance. 
211 For a brief introduction to Gardner's multiple intelligence theory, see Howard Gardner, 
Reflections on Multiple Intelligences: Myths and Messages, Phi Delta Kappan, November 1998, 
pp. 200-209. For a more thorough explication, see Howard Gardner, Frames of Mind: The 
Theory of Multiple Intelligences, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983). For an interesting 
discussion of how he relates the theory to leadership, see Howard Gardner, Leading Minds: 
An Anatomy of Leadership, (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995). 
212 The reason for this is that, in his capacity as an active member of the international 
corporate 'speaking circuit', Goleman is a regular visitor to Australia. Moreover, many 
have read his books and/or articles. See, for instance, Daniel Goleman, Working With 
Emotional Intelligence, (London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1998). 
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The second capacity is that of managing one's feelings. This amounts to 
being able to handle one's prevailing emotional state in an appropriate manner. 
Persons proficient in this domain are better able to shake off negative emotions 
like gloom, anxiety, and irritability. These are the people who experience less 
difficulty bouncing back after an adversity has struck. The third capacity 
nominated by Goleman is that of motivating oneself. People possessing this 
attribute tend, inter alia, to be capable of delaying gratification and stifling their 
more unhelpful urges. They can, with greater ease, enter the psychological 
state known as 'flow'. This is often associated not only with high degrees of 
personal contentment, but also the capacity for creative thinking and 
productive output levels. 213 The fourth is empathy. People with high empathy 
levels can readily place themselves 'in the other person's shoes, feel their 
feelings, see things from their point of view. Such individuals, according to 
Goleman, are attuned to subtle social cues and signals, which indicate what 
others want or need. Finally, the emotionally intelligent individual is adept at 
recognising and managing the prevailing emotional 'feel' or atmosphere in a 
gathering. 
5.332 Marking the relevance 
There are three reasons why the concept of EQ, as here briefly 
explained, is relevant to this stage of the current argument. First, the specific 
capacities, of which it is constituted, are clearly the sorts of characteristics that 
were displayed by Real Leaders, the normative benchmark for effective 
leadership, in reference to which I have operated since Chapter 3. 
213 The topic of flow, technically known as 'psychic negentropy', is explained in detail in Mihali 
Csikszentmihalyi and Isabella Selega Csikszentmihalyi, (eds.), Optimal Experience: Psychological 
Studies of Flow in Consciousness, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1988.   A 
fascinating everyday account is provided in Mihail Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The 
Psychology of Optimal Experience, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990). 
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Second, the concept of EQ - and especially Goleman's work in the area - 
is well known in corporate Australia. Moreover, the research conducted by the 
Consortium for Research into Emotional Intelligence, of which Goleman is joint 
chair, is well known in this country. In fact, not only is it well known, but more 
significantly, it is accepted as robust and indicative of what needs to be 
concentrated on for leadership development purposes. This is an important 
point, as it represents the sort of 'empirical evidence' that facilitates compliance 
with at least one key dimension of the prevailing corporate idiom. Third, as 
Goleman makes clear in his writings and public lectures, EQ, unlike IQ, is 
capable of stimulation and development. 
This last point is central to Goleman's propositions in respect of the 
manner in which EQ is relevant to effective leadership practice. 214 Specifically, 
he argues, - and this is a crucial link in the logic chain as it bears upon my own 
overall argument — the challenge of systematically cultivating higher levels of 
EQ always depends on elevating one's level of critical self-awareness. The 
reason for this is that both EQ level, and the deliberate cultivation of character, 
share the same commencement imperative. 215 
Given this, it is now possible to move confidently to finalising a business 
case to satisfy the hard-nosed decision-maker. Not only that, this last point 
also serves to indicate what sort of normative ethical platform can serve to 
underpin a developmental syllabus. 
214 Foremost among these are: (a) Daniel Coleman, What Makes a Leader? Harvard Business 
Review, November-December, 1998, pp. 93-102; (b) Daniel Coleman, Working With 
Emotional Intelligence, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1998); (c) Daniel Goleman, 
Leadership That Gets Results, Harvard Business Review, March-April, 2000, pp. 78-90; and 
(d) Daniel Coleman (with Richard Boyatzis and Annie McKee), The New Leaders: 
Transforming the Art of Leadership into the Science of Results, (London, UK: Little, Brown, 
2002). 
215 As we shall see in Chapter 7, there is a good deal of similarity between Kekes' notion of 
moral wisdom, and the type of eudaimonism-centred ethical competence that I am here 
advocating. Moreover, we shall see how Kekes considers what he refers to as 'self-
knowledge' to be inextricably connected to the cultivation of character and moral wisdom. 
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5.34 Some key lessons from 'Marketing 101' 
5.341 The feature-benefit concept 
Larger Australian organisations, like Agritest, each year commit 
significant funds to management development programmes that fall into one or 
other of two generic categories, what I call the staple diet and the innovative 
newcomers. Corporate decision-makers will readily attest to the vast amount 
of promotional material they receive, literally every work day, in respect of 
programmes falling into both categories, but especially the former. 
Staple diet offerings, as here conceived, typically address a predictable 
range of perennially favourite topics that includes (a) basic principles of 
management, (b) managing change, (c) managing conflict, (d) negotiation 
skills, (e) building teams, and so forth. What characterises them is that their 
demand patterns are well established and predictable. The marketing challenge 
for each service provider is simply to maximise its market-share. The position 
is somewhat different in respect of the category of innovative newcomers. 
Here, there is no established demand pattern and the competitive threat may 
be, at least in the early days, insignificant. 
It is my view that many applied ethicists would fail to recognise the 
crucial difference between these two generic types of product offering. In 
consequence, their product positioning strategies tend to be ineffective. Let me 
illustrate what I mean by product positioning strategy by direct reference to the 
challenge at hand. 
The first issue to be addressed in formulating a strategy for marketing a 
development programme aimed at the systematic fostering of ethical 
competence in leadership, is to recognise that it belongs to the category of 
innovative newcomers. The second issue for consideration can be 
appropriately introduced by means of a well-known anecdote from 'Marketing 
101'. In this story, two engineering companies simultaneously develop a new 
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product, the quarter-inch drill bit. They each then manufactured 250,000 units 
of the product, which they proceed to offer to the market. One succeeds 
magnificently, while the other fails miserably. Given that all other things are 
equal, why does this happen? 
'Marketing 101' students learn that the successful competitor knows that 
to be successful, one must sell benefits, not features. This lesson is typically 
conveyed by means of the aphorism: Two hundred and fifty thousand 
carpenters bought the Brand X quarter-inch drill bits, because Vendor X 
positioned its product as a solution for those needing quarter-inch holes (a 
benefit). In contrast, Vendor Y was unsuccessful on account of working from 
the assumption that the carpenters wanted new-fangled quarter-inch option (a 
feature). The difference is subtle, but it cuts to the heart of contemporary 
competitive economics. Simply put, most consumers are interested in having 
problems solved or needs met. They typically do not really care how it happens, 
so long as it does. 
5.342 The 'redundant question' concept 
The 'redundant question' concept is both simple and arguably simplistic. 
It is the question that does not need to be asked, because everybody already 
knows the answer. Thus, to ask, "Do you still love your Mom?" is to ask a 
redundant question, at least in the vast majority of cases. Marketing 101 
teaches that it is a good selling technique to include such questions at critical 
points in the negotiation. 
5.35 'Selling' the development of critical self-awareness 
In §5.33 above, I identified the role of critical self-awareness in respect 
of movement towards higher levels of ethical competence. But movement 
towards increased critical self-awareness has likewise been identified as a 
necessary condition for the development of emotional intelligence, which 
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currently is a development offering of interest to corporate Australia. It is not 
necessary, accordingly, to make explicit appeal to the fostering of ethical 
competence. Instead, the appeal can be directed towards the fostering of 
emotional intelligence. By leveraging this simple but seminal distinction, the 
ethicist can get around several otherwise troublesome obstacles. 
In the immediately preceding section, I discussed the concept of the 
redundant question. It is now appropriate to illustrate its relevance. My claim is 
that the applied ethicist interested in successfully marketing a programme of 
leadership ethics development to corporate Australia must begin by posing the 
following question to his corporate prospect. "I presume, Ms X, that you are 
interested in increasing 'P', and doing so on some sort of sustainable basis?" In 
this question, 'P' stands for a business outcome that may be construed in one 
of three ways: individual performance, work group productivity, or overall 
corporate profitability. The important point is recognising that this constitutes 
one of the very few redundant questions that can be put to the hard-nosed 
decision-maker. He (remember, it will invariably be a 'he') can predictably be 
relied upon always to have some conception of 'P' at the forefront of his mind. 
He will answer: "Yes. Of course, I am interesting in doing something about 
shoring up our overall sustainable profitability." The applied ethicist then 
responds: "I had assumed so. I'd now like to take a few minutes to show how 
an innovative development programme can be leveraged to precisely that end." 
Making the opening move in this serves the ethicist in two ways. First, 
it alerts the decision-maker to the fact that, as a potential business partner, the 
ethicist is commercially-minded and in touch with the relevant idiom. Second, 
and of at least equal importance, it sets the scene for the subsequent 
presentation needed to make a logical and convincing sales case. It is to the 
second of these that I now turn. 
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Let me here remind the reader of a claim I made in Chapter 4 
concerning the prevailing Australian corporate mentality. It is still very much in 
thrall to an objectivist philosophy that assigns little value to claims that are not 
empirically measurable in some. Bearing this in mind, the next step should be 
to remind the prospect of the well-established link between quality of 
leadership performance and the level of "P" that can be expected. The ethicist 
is on safe ground here, because the validity of this connection is axiomatic. 
Now comes the step that involves posing the question, What factors 
contribute to quality of leadership performance? It is crucially important to 
answer this by invoking two specific sources. The first is the general body of 
research emanating from the Consortium for Research into Emotional 
Intelligence. In addition to whatever information is made available to the 
prospect on the spot, it also helps to offer the relevant website address, 
namely, xxx. The second source is that of Goleman's specific contributions to 
the theme of leadership effectiveness and emotional intelligence, notably those 
already referenced in Note 212. 
The final component in the chain of 'logical' connections involves spelling 
out the role played by critical self-awareness in determining the level of EQ of a 
given individual. In particular, what needs to be emphasised is the direct 
correlation that is known to exist between one's levels of critical self-awareness 
and EQ. 
The overall logic sequence can now be presented graphically as: 
         
CSA 
    
A 
         
where CSA stands for critical self-awareness, EQ is emotional intelligence, L A 
connotes an increase in leadership effectiveness, and 'P' A an increase in 
performance, productivity or profitability as nominated by the prospect. 
Attention has been given thus far in the overall argument to emotional 
intelligence216, leadership, and the meaning and significance of 'P'. It is now 
time to address, in more substantive terms, the nature of critical self-
awareness. I propose to do this as a component of the challenge of putting 
together a viable syllabus to underpin the development programme. Syllabus 
design is my focus in the remaining two chapters. 
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216 When making a presentation of the sort described here, it may be useful for the ethicist to have a 
further piece of empirical evidence up her sleeve. This could be used to answer the objection of a 
particularly anal and sexist hard-nosed decision-maker, who might issue the challenge: "All this talk 
about emotional stuff is OK for you. You're a woman, after all. It's easy for you. As far as I'm 
concerned, emotions just get in the way of good (read 'macho') decision-making." The evidence 
comes from Martin, who summarises important research findings in the following way: " [These 
findings].. .reinforce the legitimacy and wisdom of recognizing an affective dimension of the 
managerial decision-making process. Such a dimension reflects sensitivity to the feelings, emotions 
and plight of employees, customers, suppliers, communities and other constituencies affected by the 
implementation of managerial decisions. In short, decision-makers are advised to listen to the 
"voices of the heart", so to speak, and avoid basing decisions solely on a cognitive, rationally 
analytical level of understanding." See, Charles L. Martin, Feelings, Emotional Empathy and Decision-
Making: Listening to the Voices of the Heart, Journal of Management Development, Vol. 12, No. 5, 1993, 
pp. 33-45. 
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Chapter 6 
Syllabus Structure: The Broad Platform 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the 7-5 Framework. I showed that 
by selecting a commencement interpretation for each of the seven variables, 
and then by looking at them in mutual interplay, it was possible to gain some 
important insights into how the change process under review might be 
expected to proceed. Vis-a-vis my own project, where the change process 
involves the design and implementation of a development programme aimed at 
the systematic cultivation of ethical competence, the model assisted with (a) 
overcoming the challenge of dealing with the hard-nosed decision-maker, and 
(b) pinpointing human character as the developmental focal point. 
To be effective, a development programme requires a well thought out 
and robust syllabus. My aim in this chapter is to show that the ancient ethical 
doctrine of eudaimonism, in a broadly Aristotelian expression, is an especially 
suitable platform for my purposes. 
Character, while a word in widespread colloquial usage, takes on special 
meaning in moral philosophy. A syllabus for its systematic development should 
therefore be carefully located in normative ethical theory. But ethical theory is 
by no means a unified field. After two and a half thousand years of continued 
exploration within the Western moral tradition, debate continues to rage as to 
the relative merits and demerits of the many individual positions that have 
been postulated. 217 Accordingly, in seeking out a suitable ethical platform for 
the current project, care needs to be taken to make the appropriate choice 
from among the relevant alternative platforms. For this reason, I will provide an 
217 I touched briefly on this point already in Chapter 4, and will return to it later in this 
chapter. 
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outline mapping of the overall territory. But before tackling that task, it is 
appropriate to begin with an examination of the ethical nature of character. 
6.2 Character 
6.21 A general commentary 
My aim in this section is to show why a concentration on character, as 
the critical object of developmental scrutiny, is warranted in light of the account 
of the strategic organisational change agenda to emerge in the previous 
chapter. To this end, I will commence by looking at how the topic has been 
treated in the philosophical literature. 
The following situation is commonplace in the recruitment and selection 
of new managers. The person doing the selecting, having worked through the 
applicant list decides, before finally offering the position to the favoured 
candidate, to refer to an acquaintance of that person in search of a character 
reference. In so doing one is normally hoping that the referee will feel free to 
speak of the individual as a person of good character. This is the sense in 
which the term character will be considered for the purposes of the present 
enquiry. The first question to be addressed, then, is this: What exactly do we 
mean by character, when used in this sense? 
Flanagan and Rorty see character as consisting in a person's motives, 
perceptions, emotions, ideals, and self-conception. 218 As such, they suggest 
that any approach to ethical enquiry using it as the focal reference, is clearly 
one that recognises the relevance of psychology to morality. The reason, they 
suggest, is that the concepts of character and personality have long been 
conflated in everyday discourse, and with some justification, a point to which I 
will return in the Epilogue. 
218 Owen Flanagan and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, (eds.), Identity, Character, and Morality: 
Essays in Moral Psychology, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p. 2. 
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While personality has long been considered central to deliberations on 
mental functioning and related behaviour patterns, it came very much to the 
forefront of psychological investigation when Isabelle Myers and Joanne Briggs 
built their modern theory of personality types in the mid-1940s on a foundation 
of Jungian thought. This, in turn, quickly became a foundational tenet of 
modern developmental and educational psychology. The particular 
configuration of virtues and vices that stamp human individuality, as 
constituted by our individual personality styles, tends to be a reliable signpost 
to the quality of our character. 219 
Sennett tells us that "... old English speakers, and indeed writers going 
back to antiquity, were in no doubt about the meaning of "character": it is the 
ethical value we place on our own desires and on our relations with others." He 
goes on to say that Horace saw the character of a person as depending on his 
or her connections to the world. In this sense character is seen as a more 
encompassing term than its modern offspring "personality", which concerns 
desires and sentiments which may fester within, witnessed by no one else. 22° 
Another feature of character is its enduring nature. Whilst some 
descriptors of human individuality tend to focus on short-term or transitory 
conditions - mood here springs to mind - character in contrast is very much 
about the longer-term aspect of our emotional experience. Good character 
becomes manifest, accordingly, through values such as loyalty and 
commitment, or through the pursuit of long-term goals, or via the practice of 
delayed gratification for the sake of a future end. "Character concerns the 
personal traits which we value in ourselves and for which we seek to be valued 
219 See, for instance, John Deigh's Introduction in, John Deigh, (ed.), Ethics and Personality: 
Essays in Moral Psychology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 1-10. See, also, 
Nancy Sherman, The Habituation of Character, in Nancy Sherman, (ed.), Aristotle's Ethics: 
Critical Essays, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999), pp. 231-260. 
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by others."221 Gini tells us that the root of the word "character" comes from 
the Greek word for engraving. As such, applied to human agents, it refers to 
the "...enduring marks or etched-in factors in our personality, which include our 
inborn talents as well as the learned and acquired traits imposed on us by life 
and experience. These engravings define us, set us apart, and motivate 
behavior. "222 
Given the oft-encountered conflation of character and personality, one 
might wonder why modern psychology does not speak of character theory. 
Presumably the answer has something to do with the fact that the word 
character has moral overtones which personality lacks, and many psychologists 
are understandably wary of wandering outside their domain of expertise. 
Given this aspect of the constitution of character, it becomes clear why 
it is so relevant to an enquiry of this sort; that is, one concerned with moral 
education, albeit in the specialist arena of organisational leadership practice. If 
character, in its most commonplace understanding, has to do with the ways in 
which we most typically tend to think and act, then the thoughts and actions 
that are related to moral choice present as the most significant. A leader's 
habit of taking her morning coffee break at 10am might say but very little 
about her character. But her tendency to tell lies, or for that matter to be 
scrupulously honest in all her dealings, are quite telling and revealing factors in 
terms of character insight. But it is important to remember that not all 
character traits (in the loose sense) which potentially affect the happiness and 
wellbeing of others should be so readily classified as moral. 
220 Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New 
Capitalism, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), pp. 9-12. 
221  Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New 
Capitalism, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), p. 10. 
222 Al Gini, Moral Leadership and Business Ethics, in Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of 
Leadership, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p. 37. 
For example, John's tendency to be nit-picky may be both a feature of 
his character and a source of real annoyance to his subordinates. Likewise, the 
favoured characteristic of resilience can be morally significant but it certainly 
need not be. Having thus established that character can have a non-moral 
dimension, it is appropriate to concede, following Kupperman, that it is its 
moral dimension in which we are most clearly interested. As he says: "No one 
would be spoken of as having a good character who did not, on the whole, 
make moral choices in a way that we considered correct." 223 To have a good 
character suggests the dominance of virtue over vice. 
People with but a vague grasp of the role which character plays in 
shaping moral consciousness, are likely to figure prominently among those who 
tend to express views or act in a moralistic manner. This is one reason for 
making a specific attempt to spell out, as definitively as possible, the precise 
nature of the relation between character and morality. Having set the scene by 
way of the observations made above, let us now move to a more precise level 
of analysis. 
6.22 Anatomy of character 
As with many of the concepts of moral philosophy, it would be naive to 
commence from the assumption that a single, unambiguous, and unchallenged 
definition of character can be found. Likewise, it would be silly not to assign it 
one for the purpose of this project. However, given the obvious complexity of 
the term, one should be especially careful in setting parameters to cover the 
formulation of such a definition. There are at least four that should be kept in 
mind. First, while character is concerned with the moral quality of a person's 
life, the emphasis should not necessarily be on distinctiveness. Second, one 
should avoid the temptation of trying to give a succinct account of it by 
223 Joel Kupperman, Character, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 8. 
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nominating a list of qualities that one ideally needs to possess in order to 
demonstrate good or bad character. Third, whatever conceptualisation one 
arrives at should capture features of the important ordinary uses of the word, 
and should help us grasp the implications and importance of those features. 
Fourth, ideally the chosen conceptualisation will include some clearly outlined 
position on the nature of the 'self' to which character traits will be assigned. 
With these sorts of guidelines in mind, the strategy I now use to build a 
defensible account of character has two main components to it. The first 
involves using the comprehensive account of the topic provided by Kupperman 
as a primary reference point. The reasoning for this choice relates to its 
prominent position in the current literature, and the fact that it presents a 
contemporary perspective. The second involves reviewing the insights arising 
from the Kupperman analysis by cross-referring them to what is arguably the 
most revered account of the topic in Western philosophy, that of Aristotle. 
According to Kupperman: 
X's character is X's normal pattern of thought and action, especially 
with respect to concerns and commitments in matters affecting the 
happiness of others or of X, and most especially in relation to moral 
choices. 224 
On examining this definition closely, five interesting points reveal 
themselves. First, normal pattern is intended to emphasise that the concern is 
with thoughts and actions that are durable and predictable. If it is an occasional 
tendency of mine to show compassion for the misfortunes of others, this is not 
sufficient for someone to conclude that a compassionate disposition is an 
enduring feature of my character. Second, the explicit reference to thought and 
action is Kupperman's way of alerting us to an important caveat. 
224 Joel Kupperman, Character, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 17. 
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While character is somewhat easily recognisable through an agent's 
pattern of actions, of at least equal importance are the patterns of sensibility, 
attitude, value, and belief (collectively designated by him as 'thought') which 
inspire those actions. 
Third, he sees fit to qualify the object of thought and action as relating, 
specifically, to concerns and commitments in matters affecting happiness, as 
opposed say, to relating more broadly to just the matters as such 225 . The 
reason for this qualification is important in that it serves to highlight another 
important nuance of meaning. According to Kupperman, temporal continuity 
needs to feature in order for the character of the individual to be involved. If 
my tendency is, even on a regular basis, to have thoughts or feelings that 
merely come and go fleetingly, then they are not significant for present 
purposes. Thus, I may be inclined to say that "I'm sick and tired of listening to 
Fred's complaints", when Fred is being especially grumpy. But if I am also 
inclined to bounce back quickly to a display of greater equanimity, and even if 
this occurs on a regular basis, then it does not necessarily point to an uncaring 
trait in my character. According to Kupperman, to avoid the possibility of 
arriving at an incorrect characterisation, it is helpful to select, as the object of 
one's thoughts and associated feelings, those things that are either concerns or 
commitments. He correctly asserts that both the latter sentiments represent 
features that clearly endure, and thus constitute "temporal bridges" in one's 
sensibilities. 
Fourth, on Kupperman's view, there are many choices that we make 
which, even though significant on some criterion or other, do not necessarily 
count as salient in an evaluation of character. Thus, my decision as to whether 
225 This point becomes clearer when it is noted that in working towards this definition, 
Kupperman presents a preliminary version that reads: X's character is X's normal pattern 
of thought and action in relation to matters affecting the happiness of others and of X, most 
especially in relation to moral choice." Op. cit., pp. 14-16. 
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or not to accept a job offer to work overseas is clearly significant in my life, but 
may not reflect in any salient way reflect the quality of my character. If I am a 
conscientious accountant working for a reputable firm in Sydney and decide to 
take up an offer to move to the San Francisco office, this is not a reflection on 
my character one way or the other. There is no serious moral choice 
necessarily entailed. In contrast, however, consider the position of an 
accountant currently working in Sydney for the reputable firm who knowingly 
decides to accept a better-paying job in San Francisco working for the Mafia. 
This would involve a significant moral choice, and subject to the other criteria 
stipulated in Kupperman's definition, would speak much more closely to the 
quality of my character. 
The fifth and final insight about the nature of character to be derived 
from Kupperman concerns his reference to happiness. His position is this. If 
the object of one's concern or commitment is a matter that has the potential to 
affect the happiness of that individual or others, then character is implicated. 
This, however, requires consideration of a number of issues, the most serious 
of which relates to the meaning of happiness and its level of significance in 
matters of moral choice. This is a topic to be taken up in greater detail in a 
forthcoming section. (Differentiate strong and good character). 
I believe four important insights, of relevance to my overall argument, 
can be derived from the Kupperman account. First, character is an inherently 
complex notion within ethics, which itself is an inherently complex discipline. As 
such, it does not readily yield its secrets, especially to superficial scrutiny. 
Second, one can certainly say that to be considered 'of good character' is a 
most desirable, indeed essential, qualification for those aspiring to be leaders, 
given the account of the nature of leadership presented in this essay. Third, in 
order to be judged a person of 'good character', one must have learned to exert 
a certain kind of 'control'. (The precise nature of the forces that need to be 
controlled will be explored in greater detail later in the chapter.) Fourth, 
character is essentially about the goodness of our lives. Put another way, good 
character is essential for living a good life. 
Having thus confirmed the relevance of character as an appropriate 
developmental focal point for my project, and having briefly examined its place 
in moral philosophy, a key outstanding task is that of precisely pinpointing how 
the topic should be accommodated within a syllabus structure. I will return to 
address this in Chapter 7. In the meantime, it is necessary, given the above, 
to identify the broad domain of normative ethical theory within which that 
syllabus needs to be located. 
6.3 Normative Ethics: Mopping the Territory 
6.31 A general outline 
Ethics has enjoyed neither a consistent nor uncontroversial 
understanding within the philosophical community, over the two and a half 
thousands years of its existence as a formal topic of enquiry. Broadly speaking, 
it can be thought of as the study of human conduct in respect of its judged 
good or bad, right or wrong, defensible or indefensible. The actions of human 
agents supply ethics with its raw material. In distinguishing between actions 
that are voluntary, in the sense of being undertaken intentionally by the agent, 
and those that are involuntary (breathing the air, digesting food, for example), 
ethics addresses itself specifically to the former. Other professionals - for 
example psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists - also study human 
actions and conduct. What distinguishes ethicists is their specific interest in the 
moral character of such conduct, the extent to which it measures up against 
some criterion or yardstick of what is considered morally laudable or 
blameworthy. The difficulty comes not only in respect of the enormous diversity 
in human conduct to which such interest can be directed, but also in the fact 
that there are no universally agreed standards as to what constitutes laudable 
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as opposed to reprehensible and blameworthy conduct. 226 One consequence of 
this is the difficulty in finding a unified and uncontroversial definition of the 
discipline. 
On the admission, therefore, that any definition proffered is likely to 
offend someone, I nominate, as my commencement reference, a view of ethics 
recently suggested by Ciulla. My reason for the selection is not based on an 
evaluation of her position as optimal. Rather, it has to do with the fact that, in 
giving this definition, she was doing so explicitly with the topic of leadership in 
mind. She sees ethics as consisting in "... the examination of right, wrong, 
good, evil, virtue, duty, obligation, rights, justice, fairness, and so on, in human 
relationships with each other and other living things". 222 There are two 
noteworthy features of this interpretation. First, it alerts us to the broad range 
of coverage embraced by the discipline, introducing some additional variables 
over and above those flagged above (virtue, obligation, and justice being cases 
in point). Second, it points to the axial role played by human relationships 
within the ethical enterprise. 
But what of the objection that disciplines besides ethics might lay equal 
claim to the same notions. Law and religion spring most readily to mind. 
Consider the case of the former. Questions of what is right or wrong, or what 
constitutes duty, obligation, individual rights, justice and fairness are 
encountered regularly in the courtroom. So, how then does one differentiate 
ethics from law? The answer is a telling one, not just in highlighting the 
distinction, but more importantly, in providing a significant insight into the 
nature of the former. Whereas law threatens various forms of codified and 
institutional punishments (e.g. incarceration for a given period, non-negotiable 
fines, enforced community work, and so forth), there are no such sanctions in 
226 The notion of ethical relativism concerns itself with precisely this dilemma. 
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ethics. Rather, whatever 'sanctioning' may occur (and this is probably not the 
correct word) will be by way of self-recrimination and will result from appeals to 
reason, conscience or ideals. This does not mean, however, that law and ethics 
should be viewed as mutually exclusive. I may feel truly shameful and morally 
remorseful about killing John Doe, but this will not deter the law from exacting 
its full range of sanctions in retribution for the homicide. Now consider the case 
of religion. For its part, presenting in whichever of its various denominational 
guises, it threatens to respond to transgression by way of sanctions from 
supernatural forces (the wrath of God, the day of final judgement, and so 
forth). We can say of ethics, therefore, that it has essential grounding in 
reason, human experience, and the sanction of conscience and reputation 
rather than external edict and threat. Pojman sums this up as follows: 
... morality distinguishes itself from law and etiquette by going 
deeper into the essence of our social existence. It distinguishes itself 
from religion by seeking reasons, rather than authority, to justify its 
principles. The central purpose of moral philosophy is to secure valid 
principles of conduct and values that can be instrumental in guiding 
human actions and producing good character. As such it is the most 
important activity known to humans, for it has to do with how we are 
to live."8 
Thus far, it is clear that ethics is largely centred in rational or reasoned 
reflection. But another important component is that of affording equal 
consideration to the needs, concerns and perspectives of other people to that 
afforded one's own. In this sense, the conscientious person is one who is 
"...concerned impartially with the interests of everyone affected by what he or 
she does". Moreover, such a person is "...willing to "listen to reason" even 
when it means that his or her earlier convictions may have to be revised; and 
222 Joanne B. Ciulla, Leadership Ethics: Mapping the Territory, in Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: 
The Heart of Leadership, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p. 4. 
228 Louis P. Pojman, Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings, (Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995), p. 4. 
who, finally, is willing to act on the results of this deliberation." 229 Morality 
seems, therefore, to be essentially grounded in an appeal to reason and sound 
personal judgement. The morally right thing to do, in any given situation, is 
determined by what there are the most cogent and compelling reasons for 
doing. But what of the reality that many of us seem more than capable of 
exercising consistently poor judgement, even when apparently well intentioned 
in our motives? This can be answered with the claim that none of us is 
necessarily stuck in a given level of moral development. Progress towards 
greater ethical discernment is indeed possible, as we shall see below. 
6.32 Selecting from the available options 
At a practical level, to be deemed ethically conscious means to have 
developed the capacity to start by getting one's facts straight. In this sense, it 
is necessary to bear in mind that facts exist independent of our wishes, desires, 
preconceptions, mindsets, prejudices, etc. Responsible moral thinking begins 
when we set all these aside and try to see things as they objectively are. After 
the facts have been established, ethical choices have to be made. It is at this 
juncture that we encounter a most, testing question in ethical discourse, 
namely, What normative position provides the best guide to optimal ethical 
choice? A more specific example will help to explain this further. Consider the 
question: Should I take a document marked 'confidential' from a work 
colleague's desk without first asking her? Ideally the answer can be found by 
consulting some definitive and non-controversial algorithmic table of normative 
moral precepts. 
This concept can be illustrated by reference to the so-called Golden Rule 
of Living, generally articulated as: "We should do to others what we would want 
them to do to us". Employing this to the example given would enable me 
229 James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1995), pp. 
13-14. 
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quickly to answer: "Since I do not want colleagues to take confidential 
documents from my desk without getting my permission, then I should not take 
that document." Using the same reasoning, I can theoretically determine 
whether any possible action is right or wrong. So, based on the Golden Rule, it 
would also be wrong for me to lie, or to harass, victimize, assault, or kill others. 
The Golden Rule is an example of a normative theory that establishes a single 
principle against which we judge all actions. Other normative theories focus on 
a set of foundational principles, such as moral rights to life, liberty, and 
happiness. What can be said, as a general observation however, is that the 
fundamental assumption underlying normative theories is their appeal to one 
ultimate criterion of moral conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set of 
principles. 
Unfortunately, philosophers do not agree on what precisely that criterion 
is. Over the centuries many theories have been offered, each claiming ultimate 
primacy. Proponents of a given theory often devote as much time and effort to 
debunking rival positions and they do to enhancing their own. For example, 
many normative ethicists reject the Golden Rule as presented above, using the 
argument: I am a masochist and, as such, want others to inflict pain on me. 
Therefore, following the Golden Rule, it is morally permissible for me to inflict 
pain on others. But such a position is clearly flawed, since most persons would 
hold that it is morally wrong to inflict pain on others. Hence, they would argue, 
the Golden Rule fails as the ultimate criterion of morality. 
What can be claimed with some confidence, however, is that in spite of 
the quantity of normative theories available for consideration, most involve 
common strategies that can, and have been, classified into three broad 
categories: deontological theories, consequentialist theories, and virtue theory. 
A detailed examination of how these generic positions differ from one another 
would take far more space than that available here. However, a brief 
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explanatory comment is in order as the doctrine of eudaimonism falls under the 
third category. Why, then, have I chosen a virtue ethics position over a 
deontological or consequentialist alternative? This can be answered 
surprisingly easily, given the complexity of the overall subject matter. 
Deontological theories, such as Kant's view of moral reasoning, emphasise duty 
and obligation as focal references in ethical decision-making. Consequentialist 
theories, as the name suggests, emphasise the consequences of action as the 
principal determinant of moral choice. The various streams of utilitarianism 
fall into this latter category, each designating the correct moral choice in a 
given situation as the one producing the greatest amount of benefit for the 
greatest number of people. 
According to their respective adherents, both the above generic ethical 
platforms offer one very significant advantage which virtue theory does not. 
This resides in the fact that each is, in its own way, quite specific about what 
should be done in a given set of circumstances: Always do what it is your duty 
to do, urges the deontologist. Always opt for the course of action that produces 
the greatest quantum of advantage over disadvantage, exhorts the 
consequentialist. It has to be conceded that virtue theory, in contrast, is much 
less definitive in respect of its exhortations. 2" In fact, it can be said that 
whereas deontology and consequentialism focus on duty/obligation and 
outcomes respectively, virtue theory sees the character of the agent as the 
principal determinant of ethical choice. Instead of presenting the agent with an 
injunction as to what to do in a given set of circumstances, virtue theory takes 
a more circuitous route. It suggests that the person of good character will 
230 For reasons that will become clear, this objection to virtue ethics is not one that need 
concern me. In theoretical sparring matches, however, it is a valid objection. The 
interested reader can refer to a very strident attack on virtue ethics by referring to Robert 
Louden, On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics, American Philosophical Quarterly, 21, 1984, pp. 227- 
236. 
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know what to do when presented with moral choices, especially when complex. 
Moral progress, accordingly, lies in the systematic cultivation of character. 
My reason for choosing a broadly virtue ethics platform, therefore, can 
be stated quite simply. With its emphasis on character and character 
development, it offers, prima facie, the most appropriate solution, given the 
arguments outlined in the previous chapter. Neither an ethics of duty/obligation 
on the one hand, nor consequence/outcome on the other, comes close to the 
broad-based relevance of a virtue based platform. 
There is a further reason for choosing a virtue ethics developmental 
platform within my overall argument. Concepts such as relatedness, 
connection, community, mutuality, and capacity to give and receive trust have 
all loomed large in the account of leadership presented up to this point. As we 
shall see in the next section, virtue ethics more comfortably embraces these 
than either of the main rivals considered here. 231 To achieve a fuller 
understanding of precisely why this is so, it is necessary to look more closely at 
the role of character in virtue ethics. To do this, I will begin with a more 
specific look at the nature of the latter. 
231 There is one exception worth noting to the broad claim that a consequentialist platform 
is not especially suitable to the project of developing psychological maturity. This relates 
to a situation where intended behaviour modification was a primary focus in the 
cultivation of PM. A certain strain of behaviorist thinking closes aligns itself with a broadly 
consequentialist ethic in this respect. However, behaviorism retains very few sympathisers 
in the contemporary community of organisation development (OD) and human resource 
(HR) specialists, in this country at least. In the case of potential selection of a deontological 
position, grounds for such a choice are even harder to contemplate. Only in situations 
where a general ethic of adherence to codified practice seems in order might one find any 
obvious rationale for selection of a deontological platform in respect of management 
training. One may have to look at an extremely specialised application, such as the 
training of prison supervisors, to find adequate justification. Even then, a compelling 
counter-argument could still be mounted. 
6.4 Virtue Ethics 
A useful way of coming to grips with the key concepts in virtue ethics is 
to begin by tracing its evolution. Historically, virtue theory is the oldest 
normative tradition in Western philosophy, having its roots in ancient Greek 
civilization. Greek epic poets and playwrights, such as Homer and Sophocles, 
paint the morality of their heroes and antiheroes in terms of their respective 
virtues and vices. Plato believed that an integral part of one's quest for truth 
lay in understanding the ideal nature of virtues such as justice, piety, and 
courage. 
The earliest and most influential systematic account of virtue theory 
appears in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, a key element of which is his 
account of the moral virtues in Book two. There he argues that moral virtues 
are desire-regulating character traits, which lie at a notional mean-point 
between more extreme positions that constitute the vices. 232 For example, in 
response to the natural emotion of fear, we should develop the virtuous 
character trait of courage. If we develop an excessive character trait by curbing 
fear too much, then we are said to be rash, which is a vice. If, on the other 
extreme, we develop a deficient character trait by curbing fear too little, then 
we are said to be cowardly, which is also a vice. The virtue of courage, then, 
lies at the mean between the excessive extreme of rashness, and the deficient 
extreme of cowardice. Most moral virtues, and not just courage, are to be 
understood as falling at the mean between two accompanying vices. 
Aristotle illustrates this with the virtues of temperance, liberality, 
magnificence, high-mindedness, controlled anger, friendliness, modesty, and 
righteous indignation. He concludes that it is difficult to live the virtuous life 
primarily because it is often difficult to find the mean between the extremes. 
232 Specifically, Aristotle provides his account of the moral virtues in Book II of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. I will return to these later in the chapter. 
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During the later Greek period, Aristotle's account of virtue ethics 
competed with rival moral theories, particularly those offered by Epicureanism 
and Stoicism. 233 However, by the late Middle Ages Aristotle's virtue theory was 
the definitive account of morality. Its position in this regard was entrenched 
when Aquinas endorsed it. In medieval discussions, the particular virtues 
described by Aristotle and the ancient Greeks became known as the cardinal 
virtues. Medieval ethicists added to these the three theological virtues that 
appear in the New Testament: faith, hope, and charity. With the waning of the 
Middle Ages and the rise of the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution, and 
Enlightenment thought, the influence of Aristotle's virtue ethics declined. 
Many would argue that virtue ethics became neglected or ignored in the 
centuries that followed. However, Schneewind 234 argues that the fate of virtue 
ethics was not one of neglect, but instead, one of critique, revision, and 
eventually abandonment in view of newer accounts of moral obligation. For 
Schneewind, virtue theory met its greatest challenge with the rise of natural 
law theory, particularly as put forward by 17th century Dutch philosopher Hugo 
Grotius. For Grotius, morality necessitates conformity of one's actions to moral 
laws which are fixed in nature, and which even God cannot change. Grotius 
rejects the role of virtue assigned by Aristotle, and directly criticizes Aristotle's 
theory on three accounts. First, Aristotle's doctrine of the mean fails to 
adequately explain basic moral concepts such as truthfulness and justice. 
Second, in the case of justice, the agent's particular motive does not matter. All 
that matters is following proper reason with respect to the rights of others. 
Third, contrary to Aristotle, the moral agent does not have special moral insight 
233 The details of these rival theories need not concern us here, but their respective merits 
and shortcomings are discussed at length and with great perspicuity in Julia Annas, The 
Morality of Happiness, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). See, in particular, 
Chapters 5 and 7. 
234 See, J. Schneewind, The Misfortunes of Virtue, Ethics, 101, (1990), pp. 42-63. 
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simply because she is virtuous. Instead, morality is fixed in natural laws that 
can be rationally perceived by all. 
By the 19th century, the 'rule' emphasis of moral theories such as 
utilitarianism supplanted the character trait emphasis of virtue theory. But 
within the past few decades there has been a revived interest in virtue theory, 
owing largely to seminal contributions by Anscombe and MacIntyre. MacIntyre, 
in particular, argues that today we have only fragments of conflicting moral 
traditions, and that we need to re-establish the goal or meaning of life towards 
which ethics is directed. This meaning is established in the context of a moral 
tradition, particularly one that advocates virtuous character traits. 235 
I can summarise my current position with the claim that, of the broad 
categories of interpretation of the nature of the ethical, it is the generic domain 
of virtue ethics, that most closely fits the developmental challenge to be faced 
in this project. The reason for this resides in its explicit and particular focus on 
human character, and the benefits associated with the deliberate formation 
thereof. But the generic domain of virtue ethics itself comprises various 
interpretive doctrines. It is important, accordingly, to select carefully from 
among the competing alternatives. One criterion for doing this involves 
ensuring that as many as possible of one's specific needs are met by the 
doctrine of choice. In the next section I will argue that Aristotelian 
eudaimonism presents itself as the closest fit for my purposes. 
6.5 Aristotelian Eudaimonism 
6.51 Introduction 
My aim in this section is to show why an Aristotelian conception of 
eudaimonism represents an appropriate pedagogical platform on which to 
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construct a syllabus for a development programme that aims to increase the 
ethical effectiveness of those holding managerial leadership roles in 
contemporary corporate Australia. 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is generally regarded as the first 
systematic treatment of ethics in Western thought. 236 In it, he begins his 
enquiry into morality with an empirical examination of what it is that humans 
fundamentally desire. He suggests that every form of human endeavour - 
practical, theoretical, artistic, et cetera - has a teleological basis: that is, it is 
undertaken for the purpose of realising a beneficial outcome, commonly 
referred to as a good. Further analysis, he argues, reveals a hierarchical 
structure to such goods. To illustrate this point he identifies certain human 
activities which, while valuable for their own sake, are clearly undertaken 
primarily for the contribution they make to the achievement of some further 
end or ends. 237 
But within such a hierarchy of means and ends, there must logically be, 
according to Aristotle, some ultimate good to which all others are subservient 
and contributive. To identify what this might be, he points to the science of 
politics, which he takes to subsume all the humanistic disciplines, both practical 
and pedagogical. 
235 See, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (2 ,0 Edition), (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1984), especially pp. 6-23. 
236 The treatment of Aristotle presented here is derived entirely from what he has to say 
in Books I and II of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE). As I am not conducting an 
exegetical study of this work, I have chosen to refrain from referencing individual 
points in line with the accepted citation protocol for the NE. The text I have 
consistently used, however, for analysis of the original passages from Books I and II, is 
Nichomachean Ethics, translated by Terence Irwin, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1985. 
232 In the work organisational context, training programmes too can be examples of this. 
They can have intrinsic benefit in and of themselves (e.g. a source of intellectual renewal 
for participants; a welcome break from the normal work routine), but are often undertaken 
as part of a wider strategic agenda. This could be something like the generation of required 
Thus, economics, the science of strategy formulation, rhetoric, ethics, 
and social philosophy all fall within the ambit of politics. As the end of such a 
superordinate science must include those of the others, and given that it 
ultimately promotes the development of fine and just actions, in all aspects of 
human agency, so its proper end can be taken to be nothing less than the 
ultimate human good. He concludes his opening teleological discourse with the 
suggestion that knowledge of the concept is surely useful for those committed 
to serious reflection on the moral quality of their lives. He offers the caveat, 
however, that one should guard against expecting too high a degree of 
precision in political discriminations, since political science deals with the 
human condition, which is inherently unpredictable and indeterminate. 238 
As an adjunct to the discussion of his advocacy of reflective discipline, 
he makes the point that not everyone has the ability to exercise the 
discernment needed to arrive at the nature of the ultimate human good. Many 
men, in fact, lack the ability. The discerning man, in contrast, is one capable of 
exercising the intellectual acuity and persistence needed to arrive at the 
hierarchical structure described above. Moreover, once at this point, he will 
take the further step needed to identify the ultimate good. 
new competencies, or as a contribution to human resource or organisational development 
initiatives. 
238 It is interesting to note, as an aside, that this particular insight has been largely lost on 
many of the most influential management theorists of the twentieth-century. At its 
commencement, as we saw in Chapter 2, Taylor endeavoured to reduce its complexity to 
so-called 'scientific principles', and this largely set the tone for what was to follow. (See, 
Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, (New York, NY: Harper 
& Row, 1915)). A hundred years on, supposedly more sophisticated but apparently no 
wiser, many leading O&M theorists are still operating out of essentially the same 
paradigm. The continuing preoccupation is with attempting to reduce both the discourse 
and practice, of what it is an essentially human interactive enterprise, to considerations of 
variance analysis, best practice benchmarking, and other forms of inherently non-moral 
discrimination. 
230 
231 
Candidates for the accolade of ultimate good must seek to satisfy two 
criteria: finality and self-sufficiency. Finality implies that a good must be 
intrinsically, and not just instrumentally, desirable. By this is meant that it is 
desirable in and of itself, in contrast to being sought purely as a means towards 
the achievement of something else. On this basis Aristotle rejects wealth, 
honour, health, pleasure, intelligence, as candidates for supreme goodness, as 
they appear no more than platforms upon which some further good can be 
sought and achieved. He acknowledges, however, that individuals of unrefined 
sensibility, or limited education, are unlikely to know this, and will thus 
unwisely choose them. 239 The second criterion, self-sufficiency, demands that 
the ultimate good be adequate, in and of itself, to make life desirable, 
worthwhile, and lacking in nothing. To understand this point, it is helpful to 
reflect on the example of material wealth. Aristotle would argue that it fails the 
self-sufficiency test, because there are clearly many instances of rich but 
dissatisfied and unfulfilled people 
Thus, Aristotle concludes, men of discernment invariably arrive at 
eudaimonia as the only fully satisfactory choice of ultimate human good. But, 
he points out, there is a problem. For while men of discernment will readily 
agree on eudaimonia as the only end meeting the twin criteria of finality and 
self-sufficiency, they tend to have a variety of conceptions as to what 
constitutes its precise nature. For this reason, more needs to be said. 
6.52 Eudaimonia: the ultimate human good 
Cooper considers that, for Aristotle, defining the nature of eudaimonia 
was to become "... the most important substantive question of ethical 
239 There is a hint here of the elitism that many consider to be a foundational weakness of 
Aristotelian thought. I will make further reference to this later in the chapter. The 
interested reader can, however, find a useful discussion of the matter in Robert C. Solomon, 
Morality and the Good Life, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). See, in particular, 
Chapter 2. 
232 
theory.. 240  Let us begin by noting that it is often simplistically translated into 
English as "happiness". However, it is agreed generally by Aristotelian scholars 
that the Greek word eudaimonia carries no direct counterpart in the English 
language. The latter group, comprising, inter alia, such contemporary figures 
as Cooper, Kekes, Annas, and Solomon, tend towards the view that phrases like 
living well or faring well better capture the essence of what Aristotle intended. 
According to Cooper, the task of figuring out what constitutes the nature 
of eudaimonia demands attention to two specific challenges. The first requires 
provision of an adequate explanatory account of its nature and psychology, and 
the second, identification of the conditions necessary for its achievement. 
Regarding the former, Aristotle argues that eudaimonia is a condition that is, by 
necessity, grounded in human nature. 241 Moreover, any attempt to penetrate 
its precise nature must begin with the facts of personal experience. 242 To 
understand Aristotle's position here, it is necessary to consider briefly the 
metaphysical commitments underpinning his ethics. 
I mentioned earlier that Aristotelian ethics belongs to a tradition, begun 
by Socrates and advanced by Plato, that stresses both the supremacy of the 
rational human intellect and the purposive nature of the universe. But within 
this broad framework, the ethical theories of Socrates/Plato on the one hand, 
and Aristotle on the other, diverge along clear metaphysical lines. In essence, 
Aristotle takes issue with Plato's contention to the effect that individual objects 
are intelligible only in terms of immutable forms that exist in and of 
themselves. According to Aristotle's doctrine, the structures that render objects 
240 John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1975), p 89. 
241 It should be noted that herein lies the basis of one major critique of virtue theory in 
general, and Aristotelian ethics in particular. It holds to the view that there is no such thing 
as human nature. 
242 In saying this, Aristotle demonstrates a predilection for what has more recently been 
called a phenomenological approach to moral and psychological enquiry. 
understandable cannot exist apart from particular objects. Thus, for Aristotle, 
individual objects represent a unity of a universal, repeatable pattern and a 
unique matter or form. In consequence, Aristotle rejects the Platonic view that 
the moral evaluations of daily life presuppose a 'good' that is independent of 
experience, personality, and human circumstance. Rather, he insists, the basis 
of morality is immanent in the activities of our daily lives, and can be 
discovered only through a systematic and reflective study of them. Within this 
general framework, Aristotle structures his entire ethical theory around the 
complexly interwoven set of principles here under discussion. Thus, he claims, 
eudaimonia cannot be found in an abstract ideal or form existing independently 
of human experience. Rather, it should be sought via an understanding of the 
essential and unique nature of human beings. 
6.53 The Aristotelian conception of human nature 
In his typically thorough style of scientific-like categorisation, Aristotle 
holds that human nature can be described by reference to other life forms, in 
particular, plants and animals. Fundamental to his thesis is the view that the 
human sou1 243 consists in two distinct but interactive parts: the rational and the 
non-rational, representing respectively our higher and lower functions. 
Consider the case of non-sentient organisms such as plants. We, as moral 
agents, share with these a need for nutrition, a dependence on sunlight, and so 
forth. 
In other words, we share with them a vegitative and entirely non-
rational nature that is demonstrably not uniquely human. Regarding other 
sentient beings, such as all the species of the animal kingdom, we share with 
them not only the same vegitative nature enjoyed with plants, but also what 
243 It should be noted that Aristotle's use of the term soul is intended to convey the same 
sense of meaning as psyche in contemporary Jungian psychology. For a concise account of 
the latter, see John Welch, Spiritual Pilgrims: Karl Jung and Teresa of Avila, (New York, NY: 
Paulist Press, 1982), pp. 66-68. 
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may be termed a sensitive or appetitive nature. Animals, like humans, in 
addition to feeling pain, are subject to two further psychological forces. The 
first of these can be termed emotional. They experience, for instance, such 
emotions as fear, anger and anxiety. 244 The second involves the reality that 
animals experience desire. The thirsty dog lunges into the pond to satisfy his 
desire for water. The hungry pony makes her way to the hay shed to satisfy 
her desire for feed. 
In respect of our joint appetitive nature, however, Aristotle identifies a 
critical difference between animals and humans. He argues that the appetitive 
nature of the former is purely non-rational, while that of the latter is rational. 
By this he means that, in virtue of our distinctly human faculty for reasoning, 
we can exercise control over the satisfaction of our desires. Animals enjoy no 
such capability. Leading in to his account of virtue and the nature of the 
virtuous, Aristotle summarises his position thus far with the claim that it is 
nutritional virtue that enables plants, animals and humans alike to satisfy the 
needs of their jointly held and purely non-rational vegitative natures. But it is 
moral virtue that enables humans to regulate, in a rational way, their appetitive 
nature. Human nature, however, cannot be distinguished by this alone, as 
animals share this appetitive drive, albeit in a manner not subject to rational 
intervention. Something further, then, is clearly needed. 
Aristotle locates the missing piece in his account of the contemplative or 
calculative faculty possessed exclusively by humans. This faculty, which 
expresses itself via intellectual virtue, enables us to bring to bear uniquely 
human abilities such as: (a) the consideration of alternative scenarios, (b) the 
formation of hypotheses, (c) the contemplation of the future, (d) the 
244 The fact that we do not know the precise nature of the emotional life of animals is no 
reason to deny the possibility of its existence. A ten-year-old child can tell when her dog is 
angry or afraid. 
formulation of principles (e.g. scientific), and (e) the ability to reason 
inferentially. 
In summary, let me remind the reader of my earlier suggestion to the 
effect that, in order to understand Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia, one 
must begin by grasping his idiosyncratic conception of human nature. We can 
now conclude that the latter resides in our unique ability, as human agents, to 
exercise the full range of nutritional, moral and intellectual virtues, a capacity 
not shared by any other form of living organism. Figure 6.1 offers a pictorial 
representation of this interesting taxonomy. 
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6.54 Eudaimonia and the doctrine of 'ergot, 
Aristotle defines eudaimonia as "an activity of the soul in accordance 
with virtue". As this definition is central to his wider theory, it is necessary to 
reflect more deeply on it. The term eudaimonia is derived from two Greek 
words: 'eu' and 'daimon'. The former approximates to the notion of spirit, in 
the sense of a spirited or energised propensity to engage with the world. The 
latter simply means good, in the adjectival sense. Loosely then, eudaimonia can 
be translated as the condition of engaging or faring well in life; Cooper uses the 
felicitous term "human flourishing IT245. It is helpful, in grasping this, to call to 
mind the manner in which a lively or spirited participation in life contrasts with 
passive or apathetic disengagement. Moreover, recalling the earlier reference to 
what Aristotle meant by soul, his alignment of eudaimonia with an activity of 
the soul suggests involvement of the calculative as well as appetitive and 
vegitative functions. 
Perhaps in response to recognising the potentially confusing nature of 
this picture for his students246, Aristotle moves to develop further his 
conception of eudaimonia by introducing the doctrine of 'ergon'. Again, care 
needs to be taken with the direct translation, which equates ergon with 
function. A better interpretation sees it as equivalent to the special talent or 
excellence that a person displays in doing a specific job well. Thus, the ergon of 
the violinist is the particular excellence she displays when playing well. One 
can see, accordingly, that what Aristotle had in mind is closer to the idea of 
'unique and special capability', than to the notion of role or purpose (the more 
typical vernacular understanding of the English word 'function'). Thus, "... the 
function of a good harp player is to play the harp well." 
245 John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1975).p 63. 
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The next challenge involves ascertaining whether the notion of ergon, 
thus understood, is transferrable to the generality of human agency. One can 
see how it works for harp or piano playing, and by extension, for all other 
human activities. Is it meaningful, however, to talk about the ergon of a 
human agent per se? Aristotle's response is to argue that, for each species of 
life form, there is indeed a distinctive ergon within which its optimal expression 
will be found. As for the occupational subsets, this characteristic is closely 
bound up with a specific excellence unique to the species in question. And this 
is where the above discussion of human nature makes its most telling 
contribution. 
He holds that as a distinctive life form, the ergon of a human agent 
cannot be simply "to live", for such a vegetative capacity we share even with 
plants. It cannot be simply to move around in time and space, enjoying 
phenomenological experience of the world, for even animals can do this. 
Likewise, we share our propensity for appetitive and conative instincts with 
other sentient beings. The unique hallmark of human agency, he claims, and 
thus the characteristic excellence out of which is born our distinguishing ergon, 
has two dimensions to it, separate but inter-linked. 
The first is our rational intellect per se, a non-corporeal faculty which he 
equates with "soul" 242 ; and the second our unique capacity to use this psychic 
faculty to inform and guide our actions in the world of practical affairs. 248 
246 It is important to remember that the NE is generally considered to be a transcription of 
Aristotle's lecture notes, composed by somebody (e.g. his son Nicomachus) other than 
himself. 
247  While in the contemporary idiom of predominantly Christian-centred Western cultures, 
the term soul has taken on certain theological or religious connotations, this orientation did 
not figure in the thought of pre-Hellenistic philosophy. What was being alluded to in this 
dualistic formalism was the distinction between the tangible-material manifestation of 
bodily function on the one hand, and the intangible, psychical functioning of the mind. 
248 In concluding that the distinctive ergon in human agency is to be rational, Aristotle does 
not exclude or demean other human capabilities such as physical prowess. Nor is it 
intended to exclude pleasure (more on this later); indeed, Aristotle is more than willing to 
It is a fact, of course, that many individuals do not fully utilise their 
powers of cognitive rationality; and likewise, not everybody demonstrates the 
will and commitment to translate rational insight into purposive moral 
expression. Insofar as agents choose to express their distinctive humanness, 
and to the extent that they do so well rather than badly, they move to the 
status of fulfilling their ergon in accordance with the excellence or virtue (arete) 
appropriate to it. Thus, for Aristotle, the essential nature of human agency 
can be divided into two distinct part, what in Figure 6.1 are presented as the 
Rational and Non-Ration Faculties. Thus, an activity of the soul for Aristotle 
means a reflective inclination and capacity. It is not, however, just 'any old' 
activity of the soul, but one "... in accordance with virtue." This in turn raises 
the problematic matter of the meaning of virtue, which, as Annas points out, is 
one of the central questions in all of moral philosophy 249 . 
6.55 Aristotle on virtue and the virtues 
Aristotle's final manoeuver in his exposition of eudaimonia is to suggest 
that, of the three categories of virtue shown in Figure 6.1, only two come into 
play in discussions of human morality. Nutritional virtue is excluded because it 
is entirely associated with non-rational faculties. In contrast, intellectual virtue 
is included because it is grounded exclusively in the rational realm. We are left, 
accordingly, with moral virtue, which, it will be recalled, has both a rational and 
non-rational grounding. The latter dimension can be excluded because it is 
shared by other sentient beings. This leaves the rationally grounded 
component, or more explicitly, the element of human virtue that performs the 
desire regulating function in the human psyche. 
insist that a person cannot be happy without being (by his standards) relatively rich, 
handsome and born into an aristocratic family. 
249 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 3-9. 
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Regarding the notion of moral virtue, Aristotle makes three key points. 
The first is to suggest that our ability to regulate desire is by no means a purely 
instinctive ability. It can be cultivated via habituation or practice. 25° The second 
involves the claim that the regulation of desire be viewed as a matter requiring 
judicious consideration. Both over and under regulation can result in moral 
problems, akin to the idea that too much or too little exercise in the gym can be 
detrimental to one's physical health. His third point involves the identification 
of virtue as a disposition to act. This is based on the claim that functions of the 
soul (or, as we might say, psychic functions) can manifest as faculties, as 
passions or strong feelings, or as dispositions. Virtue, being a function of the 
soul, must accordingly be one of the three. Virtues are not faculties because 
these, as should be clear from Figure 6.1, are naturally endowed and, as such, 
cannot be objects of praise or blame. Likewise passions, as emotional states 
made possible by underlying faculties, cannot be praise or blame worthy. By 
elimination, he concludes that virtues are dispositions, or states of character. 
(Annas, in fact, defines a virtue as " ... a disposition to do the right thing, in 
various areas of life, and to have the right feelings and emotions about it. II )251 
6.56 The doctrine of the 'mean' 
With this understanding of moral virtue duly in place, Aristotle moves to 
his account of the doctrine of the mean, what many commentators consider the 
centre-piece of his ethical theory. According to this, we regulate our desires by 
reference to a notional mid-point on a vice-virtue-vice continuum. In locating 
this mean position, and by acting in accordance with its dictates, we can 
demonstrate a particular virtue. 
250 In Book II of NE, he tells us that intellectual virtues (such as the capacity for 
contemplative thought) come into existence and develop as the result of teaching, and need 
the benefit of experience and time to mature. Moral virtues, in contrast, are the result of 
habituation, and involve conformity to rational principles. 
251 Julia Annas, op. cit., p 93. 
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Consider, for instance, the important virtue of courage. According to 
Aristotle, courage is to be found somewhere on a continuum that has reckless 
abandon or rash behaviour at one end, and cowardice at the other. Thus, the 
virtue can always be found between a generic vicious expression of excess and 
a corresponding generic vicious expression of deficiency. However, judicious 
contemplation is needed on the part of the agent to pinpoint the region in which 
the virtue resides. Moreover, the region itself is not locatable via any set of 
determinate coordinates. It varies from situation to situation and from 
individual to individual. With this in mind, Aristotle suggests that virtue tends 
to rest where a "prudent man", or a man of practical wisdom (phronesis), 
would determine it to be. 
In addition to providing a list of twelve virtues, each representing a 
mean between two vicious extremes, Aristotle sees fit to offer various other 
explanatory comments. Four of these are especially noteworthy from my 
perspective, relating respectively to his thoughts on (a) justice, (b) the 
importance of high-mindedness, (c) moral insight, and (d) taking a whole-of-
life perspective. Let us consider each briefly in turn. 
6.561 Justice 
Justice does not appear as a moral virtue on Aristotle's list. This, 
however, should not be taken as either oversight or indication perceived 
insignificance. Instead, Aristotle devotes special treatment to justice, 
considering it to have relevance in both a general and a specific way. In 
respect of the former, he likens justice to observance of the law, and as such, 
considers it similar to a virtue. It differs, however, in the following way. While 
virtue is conceptually an abstract disposition to act in a certain way, justice 
constitutes its application in practical dealings with other people. Accordingly, 
in order for me to demonstrate specific virtues like courage, temperance, and 
friendly civility, I must by definition be acting in a just way when relating to 
others. Turning to the specific interpretation, Aristotle argues that justice 
manifests itself as either distributive or corrective. 252 
While the former determines the relative distribution of honours and 
rewards in consequence of the merit of the recipient, the latter involves some 
arbitrary balancing of advantage and disadvantage between parties when 
injustice is seen to have occurred. Aristotle's conception of justice, as presented 
here in outline, certainly leaves itself open to the objection of being overly 
vague and not adequately prescriptive. But against this can be said that in 
making the two sets of distinctions (between general and specific forms of 
justice, and between the distributive and corrective dimensions of the latter), 
Aristotle demonstrates his penchant for a common sense approach to morality. 
His treatment seems to suggest the need to recognise that, as an absolute 
ideal, justice is morally fine but somewhat impractical. But in its specific 
manifestations, where practical questions of reciprocity and/or retaliation need 
to be considered, then justice needs augmentation by other considerations 
associated, perhaps, with virtues such as equity and fairness. 
6.562 High-mindedness 
Within Aristotle's ethics, the virtue of high-mindedness assumes a 
certain significance, which, because of its relevance to my overall argument, 
deserves mention at this stage. Aristotle, by all accounts, did not always find it 
easy to select a word to cover the virtue located at the mean between two 
vices. So it was with high-mindedness, which on its English translation, is 
certainly a cumbersome term. According to his conception, it lies between the 
252 It is noteworthy that, in making this distinction, Aristotle was to establish a sort of 
intellectual template for has followed on the topic of justice over the intervening two and a 
half millennia. 
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vice of deficiency called humble-mindedness and that of excess called 
vaingloriousness. 
Semantic considerations notwithstanding, the notion he had in mind is a 
significant one. Persons possessing this virtue are individuals with an 
appropriate amount of self-respect and self-esteem. They place value on their 
own personhood in a way that transcends any notion of mere role-identification 
or other forms of egocentricity. Part and parcel of what high-mindedness entails 
is a certain autonomy of consciousness on the part of individual agents that 
enables them to be appropriately motivated in respect of their ethical 
discriminations. Let me illustrate this point by drawing on a specific incident 
from the Agritest study discussed in Chapter 3. 
Dr John Doe was a senior scientist in the company, and Department 
Head within the organisational structure. As such, he was of middle-rank in 
terms of formal authority and influence. Informally, he was seen as a "mover 
and shaker" within the Agritest culture, and someone who regularly played the 
role of maverick. He would, for instance, often take a controversial position on 
an issue in a manner considered 'courageous' by subordinates and peers. His 
slightly arrogant attitude was generally excused on the basis of the claim, "We 
need guys around here who are prepared to stand up and be counted". Other 
admirable qualities he regularly displayed, such as decisiveness and an 
abundance of energy, were considered to outweigh his day to day tendency to 
be overly autocratic with subordinates and overly belligerent with colleagues. 
In general, it would be fair to say that he was considered a courageous figure 
within the prevailing corporate mythology, with courage being defined in the 
Aristotelian manner, namely, as the virtuous mean between rashness and 
cowardice. On first blush, then, Doe was virtuous, at least in respect of his 
courageous disposition. My claim, however, is that he would receive a harsher 
appraisal from Aristotle than from his colleagues. The reason is that Aristotle 
would most likely judge him to be lacking in adequate high-mindedness; in 
Doe's case, tending towards vaingloriousness. 
The latter stages of my work at Agritest involved the design, 
development and implementation of a programme aimed at cultivating self-
awareness levels among those in managerial roles. As the detail of this will be 
described in the Epilogue, suffice to say, for present purposes, that participants 
were inducted into the programme via participation in a structured process of 
self-assessment of individual motivational structures. Depending on which 
model one is employing, the latter can be determined via processes of critical 
introspection. 253 John Doe participated in the programme, in conjunction with 
a group of fourteen colleagues. During his de-briefing process, he admitted to 
possessing a motivational structure shaped largely by the need to avoid 
emotional vulnerability. In the low to average levels of psychological maturity 
(or emotional intelligence as it was described in Chapters 3-4), this need often 
manifests as a compulsive drive to exert control over one's immediate 
environment. In the managerial context such an environment invariably 
involves, inter alia, other individuals. 
Again emphasising a focus on the lower levels of psychological 
development, it can be seen that much of Doe's behaviour that was interpreted 
as courageous in fact represents a compulsive tendency to get one's own way, 
to be seen to be in charge, even to strike fear into others. It is, in effect, a 
form of compulsive behavioural over-compensation employed, albeit 
unconsciously, to mask 254 a vulnerable emotional interior world. 
253 The models in question, of which (a) the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and (b) the 
Enneagram, are examples, do not restrict themselves to evaluation of motivational 
structure. They can be used, with equal validity, for assessing other psychological 
variables that determine human difference and diversity. 
254 It is interesting to note that the Latin word for mask is persona, from which 'personality' 
is derived. 
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Viewed from this perspective, Doe's prima facie displays of courage 
seem more compulsive than virtuous. The 'arrogance' often seen, but excused, 
in Doe's behavioural profile was, on this view, a reflection - albeit a subtle one 
- of the vice of vaingloriousness manifesting itself. Aristotle would have noticed 
this and would, in consequence, have deemed Doe to be in possession of an 
inadequate level of high-mindedness. And while this would have signalled, in 
and of itself, a lack of that particular virtue, it would also have served to call 
into question the motivation behind other virtues overtly displayed by him, for 
instance, his courage. 
6.563 Moral insight 
Aristotle was greatly concerned, perhaps even to a more pronounced 
degree than many of his successors in Western philosophy, by the connection 
between moral evaluation and action. While his views on the topic are not 
always easy to unravel, there is a certain insight that can nonetheless be 
gleaned. It can be briefly outlined in the following terms. Some, perhaps 
most, of our moral sentiments are the result of involuntary participation in a 
given moral tradition. Thus, for instance, in John Grisham's insightful novel, 
The Painted House, we can see that the personality of young Luke Chandler, at 
only seven years of age, has already been significantly shaped by Southern 
Baptist morality. Not all our moral sentiments, however, derive from this sort 
of involuntary early socialisation. Many are shaped by habitual experience, 
which itself results from particular perceptions reinforced over time. According 
to Aristotle, it is the function of reason to, (a) apprehend and (b) organise, 
these perceptions. But reason (or understanding) alone is never enough to 
motivate action. Nor is it ever simply a matter of volitional impulse alone. 
Instead, action is prompted either by intellect acting on volition or vice versa. 
Put more simply, our choices and actions are motivated either by reason 
stimulated by desire, or in virtue of desire guided and moderated by 
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understanding. For Aristotle, it is the latter that tends to be the hallmark of 
moral action. 
Indeed, his position on this point is further reinforced when freedom of 
will is taken into consideration. This kind of personal freedom applies to both 
virtuous and vicious choices and actions. According to Aristotle, the morality of 
our actions is mitigated only when the latter are involuntary. But, they are 
involuntary only when forced on us by others. In contrast, they are voluntary 
when the originating motivation resides within our selves. 
Herein lies the important link to the John Doe anecdote relayed in the 
previous section. By Aristotle's lights, Doe is morally bound by his actions, 
even when they are driven by compulsive motivational forces outside of his 
conscious awareness. Ignorance of one's inner world is no excuse for 
immorality. For adults, if not for seven-year-old children, morality is 
ineluctably tied in to critical self-awareness. It is part of the challenge of moral 
development to learn more about our inner worlds, a project for which we are 
each individually responsible. 
6.564 Aristotle's holistic perspective 
In his conception of what constitutes a flourishing life, Aristotle makes 
the point that a final decision can really only be reached with the benefit of 
reflective evaluation of one's life as a whole. Taking this to its logical extreme 
suggests that the ultimate evaluation can only be made at the end of one's life. 
Among other inconveniences, this makes it impossible to nominate the precise 
time when the evaluation can be made, save in the case of premeditated death 
by one's own hand or that of a willing collaborator. On the Aristotelian view, an 
obvious implication of all this is that eudaimonia should not be equated with 
episodic bouts of felt happiness or contentment. There is more to it than 
emotional gratification. 
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Another implication involves his viewing the nature of the flourishing life 
as more aligned with the journey than the destination. Herein lies a paradox in 
his ethical thought, however. On the one hand, there is an ultimate end, 
namely, living or faring well. In terms of the metaphor just mentioned, this can 
readily be identified with 'being on the journey', or more precisely, the 
savouring thereof. On the other hand, the value of the journey can only be 
properly assessed once one has arrived at the destination. 
The question can reasonably be asked, then, as to what purpose such an 
abstruse formulation might serve. I believe a plausible answer lies in the claim 
that Aristotle is here signalling his commitment to what nowadays would be 
called a holistic perspective, or, 'the helicopter view'. In the context of his 
discussion of eudaimonia, he is suggesting the need to stand back from one's 
life and, from a position reminiscent of Spinoza's notion of "sub specie 
aetemitatis"255 , to examine it in overview. But in a wider context there is at 
least the possibility that he is drawing his students' attention to a more general 
lesson. This is the view that in respect of matters of moral evaluation and 
judgement, the act of stepping back to consider the broadest feasible range of 
possibilities, represents the prudent course. 
6.6 Closing the Argument 
6.61 Objections to Aristotle 
There are a number of reasons why a direct appeal to Aristotle's ethical 
theory represents a problematic choice for inclusion in the syllabus platform 
here being considered. Two in particular are worthy of mention, as either could 
potentially bring a project to its knees, in credibility if not substantive terms. 
The first involves the criticism that much of Aristotle's thought is built around a 
fundamental worldview that is unabashedly both sexist and elitist. He was, of 
255 This translates from the Latin as, "from the eternal perspective" 
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course, a child of his times, and lived within a polity that not so much promoted 
these values as remained in ignorance of their inappropriateness. But, would- 
be detractors will argue that this is all the more reason why someone of his 
intellectual standing should to be indicted. He, above all others, they suggest, 
should have known better. In any event, and notwithstanding the hypocritical 
overtones, many in contemporary corporate Australia would claim to find an 
Aristotelian association objectionable on purely these grounds. 256 
A second objection that can be levelled at Aristotle's moral theory, and 
one that must be faced by most expressions of virtue ethics, concerns its 
allegedly non-prescriptive nature. In particular, those more comfortable with 
the black and white morality of deontological formulations, the algorithmic 
nature of consequentialist theories, or the formulaic orientation of contractarian 
systems, often charge Aristotle with being too ponderous. They allege that he 
dithers on the subject of precisely how one should arrive at ethical 
discriminations and judgements, in particular concrete situations. My concern 
in this regard is associated with a prevailing objectivist mindset, still quite 
common in Australian management circles, which holds that all business 
concepts must be clear-cut, measurable, and capable of easy translation into 
unambiguously prescriptive guidelines for action. (It needs to be pointed out, 
however, that while the corporate cultural overlay reinforces this, many 
Australian managers, in virtue of their over-riding 'Australian-ness', will tend to 
fly in the face of cultural or other mandates almost as a matter of course. A 
respectful attitude to authority - social, organisational, religious, political - is 
256 The reader should note that there is what I call a reasonably vibrant "pseudo-intellectual 
lobby" in present-day Australia, and it has its fair share of adherents in the corridors of 
corporate decision-making. These are typically people who maintain a superficial level of 
knowledge about a range of topics, but are ready to use it at every opportunity to de-bunk 
the views of others. They, of course, are typically less knowledgeable on their topics of 
choice than they let on to be. In the corporate world, this group most notably includes 
those managers who consider all academics to be merely charlatans, and out of touch with 
the 'real world'. 
not a deeply ingrained feature of the Australian psyche, no doubt due to our 
colonial past.) 257 
Not content with a focus on the genuinely technical dimensions of 
business management (e.g. double-entry accounting principles), these 
'Taylorists' generally want to push their paradigm further. It is not uncommon 
for them to seek out formulaic solutions to such notions as personal motivation, 
team building, conflict resolution — in fact all aspects of leadership as presented 
in the Figure 5.1. 
6.62 Summarising the case for a eudaimonistic platform 
In anticipation of the potentially deleterious effects of having to deal 
with either or both of these two objections, I am inclined to avoid explicit 
appeal to the ethics of Aristotle per se in respect of the detail to be included in 
the syllabus structure. For that reason, I will turn to a contemporary 
interpretation of eudaimonisnn in the next and final chapter, albeit one that has 
its roots firmly within the Aristotelian tradition. In the meantime, it is 
appropriate to close off the present chapter by summarising and confirming the 
reasons why the broad syllabus structure can appropriately be grounded on a 
foundation of Aristotelian eudaimonism. While it is tempting to launch into a 
long and thorough explication of the reasons, for purposes of brevity I will 
restrict myself to a simple enumeration of five key points, all canvassed, one 
way or another, in the foregoing paragraphs. 
257 I believe this is due, at least in part, to the enduring legacy of several centuries of 
'Enlightenment thinking' in the Western world. It found its first major socio-economic 
expression during the period of the Industrial Revolution. But its major boost came in the 
early part of the twentieth century, when Taylor attempted to reduce the managerial 
enterprise to a series of scientific principles. Despite a theoretical rejection of Taylorism by 
the middle of the last century, many vestiges of this form of thinking still prevail. See, 
Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, (New York, NY: Harper 
& Row, 1915). 
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First and foremost, of the available generic ethical systems, a virtue 
ethics platform is clearly most relevant to my requirements, given the 
identification of character as the key developmental focal point for pedagogical 
and syllabus design purposes. We also saw that much of the Aristotelian 
corpus, as described in the first two books of the Nicomachean Ethics, presents 
not only a series of relevant factors for consideration, but does so in the sort of 
systematic formalism favoured with the prevailing corporate idiom. Given that 
eudaimonism is a doctrine within virtue ethics, and given that Aristotle was 
arguably the first major eudaimonist, then a solid case is clearly present. 
Second, the Aristotelian eudaimonistic tradition was seen to place 
emphasis on individual moral responsibility, in the sense of requiring agents to 
engage in critical self-reflection for the purpose of arriving at appropriate moral 
discriminations. Again, this orientation fits much more comfortably within the 
Australian corporate idiom than one primarily appealing to rules, injunctions, or 
algorithms. Not only that, but the emphasis on individual responsibility-taking 
is surely a more powerful pedagogical device than its logical alternatives. 
Third, and allied to the emphasis on critical self-reflection, eudaimonism 
was also seen to favour a holistic perspective. For Aristotle, the quality of 
individual moral decisions is best viewed in the context of the bigger picture of 
one's life and circumstances. This fits comfortably with an understanding of 
corporate leadership responsibility that requires attention to the valid interests, 
concerns, and expectations of a wide variety of legitimate stakeholders. 
Fourth, the eudaimonistic emphasis on the cultivation of a virtuous 
disposition, and on the need to act virtuously to the point of habituation, is 
again a factor not only compatible with the cultural expectation of Australian 
corporate life, but one likely to reinforce the emphasis on individual 
responsibility-taking. Moreover, in so far as the issue of 'ergon', and indeed 
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related doctrines, bears upon the desirability of movement to self-actualisation, 
and the achievement of excellence as a person, this again presents as an 
appealing feature when the issue under consideration is a leadership 
development programme. 
My fifth and last point relates to a notion that was seen to lie right at the 
core of Aristotelian eudaimonism, namely, the exhortation to act virtuously in 
consequence of one's moral evaluations and judgements. This is a crucial 
syllabus point, given that many of the potential 'students' will live and operate 
in corporate cultures where displays of akrasia and ethical incontinence are 
often the norm rather than the exception. Therefore, a development 
programme that draws attention to the crucial linkages between evaluation, 
judgement, and action, is indeed appropriate. 
In closing off this chapter, I should draw attention to the fact that my 
selection of an Aristotelian platform for corporate application purposes is not 
original. Solomon, for instance, covers broadly similar ground in his treatment 
of the role Aristotelian thinking can play in illuminating the wider domain of 
business ethics. 258 Hartman, for his part, offers an interesting set of 
perspectives in respect of how the fostering of organisational culture and 
community can be leveraged by adopting a eudaimonistic perspective. 259 
Werhane, too, shows similar sympathies, especially in her advocacy of the 
258 Especially noteworthy are his "six parameters of Aristotelian ethics", which, while not 
exactly the same, are not dissimilar to my own treatment in this chapter. See, Robert C. 
Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), pp. 145-190. 
259 See, Edwin. M. Hartman, Organizational Ethics and the Good Life, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), especially pp. 143-165 
importance of character development as it bears upon the propensity for 
improved judgement on the part of corporate decision-makers. 26° 
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260 See, Patricia H. Werhane, Moral Character and Moral Reasoning, in Donaldson, Thomas J., 
and Freeman, R. Edward (eds.), Business as a Humanity, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), pp. 98-106. 
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Chapter 7 
Syllabus Structure: The Key Particulars 
7.1 Introduction 
7.11 Aim of the chapter 
In Chapter 6 I argued for selection of a eudaimonistic ethical platform 
within the broadly Aristotelian tradition of the virtue ethics. I stopped short of 
endorsing the precise detail of Aristotle's own framework, because certain 
aspects of his thought are out of sync with contemporary Australian cultural 
sensibility. The arguments in Chapter 5 also made clear the need to provide a 
robust normative account of the relational interactions between emotional 
intelligence, deliberate character formation, and the advancement of individual 
self-awareness. I suggest, in consequence, that what is needed to complete 
my overall argument is a contemporary formulation of Aristotelian 
eudaimonism. Drawing on recent work by John Kekes, my aim in this final 
chapter is to offer such a formulation in its key particulars. 
7.12 Background note 
Virtue ethics has in recent times re-emerged from a long period of 
dormancy in Western philosophy. A number of authoritative contemporary 
thinkers have brought it back into the foreground of moral discourse, among 
them McIntyre, Annas, Cooper, and Solomon, to name but some. But while 
most recent discussions of virtue ethics have, either directly or indirectly, 
considered the contribution of Aristotle to the development of eudaimonism, 
one, in particular, has done so in a manner of particular relevance to my overall 
argument. In Moral Wisdom and Good Lives, Kekes says that while there are 
several versions of eudaimonism, his is "... Aristotelian, but not Aristotle ' s r,. 261 
261 John Kekes, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 
p. 2. 
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Moreover, the contemporary nature of his interpretation is reflected in the claim 
that his account presents a version of eudaimonism that is "... secular, 
anthropocentric, pluralistic, individualistic, and agonistic." 262 
Of greatest interest to my enquiry, however, is the manner in which he 
elevates, to front and centre, the specific human function of desire-control as a 
means towards the cultivation of deliberate character. In fact, in the remainder 
of this chapter I will show how control of this type plays a seminal role in the 
cultivation of ethical competence. I will show, further, how achieving greater 
levels of control and how they is in turn dependent on a capacity for 'critical 
eudaimonistic reflectiveness'. 263 To lay an adequate foundation for a later 
discussion of the concept of control, it is first necessary to pick our way through 
some points of detail, where the devil often lurks. 
In everyday language we talk of the need for self-control, emotional 
control, impulse control, et cetera. In this loose form of usage, what we are 
implying is that it is a good thing for individual persons to be able to 
demonstrate a certain form of restraint over their attitudes and behaviours. 
But we are rarely specific about either the precise degree of restraint that is 
intended or that over which the restraint is to be exercised. Kekes, for his part, 
is by no means vague in respect of these questions. He considers the process 
of control of the self, in so far as it bears upon human character and 
circumstance, as explicable only in terms of an understanding of the relation 
between five key variables. These are our desires, capacities, opportunities, 
values, and corresponding actions. 264 
262 ibid ., p . 2 . 
263 The formulation of the detailed syllabus structure that follows draws heavily on Kekes' 
recent interpretation of eudaimonism, as presented in two works: (a) The Examined Life and 
(b) Moral Wisdom and Good Lives. But I wish to make clear that, in a manner reminiscent of 
his own suggested relation to Aristotle's work, the detailed syllabus structure that follows 
may be termed ' Kekesian' but not Kekes'. 
264 Ibid., p. 116. 
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Moreover, in line with his general eudaimonistic commitment, he views 
the interplay of the five variables as meaningfully interpretable only by 
reference to a well thought out conception of what it means to live a good life. 
He goes on to say that one of the benefits associated with a eudaimonistic point 
of view is realisation of the need to bring these patterns from the background 
to the foreground of our consciousness. Once there, we can begin the process 
of articulating them in terms of three subsidiary capacities. The first is an ability 
to describe a given desire currently operating in one's consciousness. The 
second concerns how and to what extent the individual is assessing and 
managing the impact of that desire on her emotional and motivational 
responses, deciding in effect either to reject or satisfy it. The third relates to 
the manner in which she responds to opportunities that come her way to satisfy 
the desire. In order to see how these and other ideas from the Kekesian 
formalism combine ultimately to shape our detailed syllabus content, it is 
necessary to spend some time examining, in more detail, the nature and 
meaning of eudaimonistic control. 
7.2 Control 
7.21 Restraint and desire satisfaction 
Kekes argues that having the ability to exercise restraint over one's 
character and circumstances is central to any defensible conception of what it 
means to live a good life. Demonstrating the kind of systematic attention to 
detail that renders his style suitable to the corporate idiom, he goes on to say 
that restraint exercised in this manner depends on five conditions. These relate 
respectively: (a) having a desire, (b) having the capacity to satisfy it, (c) 
having the opportunity to do so, (d) favourably evaluating that desire, and (e) 
reaching a decision to satisfy it, in consequence of having undertaken adequate 
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evaluative reflection. 265 I will expand briefly on the interplay of these variables 
by way of an illustration. 
In order to acquire a PhD in philosophy, a prospective candidate needs 
to have the desire to achieve the award. The desire may, in turn, be grounded 
in a variety of underlying motivations (e.g. to teach at a university, to get a 
certain type of job, et cetera). Assuming the desire is there, then capacities 
come into the equation, which can be thought of as falling into two broad 
categories. The first comprises those with which the aspirant was born, for 
instance, an innate cognitive ability. If my IQ is 75, then desire and capacity in 
respect of achieving a PhD will diverge; I will simply not have the intellectual 
wherewithal to handle the required conceptual challenges. The second category 
involves those capacities the candidate will have developed along the way. For 
instance, though naturally a somewhat indolent and laid back fellow, I have 
learned that in order to get what I want, hard work, diligence, and persistence 
are needed qualities. 
Next comes opportunity, which in this example may include such things 
as access to a university with a philosophy school, or access to the necessary 
funds to pay tuition fees and other subsistence costs. Likewise the 
opportunities that present themselves fall into two categories. There are those 
that are purely serendipitous, such as when I strike up a conversation in a bar 
with a stranger who, during the course of the ensuing discussion, offers me a 
job for which he adjudges me a suitable candidate. Then there are those 
towards which I have made some sort of premeditated contribution. Such 
would be the case if someone had tipped me off that the stranger in the bar 
had a job to offer in which I might be interested, and in consequence of the tip, 
I had strategically positioned myself so as to fall into conversation with him. 
265 John Kekes, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 
p. 96. 
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In doing this, I would have 'made my own opportunity, so to speak. 
The next component involves favourable evaluation of the desire. 
Evaluation of this type can be undertaken either formally or informally. A formal 
process might involve something like a systematic analysis. In the context of 
my original example, during such an analysis the candidate will attempt to 
measure anticipated benefits (e.g. in terms of prospective future income 
generation) against predictable or estimable costs. In contrast, an informal 
process might involve something like the candidate having nothing more than a 
'strong intuitive feel', engendered over a number of years, to the effect that 
having a PhD would be a really worthwhile thing at this stage in one's life. 
Related to the evaluation process is the final component, reaching a 
decision to act in consequence. The best way to come to terms with the 
relevance of this last component is through considering its absence. Without 
the decision to take action in respect of enrolment application, payment of fees, 
commencement of studies, and so forth, the previous four components will not 
of themselves have resulted in any movement towards satisfaction of the 
desire. 
While this outline presents a plausible account of how the five 
components fit together in an overall matrix of desire satisfaction, it fails to 
give an adequate explanation of precisely why certain desires ultimately 
translate themselves into decisions to act in pursuit of their satisfaction. To 
achieve this, we need to take a closer look at the forces at play. 
7.22 Anatomy of human desire 
Kekes describes the generic category of human desire as consisting in a 
complex interplay of factors, including wants, needs, drives, motives, decisions, 
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acts of will, aspirations, inclinations, and so forth. 266 To unravel both the 
psychological and ethical implications of the interplay of these various eclectic 
constituent forces, perhaps a useful commencement question relates to why 
particular desires manifest themselves during the course of our lives. In 
considering this, I begin with the claim that reasonable persons, if pressed, will 
concede that they desire to do, acquire, or accomplish things because the 
effort, acquisition or accomplishment is expected, in some way, to contribute to 
making life better. Both common experience and even the most basic grasp of 
Aristotelian eudaimonism both support this claim. 
The concept of a human life 'becoming better', of course begs a more 
fundamental question, namely, What constitutes a good life to begin with? Let 
us begin to answer this by considering the prima facie plausible proposition that 
what moral agents consider the elements of a good life, intimately bears upon 
those specific goods, which they consider most valuable. 
The subject of human values is a widely canvassed one in moral 
philosophy, largely because of its centrality to the overall discipline. While it is 
not necessary for present purposes to engage in a detailed exegetical review, it 
is important to lay out an interpretation of values commensurate with (a) the 
principles of eudaimonism to which I am now committing myself, and (b) the 
need for sensitivity to the corporate idiom. 
Gini tells us that values are "... the ideas and beliefs that influence and 
direct our choices and actions". 262 Two insights can be gleaned from this simple 
but accurate account. First, values are not necessarily positive, affirming and 
uplifting commitments. They may variously be considered good or bad, right or 
wrong, tenable or untenable, sensible or not so sensible. I may firmly believe 
266 Refer to John Kekes, The Examined Life, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1988), pp. 18-20. 
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in the superiority of my particular race or ethnic group and be committed, in 
consequence, to a policy of ethnic cleansing. Similarly, as a corporate 
manager, I may firmly believe in a totally autocratic style, and in consequence 
make decisions without consultation with or undue consideration for others. The 
fact that the vast majority of my colleagues and subordinates may believe, with 
equal conviction, in a democratic style, does not invalidate the actuality of my 
commitment. (I will return to this point later.) 
The second insight to be gleaned from Gini's definition relates to the 
possibility of values being motivational, that is, they prompt action. They need 
not, but they often do. I may believe in the superiority of my race but never 
undertake any specific action in consequence of that belief. This, however, 
while theoretically possible, tends to be unusual. Referring to the other 
example, it would be highly unlikely that autocratic managers would or could 
hide such a commitment on anything other than an occasional basis. 
Philosophers tend to fall into one of two camps when it comes to the 
moral appraisal of values. Hedonists consider pleasure to be the only thing that 
is essentially good and worthwhile, in and of itself. Among this group, one sub-
category equates all pleasure with sensual stimulation, while another takes a 
broader perspective; they equate it with satisfaction or enjoyment, which may 
or may not involve sensuality gratification. 
The second camp, comprising what we might refer to as pluralists, 
generally admit pleasure (in at least one of its guises) as a value, but consider 
it just one item on a long and indeterminate list. The list may also include such 
things as knowledge, beauty, freedom, friendship, moral rectitude, good 
character, health, and so forth. 
267 Al Gini, Moral Leadership and Business Ethics, in Joanne B. Ciulla, (ed.), Ethics: The Heart of 
Leadership, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p. 36. 
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A further attempt at categorisation involves differentiating extrinsic from 
intrinsic values. Taylor, for instance, employs this system, suggesting that 
extrinsic values include goods with purely instrumental, contributive or inherent 
value, such as (a) a key, (b) a computer, or (c) Mozart's Fifth Symphony 
respectively. Intrinsic values, in contrast, have worth in and of them selves, 
and can be either hedonistic or non-hedonistic. 268 Sexual pleasure would be an 
example of the former, and health the latter. 269 
One further distinction sees values viewed as either objective or 
subjective. Objectivists assert that we value and desire the good because it is 
good. The classic formulation of this position can be found in Plato, who viewed 
the ultimate good as the highest Form or Idea. 27° A more recent objectivist 
account was provided by Moore, who believed in the independent existence of 
values apart from rational human interest in them. For him, the 'good' is a 
simple, unanalysable quality like the colour yellow, which can be known to 
humans only via intuition. 221 Subjectivism, in contrast, views values as no 
more than products of conscious desire. On this view, value only comes into 
existence in response to human want, and any given value is valuable just to 
268 Richard Taylor, Value and the Origin of Right and Wrong, in Louis P. Pojman, Ethical 
Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 1995), pp. 132-138. 
269 It should be noted, in respect of the extrinsic versus intrinsic differentiation, that further 
complications can arise. So called 'foundationalists' argue that all values are either intrinsic 
or derived from intrinsic values, while 'coherentists' claim that all intrinsic value emerges 
in the relationship of the extrinsic parts one to another, resulting in an overall coherent 
whole, which is a happy life. 
220 Plato, The Republic, translated by H. D. P. Lee, (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1960). 
221 The account referenced here is extracted from Principia Ethica, and can be found in G. E. 
Moore, Non-Naturalism and the Indefinability of the Good, in Louis P. Pojman, (ed.), Ethical 
Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 1995), pp. 406-411. 
260 
the extent that it is wanted or desired. Moreover, subjectivists typically do not 
make normative claims about what constitutes a 'proper' want or desire. 272 
In addition to philosophical debate on the relative merits of the three 
distinctions outlined above, philosophers also ask certain metaethical questions. 
Among these are whether right and wrong, goodness and evil, are themselves 
intrinsic values, or whether such ethical categories are defined through 
relational roles they play in advancing other non-moral values such as health, 
political stability, civic harmony, and so forth. For example, Taylor suggests 
that ethical principles are based on what agents value, and that 'desire' is the 
measure of such valuing. Morality, in consequence, is no more than a set of 
principles and practices that have evolved into public acceptance, in virtue of a 
long history of individual agents simply taking care of their own individual 
interests. 273 This, however, is but one view, and it that need not be debated 
here. For my purposes, I consider if sufficient simply to acknowledge the 
relevance of questions dealing with the relationship of value to morality. 
Getting back to the specific challenge facing me, namely, the 
appropriate positioning of values within a detailed syllabus structure, the 
question that needs addressing relates to what precisely should be said on the 
topic. Bearing in mind the above introductory comments, and remembering the 
need for idiomatic sensitivity, my response is to offer an account that views the 
concept of values as a moral psychological rather than purely moral construct. 
The reason for this resides in the fact that the Australian organisational 
community, especially over the past twenty years, has become culturally 
272 This contrasts with some objectivist accounts, which do make normative claims. For 
instance, Thomas Nagel in The View from Nowhere, (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1986). 
273 Richard Taylor, Value and the Origin of Right and Wrong, in Louis P. Pojman, Ethical 
Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 1995), pp. 132-138. 
sensitised to the language of psychology, and in particular, to the necessity of 
addressing managerial problems through that conceptual medium. 
Learning to differentiate belief statements from value judgements is one 
way of coming to terms with the nature of value. In general, we can say that 
the former refer to what is possible, what exists, what happened in history, 
what a person is, what she can do, and so forth. As Scheibe says: "They are 
framed in terms of expectancies, hypotheses, probabilities, assumptive worlds, 
cognitive maps, and so on." 274 The latter refer to what is wanted or desired, 
what is considered best, what is preferable, what ought to be done or not done. 
In this respect, they suggest, according to Scheibe, "... the operation of wishes, 
desires, goals, passions, valences, or morals."275 Thus, we might say that it is 
easier, or perhaps safer, to attempt to argue facts than to argue values. (In 
response to my claim that Auckland is the capital of New Zealand, you can 
reach for your atlas and readily demonstrate that I am incorrect. But to get me 
to relinquish my passionately held feeling that Auckland is the world's finest 
city, and therefore deserving of being its nation's capital, you may find that far 
more is needed than an appeal to evidence or rational argument.) Facts exist 
independently of how we feel about them, but values are generally emotionally 
resonant. As Scheibe puts it: "Values are contextual occurrences in that they 
depend upon a variety of internal conditions, external stimulus configurations, 
and response options. They are relational in that they represent a relationship 
between the valuing person and the valued object."276 
One of the reasons why an understanding of the nature of values is so 
important to my project involves the role they play in conceptions of what it 
means to live a good life. To get a grasp of the nature of this role, it is useful 
274 Karl E. Scheibe, Beliefs and Values, (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winstron, Inc., 
1970), pp. 41-2. 
275 Ibid., p. 47. 
276 Ibid., p. 47. 
261 
262 
to examine one further manner in which values have been categorised over and 
above those already reviewed. Primary values are goods or evils to which 
humans commit that will respectively benefit or harm every person by way of 
the needs and capacities inherent in human nature as such. 277 Secondary 
values, which are likewise an indispensable part of human existence, depend on 
primary values. They derive their status, according to Kekes, from "... 
historically, socially, and culturally variable aspects of good lives." But instead 
of being essentially grounded in human nature, secondary values are 
associated with human individuality. Each of us is different on certain levels, 
and Kekes has found a useful way of describing this phenomenon by reference 
to differences in human character and circumstances. 278 
As a solid understanding of the difference between primary and 
secondary values is central to a coherent explanation of the nature of the 
relationship between values and conceptions of a good life, it is appropriate to 
spend a little longer on the topic. Let me begin the expanded commentary by 
introducing the work of pioneering personality psychologist, Abraham Maslow. 
In the early 1940s, he published a paper entitled A Theory of Human 
Motivation. In it he argues that human needs fall into five categories, and that 
the categories in turn are part of an empirically observable hierarchy. 279 
Located at the most primitive or lowest level are what he calls 
physiological needs. These include the drives to satisfy our hunger and thirst, 
to keep warm, to find opportunity for sexual release, and so forth. Unless 
277 I wish to make clear that the type of eudaimonistic theory to which I am here 
subscribing is one that accepts, as given, the existence of something called 'human nature'. 
This, of course, is by no means an uncontroversial tenet of Western philosophy. Moreover, 
even among those who do hold to its existence, there are several radically different 
interpretations of what it is. For instance, the Hobbesian view is entirely different to the 
more sanguine perspective of, say, Aristotle. 
278 See the discussion in John Kekes, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives, (Ithaca, NIY: Cornell 
University Press, 1995), pp. 19-24. 
these needs are satisfied, he argues, we have little interest in attempting to 
satisfy the next level. "Freedom, love, community feeling, respect, philosophy, 
all may be waved aside as fripperies which are useless since they fail to fill the 
stomach. Such a man may fairly be said to live by bread alone." 
When physiological needs are being adequately satisfied, then, 
according to Maslow, they begin to lose their motivating influence. The valued 
objects of desire now become something else, falling into a category he names 
safety needs. Once the belly is full, the individual begins thinking in terms of 
the preservation of personal safety and security. Desires and needs are now 
directed towards maintaining stability, and continuity of access to the goods 
that satisfy basic survival needs, and on bringing a sense of order and 
predictability into one's life. These remain the predominant drivers until, on 
becoming consistently satisfied, they in turn lose their motivational force. 
At this point, according to Maslow, a range of goods associated with the 
need for social and personal intimacy emerges to prominence as the objects of 
desire. Under their influence, one is driven by a need for a sense of belonging, 
for friendship, and for relationship. The penultimate stratum in the hierarchy 
centres on so-called esteem needs. At this level, agents are driven by a desire 
to be respected by their peers, to be recognised both for who they are and for 
their achievements, and by a need for self-respect. The fifth and final level 
sees agents motivated by the need for self-actualisation, that is, towards 
recognition that each one is on a pathway that is likely to lead to an 
appropriate expression of his or her unique individuality, and the fulfillment of 
personal potential. 
279 Abraham 1-I. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, Psychological Review, 50, (July, 
1943), pp. 371-396. 
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Maslow argues that the human values postulated within this taxonomy 
are sought progressively in the order stipulated. We tend to be preoccupied 
with, and motivated by, the particular batch of needs operating at the level 
currently obtaining in our lives. The order is not immutable, however, and does 
not hold for everyone; but, by and large, this is the general sequence that he 
observed operating in a majority of cases. While Maslow produced a significant 
body of work in the field of personal and developmental psychology, much of 
which was controversial, my interest here is limited to the specific theory 
presented. This did, in fact, receive widespread support, and continues to do 
so, including from many of those interested in workplace motivation. 
I have chosen to introduce Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs construct at this 
juncture for two reasons. In the first instance, it presents a coherent 
framework within which we can clearly identify the meaning of primary values. 
The needs operating at all five levels of the hierarchy exist because they are 
part and parcel of what human existence is all about. We have these needs in 
virtue of our shared humanness. My second reason relates to the high level of 
credibility it enjoys within the Australian organisational community. Used 
normally in the context of its explanatory power in respect of workplace 
motivation, its credibility can be leveraged to good effect for the purpose of 
explaining the difference between primary and secondary values. 
With the benefit of this explanatory model, it is possible to explore more 
fully the moral significance of human desires. Kekes suggests that according to 
a eudaimonistic conception, primary values can be thought of as setting the 
moral limits or boundaries governing the extent to which a life can be 
considered good. Thus, for instance, if I am deprived of the satisfaction of my 
needs at any level on the Maslovian hierarchy, and if this deprivation turns into 
an consistent pattern, then it will have the effect of making it very difficult for 
me, if not impossible, to live a good life. This provides a clue as to why 
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Aristotle considered such goods as friendship, health, some good fortune, et 
cetera, as part of parcel of what is needed to achieve eudaimonia. 28° 
Secondary values, for their part, define what Kekes calls our moral 
possibilities. Unlike primary values that inhere in human nature, these are 
specific to each individual. Each of us is defined, on this view, by what results 
from the unique intersection of the prevailing facts of our individual characters, 
and the particular combination of circumstances that have shaped our current 
realities. It will be remembered that the 'facts' of one's character comprise the 
five critical variables nominated by Kekes, namely, the desires, capacities, 
opportunities, values and actions. 
For their part, one's circumstances include the social, cultural, political, 
economic, historical, technological, religious, ethnic and aesthetic influences 
that, in combination, have created and shaped the context within which 
individuals live. When one considers the interplay of variable character sets and 
variable circumstances, it becomes easy to appreciate the difference and 
diversity between people, a not insignificant issue in the context of leadership 
ethics. (I will return this important point in the Epilogue.) The extent to which 
I may be able to live a good life, then, depends on the connections between the 
facts of my character, as influenced by my primary values, and the 
circumstances of my life as determined by secondary ones. Kekes sums up 
the eudaimonistic challenge as that of recognising the meaning of these 
connections, striving to learn their significance, and then engaging one's 
reflective capacities so as to configure one's values in such a way that their 
lived expression equates to a flourishing life. 281 
28° I refer the reader back to the account of Aristotle's ethics given in Chapter 6. 
281 Within the Western tradition, positions taken in answering the question, What 
constitutes a good human life? fall into three categories: objectivist, subjectivist and 
combinationist. Objectivists, in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, point to a single ideal 
against which the worthiness of a life should be assessed. As we saw in Chapter 6, for 
Aristotle this is by no means a simple notion, either conceptually or in terms of ease of 
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7.23 Control, judgement and mastery 
There are two reasons why the concept of sound judgement is important 
to my overall argument. One can be termed 'cosmetic' and the other 
substantive, but both are important. On the cosmetic dimension, to speak of 
the need for sound judgement, on the part of corporate managers, is to speak 
within the accepted idiom. All senior executives like to think that their direct 
reports uniformly display it in good measure. To illustrate what I mean, let me 
again invoke the 'redundant question' device introduced earlier (see §5.5xxx). 
In doing so, I will extend the notion beyond that already discussed earlier. For 
instance, to ask a CEO if she is interested in improving the ethical 
consciousness of her managers, you can confidently expect an affirmative 
reply. Yet this question does not pass the 'redundant question' test. 
The reason is that real conviction will most likely be lacking when it 
comes to doing something in pursuance of the affirmed developmental 
objective. This is because the notion of ethical consciousness falls outside the 
idiomatic boundaries. It is likely to be perceived as soft as opposed to hard; 
nebulous as opposed to clear; flaky as opposed to concrete; ephemeral as 
achievement. It means a life lived in a manner consistent with a complete expression of our 
essential ergon, that is, becoming fully rational and disciplined beings. For their part, 
subjectivists tend to conflate happiness and the good life in a more straightforward way, 
arguing that we are just as happy as we think we are, or perhaps more accurately, as we 
feel. And, if we succeed in living happily, then it is by definition a good life. There is no 
normative component to this conception. If I feel happy with my life, then so be it. The 
fact that others may despise my lifestyle and values is of no consequence, provided I am 
not committing crimes. Combinationists take the view that there are both objective and 
subjective dimensions to the good life. By way of example, consider the so-called 
dominant-end view of eudaimonia. This refers to those lives lived in single-minded pursuit 
of one specific end, to the virtual exclusion of all others. Virtuous examples of this 
conception can be seen in those individuals who devote their lives selflessly and tirelessly 
to the service of others, the late Mother Teresa of Calcutta springing to mind by way of 
example. 281 This conception is subjective in that the agent autonomously chooses what the 
dominant-end is going to be. It is objective in that it affirms happiness (satisfaction, 
contentment, et cetera) as an intrinsic good in virtue of its being, in the words of Taylor "... 
the authentic manifestation of an individual's autonomous choice of his own selfhood." 
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opposed to sturdy. An ability for consistently sound judgement', on the other 
hand, will tend to be perceived in the reverse manner. 'Cosmetics', in the 
sense in which the term is being used here, is largely about perception, putting 
a certain 'spin' on things. 
What of the substantive element of judgement? My opening claim is 
that many judgements made, during the course of human affairs, appear as 
discreet events in time and space to third-party observers. Thus, it may appear 
to my colleagues, in our shared study room, that I have made a judgement, 
right this moment, here at my desk. The reality, I believe, is quite different in 
most cases. Judgement is better thought of as a process. What can appear as 
a discreet event with observable manifestation (e.g. I say to my colleagues, 
Guess what I've just decided?), is more realistically the end point in a chain of 
events that will have involved some combination of cognitive, affective and 
conative elements over a period of time. Moreover, at least some of these 
'events' can reasonably be expected to have taken place outside of my 
conscious awareness. 
Another important feature of any judgement is its outcome, which, by 
definition, involves a decision being reached about what to do or not to do in a 
given set of circumstances. One guideline on how the circumstances in 
question relate to the decision to be made is provided by the practical 
syllogism. A useful expression of this, following Kekes, goes as follows: 
o Minor premise: Given that the agent wants to achieve a certain 
outcome (or good). 
o Major premise, Given that this is the situation being faced (providing 
description thereof). 
o Conclusion: Then here's what ought to be done. 
With the practical syllogism, it is important to remember that the 
conclusion must always involve an exhortation to action (hence the term 
'practical'). Deriving from this syllogism, we can now refine our understanding 
of judgement as the process through which a decision is arrived at to do, or not 
to do, something, given the good the agent wants to attain, and given her 
concrete circumstances. 
Another substantive element relates to the quality of judgements made, 
for clearly they lie on a spectrum ranging from the impeccable, through the 
ordinary, to the awful. This is an important distinction in the context of 
capturing the interest of the senior-level corporate decision-maker. No CEO 
would be willing to invest continuing confidence in managers whose overall 
performance, in terms of quality of judgements made, is perceived as lying 
towards the lower end of the spectrum. How, then, do we differentiate 
between the good and the bad? Within the eudaimonistic framework set by the 
five principles outlined at the end of Chapter 6, I believe some guidelines are 
available to address this. 
From the principle advocating the need for the agent to have a well 
thought out conception of what it means to live a good life, it can be deduced 
that good judgement lies in the ability to discern those aspects of concrete 
situations that can be changed, for the purpose of making life better. 282 
Another, from the holism principle, suggests that good judgement reflects 
consideration of the whole picture, including a preparedness to evaluate, in any 
given situation, not only the appropriateness of what one wants to achieve (the 
desired end), but also those strategies available to make it happen (the 
means). 
282 John Kekes, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 
p. 26. 
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A third, deriving from the integrated psychological profile of 
eudaimonism-centred thinking, is the admonition that the gut and heart be 
engaged, in addition to the head, when important judgements have to be 
made. 
The foregoing account of control and judgement can be thought of as a 
necessary prelude to a more complete and advanced capability, that of 
achieving mastery over the general thrust and direction of one's life. To explain 
this, let me begin by drawing attention to a common condition with which most 
of us must grapple. This is the human proclivity to attribute blame to others. 
This often starts in childhood as a self-protective coping strategy. "Mummy, It 
wasn't me who stole the cookies; it was Sally." As we grow older, we quickly 
discover that we can extricate ourselves from many forms of difficulty by astute 
re-assignment of culpability. In more extreme cases of compulsive maladaptive 
behaviours, the agent can actually create the problem so as to set up the 
opportunity to pass on the blame to the intended victim. 
If this trend is not arrested, it is not unusual for individual lives to move 
out of sync with the world in which they are being played out. One 
consequence of this, as Kekes correctly points out, is for those agents to 
attempt to restore equilibrium by trying to change the world. At a point in time 
when they should be seeking to adapt their own lives to fit external reality, 
they are compulsively attempting to do the reverse, an enterprise doomed to 
failure. Self-mastery is the felicitous condition attained by those individuals 
who have progressed through the various intermediate stages of achieving 
incrementally greater control over the interplay between their characters and 
circumstances. 
The functional hallmark of someone with a high level of self-mastery is a 
well thought out, and regularly reviewed, conception of what it means to live a 
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good life. This, in turn, will tend to be reflected in the agent in question having 
a clearly established set of prioritised values, against which decisions, choices, 
and judgements that lead to actions, will be checked. Moreover, this individual 
will understand that not all her desires can reasonably be expected to be met. 
She will be comfortable with the art of compromise. She will expect to have to 
sacrifice the possibility of satisfying some wants or desires, in order to realise 
others. Moreover, she will be comfortable with this. 
As mentioned at the outset, however, the road to self-mastery begins 
with a recognition of the need to exert control. Not over the external world, 
but over the psychologically-grounded impulses of the self. Moreover, it is the 
incrementally improving control that results from this recognition, and a 
willingness to act on it, that leads in turn to a capacity for incrementally better 
judgement. 283 
7.24 Marking the relevance 
I have argued above for the importance of learning how to exercise the 
sort of judicious control needed to manage one's desires. The aim is to be in 
control of one's psychological state, thus avoiding the reverse condition. Before 
moving to the final part of my argument, describing how the discipline of critical 
eudaimonistic reflection can be employed to achieve this form of control, I draw 
attention briefly to the fact that I am, by no means, a lone voice in promoting 
the relevance of self-mastery to the enterprise of effective organisational 
leadership. Within the recent O&M literature, Senge has been a strong 
advocate of what he refers to as the discipline of personal mastery. 284 In 
suggesting that those with higher levels of personal mastery are consistently 
the ones displaying above average leadership performance, he lists various 
283 A good account of self-mastery of the type discussed here can be found in John, The 
Examined Life, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988), pp. 20-30. 
284 See, Peter M. Senge, Peter M., The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning 
Organization, (London: Century Business, 1992), especially pp. 142-143. 
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attributes he considers hallmarks of the achievement. These include capacities 
for (a) continuous learning from experience, (b) high levels of empathy, (c) 
being self-motivated, (d) being seen as 'connected' to others, (e) pursuing and 
achieving higher levels of emotional maturity, and (f) having a better 
understanding of the meaning of happiness. To my knowledge, Senge is not an 
Aristotelian scholar. I have been able to find no such reference in his work. 
Yet, he seems to have intuitively arrived at conclusions that align very closely 
with the thrust of my own argument. I find this encouraging on account of his 
well-regarded reputation in the corporate world. 
7.3 Critical Eudaimonistic Reflection 
7.31 Reflection 
I would like to begin by describing clearly what I mean by the notion of 
reflection. To reflect on something means to think carefully about it. It can be 
distinguished from idle day dreaming, which allows the mind to wander in every 
which way and invariably conjure up a raft of either pleasant or unpleasant 
thoughts and emotions. It can further be distinguished from what might be 
called 'thoughtful consideration'. It is not yet to be engaged in the reflective 
process if my attention is merely engaging comfortably, perhaps even kindly, 
with an object of thought, for instance, a person or circumstance. It can also be 
distinguished from meditation, which generally seeks to ease the conscious 
mind into a state of quiet inattention, perhaps even to induce a state of altered 
consciousness. 
Thus, Boud et al define reflection as "... a generic term for those 
intellectual and affective activities in which individuals engage to explore their 
experiences in order to lead to new understandings and appreciation." 285 This 
285 D. Boud, R. Keogh, and D. Walker, Introduction, in D. Boud, R. Keogh, and D. Walker 
(eds.), Reflection: Turning Experience into Learning, (London, UK: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1985). 
is instructive in that it draws attention to two important insights. The first 
relates to the fact that in reflective exploration of our experiences, we are 
expected to bring to bear some form of affective as well as cognitive 
evaluation. We should attempt, in other words, to reconstruct the emotional 
content of a given experience to complement what will be revealed through the 
purely cognitive reconstruction. Second, the definition makes clear that in the 
same way that we might associate a pleasurable interlude with day dreaming, 
or deep relaxation with meditation, we should associate learning and insight 
with reflection. Thus, the term is intended to imply a systematic effort to pay 
attention to a selected object of experience, for the purpose of evaluating it 
with the benefit of both cognitive and affective reconstruction. 
Reflection becomes ethical reflection when the evaluative component is 
explicitly directed towards assessing its object in terms of good or bad, right or 
wrong, suggesting perhaps that every reflective effort is ethical to some 
degree. Nevertheless, I am comfortable to make the distinction here for the 
purpose of emphasising the need for the evaluation to be explicitly ethical. To 
understand what I mean by this, it is merely necessary to recognise the 
difference between evaluating an object as nice or not nice versus right or 
wrong. 
To extend the analysis a little further, let us consider the thoughts of a 
contemporary philosopher with a specific interest in the art of ethical reflection. 
McCollough suggests that it consists "... not of analysis and application of 
principles derived from historical texts, but of critical analysis of what we say, 
what we do, what we are."286 We hold, he contends, a set of beliefs about 
these things, which may not be warrantable. As such, part of the process of 
developing moral authority is learning how to apply evaluative scrutiny, taking 
286 Thomas .E. McCollough, The Moral Imagination and Public Life: Raising the Ethical 
Question, (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers Inc., 1991). 
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care to ensure that it is sufficiently critical. For many of us, the tendency is 
judge ourselves too kindly rather than too harshly. 
With this background in mind, I introduce the notion of critical 
eudaimonistic reflection, suggesting that it be thought of as the discipline, 
which managerial leaders need to master, for the purpose of becoming more 
ethically competent. 287 
7.32 Adding eudaimonistic discipline 
In using the term 'discipline' I wish to invoke two of its meanings for 
present purposes. In one sense, to call critical eudaimonistic reflection a 
discipline is to assign to it the status of a set of practices that are, or might be, 
formally codified. I am thus suggesting that we view it in the same way we 
might view the 'discipline' of bridge-building within civil engineering. If one 
carefully follows the prescriptive guidelines established within the discipline, the 
job gets done well. The other sense of the term to be invoked is suggested by 
the phrase, "Personal discipline needs to be shown by a manager wishing to 
become an ethically competent practitioner". In respect of this, however, a 
small but important distinction needs to be made. While critical eudaimonistic 
reflection, as here interpreted, requires discipline on the manager's part, it 
need not interfere in any significant way with busy work schedules. Critical 
reflection sessions can be undertaken in the shower, the bath, in bed, driving to 
work, or while taking a quiet five-minute stroll during the day. 
287 I wish to draw to the reader's attention my recognition of the fact that I am by no means 
alone in espousing the need for organisational leaders to adopt more critically reflective 
practice. Ciulla, in fact, calls critical thinking a "fundamental leadership competency". 
See, Joanne B. Ciulla, Ethics and Critical Thinking in Leadership Education, The Journal of 
Leadership Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, (1996), p. 111 in pp. 110-119. It should also be said, in 
fairness, that this recognition is not limited to philosophers. As far back as 1964, Brouwer 
advocated the same message in the Harvard Business Review. See, Paul J. Brouwer, The 
Power to See Ourselves, Harvard Business Review, Nov-Dec, (1964), pp. 36-43. 
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Nevertheless, the need for discipline is still present, because there is no 
shortage of managers in contemporary Australia who will argue vehemently 
that they have absolutely no discretionary time in their alleged '24-7' working 
lives. 
I call the form of reflective discipline I wish to promote 'eudaimonistic' 
for three main reasons. The first has to do with the fact that the principal 
referential focus in the intended critique is directed towards the interplay of 
character and circumstance, and does so in a manner that requires the critique 
to take account of affective and well as cognitive factors. The second relates to 
the manner in which the critique needs to be made 'holistic' in a number of 
quite specific senses. The third involves the essential connection between 
reflection and action. 
7.33 Reflection on character and circumstance 
I begin by reminding the reader that the role of leader was characterised 
earlier in the argument as intimately associated with the capacity to build and 
maintain high-trust communities. From this perspective, for leaders to be 
critically reflective, they need to give disciplined consideration to a range of 
questions, including the following: To what extent can the manner in which I 
exercise my legitimate authority over others be adjudged fair and just? To 
what extent is my use of power morally legitimate? To what extent am I a 
genuinely trustworthy person? To what extent am I willing to be trusting? To 
what extent do I set goals that are morally defensible? To what extent are the 
strategies I advocate, for the achievement of these goals, morally defensible? 
This is by no means an exhaustive list. In fact, it could easily be extended to a 
thoroughly unmanageable length, which would have the effect of discouraging 
would-be students of the critically reflective process. (Again, let me emphasise 
that this is an important practical consideration for busy managers. If the 
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syllabus is made to appear too demanding, their enthusiasm for participation 
will diminish.) 
One way of avoiding the pitfall is by subsuming the list of questions to 
be addressed within a more manageable set of parameters, or more accurately, 
what is likely to be perceived as a more manageable set of parameters. This 
can be achieved by nominating, as the object of required reflection, the overtly 
straightforward interplay between one's character and circumstances. 
Portrayed this way, the challenge does not sound quite so daunting. 288 
In respect of reflection on the facts of one's character, learners can draw 
on the framework described earlier in this chapter, directing their reflective 
gaze on the five variables identified. In doing so, novices in the arena of critical 
self-evaluation will come to realise that they are entirely in thrall to a set of 
defining forces that have been largely outside their control, in consequence, 
partly at least, of the existence of the forces having been outside their 
conscious awareness. On coming to know them better, the learner will discover 
that they are quite eclectic in nature. They will derive, inter alia, from the 
lottery-style endowments of genetic inheritance, from one's early formative 
experiences, and will have reached their present expression in virtue of the 
many other socialisation influences associated with the particular cultural, 
educational, and societal milieu in which individuals have found themselves. 
These are the 'circumstances' of our individual lives which, via an on-
going commerce with our individual characters, determine the extent to which 
we will adjudge, in at least a descriptive sense, the level of goodness in those 
lives. Thus, the process of forging greater reflective insight into the interplay of 
one's character and circumstances must start with placing of the relevant facts 
288 The reality is, of course, that the devil lies in the details. The level of complexity 
associated with effective moral evaluation of the interplay of one's character and 
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into explicit focus. The eudaimonistic critique now asks for the descriptive 
profile just arrived at to be cross-referred to the normative ideal represented by 
one's conception of what it means to live a good life. At this juncture, the 
novice may well discover that no well-thought-out conception actually exists. 
Reflective soul-searching will therefore needed. 
To assist the novice in meeting this challenge, we need to introduce 
another variable into the overall reflective equation. This comes collectively in 
the form of what Kekes calls the permanent adversities to which the quality of 
our lives is continually and relentlessly vulnerable. These adversities are like 
obstacles or barriers that appear from time to time, with no apparent 
predictability. No matter how well we plan, no matter how well intentioned our 
motives, no matter how morally authoritative we feel, these adversities seem 
capable of thwarting our best attempts to live good lives. They fall into three 
generic sub-categories: contingency, conflict, and evil. 
Adverse contingent facts, which disrupt our lives, can come from purely 
serendipitous happenings. We fall ill, we have accidents, we experience the 
grief associated with the loss of loved ones. We experience insecurities and 
anxieties, and a host of other debilitating emotions, sometimes to an 
unmanageable degree. We can become victims of injustice, persecution, 
exploitation, discrimination, or social and political unrest. Contingency, in this 
sense, has long been a theme in literature as well as moral philosophy, and the 
same consolative succour can be found in both sources. Shakespeare, for 
instance, with the tale of King Lear, tells us that goodness can lead to suffering, 
that attempts at moral development need not be rewarded, and that people 
circumstances is potentially immense. But this need not concern us at this juncture. I will, 
however, return to it later in the chapter. 
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often come to undeserved harm. Harold Kushner, the contemporary American 
Jewish theologian, tells us that "bad things happen to good people". 289 
Kekes tells us that our wellbeing is often at the mercy of conditions over 
which we enjoy neither control nor any form of decisive influence. He calls this 
a "non-anthropocentric truth", meaning that while its logic may be evident to 
God or some other sufficiently intelligent being, it is beyond our reach as 
human agents. It is morally significant anthropocentric fact, however, that no 
matter how virtuously we try to live our lives, we are never the masters of our 
fate. "Virtue", as Kekes puts it, simply "does not guarantee a good life." 299 
We can now appreciate a key reason why Aristotle, unlike Socrates 
before him, never felt that virtue alone was enough for a good life. More is 
needed, according to the former, the first eudaimonist. To live a good life also 
requires a fair share of good luck, some willing and helpful friends, and 
continuously providential external circumstances, none of which can be 
guaranteed despite our best efforts and best intentions. (Some might argue 
that these reflections lend of this lend some weight to the plausibility of 
Flanagan's recent assertion, as follows: "The question "What makes life worth 
living?" assumes that life is or can be worth living. Perhaps this is an 
unwarranted assumption. The question "Is life worth living" comes first. tr)291 
Another category of adversity to which we are inevitably subject, by dint 
of our humanness, has to do with the innate conflicts that inevitably accompany 
the plurality of values to which we variously commit. Why can't I enjoy both 
fulfillment in my professional life, and contentment in my private world? Why 
can't I enjoy going to the gym every day as much as I value the health benefits 
289 Harold S. Kushner, When Bad Things Happen to Good People, (London, UK: Pan Books, 
1982). 
290 John Kekes, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 
53. 
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of doing so? The list is endless. Moreover, as if to accentuate the 
psychologically existential pain associated with this particular form of adversity, 
those of us 'lucky' enough to live in the so-called advanced Western societies, 
tend to have so many of our more fundamental needs satisfied so readily. We 
certainly do not have to concern ourselves about the two lowest levels of the 
Maslovian hierarchy. And yet, levels of contentment are no higher with us than 
elsewhere. We can feel doubly cheated by the forces of conflict! 
To the extent that we are human, according to Kekes and to Aristotle 
before him, there is evil in our souls. As much as we might want to deny it 
with sincerely felt indignation, the evidence points to its truth. Socrates 
believed that evil amounted to no more than ignorance of the good. If you 
reflect long and hard enough, you come to know the good. Knowing the good 
will motivate you to do or be good, and reject evil. This is an uplifting Socratic 
sentiment that is nice to hear, and would be even nicer to be able to accept. As 
a thesis, however, it surely fails Flanagan's contemporary test of minimum 
psychological realism292 . We are motivated, in reality, by many things, 
including jealousy, inordinate desire for certain types of pleasure, resentment, 
envy, fear, anger, avarice and pride. Again, the list is by no means exhaustive. 
Socrates did not have the benefit of studying the empirical findings of the work 
of Freud and Jung. We now know that a large part of the human motivational 
economy lies outside the conscious awareness of all but the very low 
percentage of highly evolved individuals. 
291 Owen Flanagan, Owen, Self Expressions: Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), P.  3. 
292 For Flanagan, there are certain minimum requirements, of a psychological variety, that 
must be met, in order for a moral discrimination to be deemed valid in reference to some 
normative yardstick. His testing for minimum psychological realism includes, but is not 
restricted to, consideration of the role of emotion in the process of arriving at 
discriminations and judgements. See, Owen Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics 
and Psychological Realism, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
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The account given above offers but an introduction to the nature of 
contingency, conflict and evil in so far as they represent the sorts of permanent 
adversities to which our ethical natures are subject. The main reason for 
drawing attention to them resides in the pivotal role they play in explaining, not 
only the nature of critical eudaimonistic reflection, but the manner in which it 
can lead to more deliberate control of the interplay between character and 
circumstance. 
Without adequate self-awareness, we lack the ability to see the entirely 
fortuitous nature of this critical interplay. We may think it good, but be 
mistaken. We are, in effect, working on the assumption that the descriptions 
and interpretations of the facts, as we know them, are accurate. 
As we have seen, however, included among what we consider to be 
objective facts, are subjectively evaluated desires, dreams, hopes, fears, 
aversions and memories. This, moreover, is without taking consideration of the 
possibility that other relevant facts might even exist, of which we are not 
aware. Important progress gets made, in movement towards greater control, 
when two events coincide. The first involves simple recognition of the fact that 
the interplay of one's character and circumstance will remain fortuitous until we 
take purposeful action, via a critically reflective approach self-awareness, to 
make it deliberate. The second involves the formulation of a deliberate 
conception of a good life. The significance of the coinciding of these two factors 
lies in the fact that, having a clearly thought out conception of what it means to 
live a good life, acts to guide the direction and momentum of the former. 
Thus, one can now begin to understand that many of our prior, unreflective 
interpretive accounts were inadequate in some way, varying from mildly 
misguided to just plain wrong. 
These realisations, as they gather momentum, serve two important 
functions, one primary and the other secondary. In the primary instance, they 
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motivate us to look even more critically at the character-circumstance matrix 
that has thus far revealed a fair amount of what Kekes calls "anomalies and 
surprises", most of which carry with them a salutary lesson of some sort. In 
the secondary instance, they motivate us to want to change in line with, what 
we now know to be, something better. 
7.34 Reflection and holism 
For a reflective discipline to be deemed eudaimonistic, in the spirit of the 
account given in the last two chapters, it must demonstrate a capacity to 
facilitate the realisation of holistic insights. As the meaning of reflective holism 
is prima facie indeterminate, it is necessary to set some structural boundaries 
at the outset. To this end, I begin with the claim that a useful set of 
commencement parameters is available, by thinking in terms of the need for 
two types of holism, what I call the horizontal and the vertical. While the 
former is intended to ensure breadth of moral perspective, the latter deals with 
depth. In the paragraphs that follow, I will show that the breadth perspective 
can be gainfully explored and articulated by starting with the dichotomous 
relation between self and other erstwhile. Likewise, I will show that progress 
can be made on the depth side by examining the relation between 'horizons' 
and 'projects'. 
7.341 A breadth perspective in reflective holism 
There are three ways in which conceptions of what is meant by 'self' can 
be postulated. The first of these is captured in the idea of an agent holding a 
primary commitment to what I call my story. In this formulation, I see my life 
as being entirely or largely about me. What counts as valid is my way of seeing 
things, my beliefs and values. Appropriate feelings are those that I experience, 
to the degrees of intensity with which I experience them. Appropriate moral 
sentiments are those that I hold, for whatever reason. And so forth. Within 
the boundary parameters of this conception, the self is wrapped up completely 
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in my self. All other persons reside outside, in varying degrees of proximity in 
direct correlation to with I perceive as the extent to which their worldviews 
coincide with my own. 
Then there a view of self captured in the notion of our story. In this 
formulation, I readily see 'the other' as an integral part of who I am and those 
things for which I stand. To the degree that I have physical, cognitive, 
emotional, motivational, instinctual, volitional and other experiences, I assess 
them in terms of either their intended or actualised impact on others. Finally, 
there are those who hold a view of 'self' best reflected in the notion of the 
story. In this group are those who readily align their individual identities with a 
normative, ideological, or some sort of other ideal. An example would be the 
devout Muslim who sees his life as a literal, as well as figurative, surrender to 
the will of Allah. As this notion of personal surrender is the ideological as well 
as theological cornerstone of Islamic belief, then the individual self comes to be 
indistinguishable from a collective one, for those who are the true believers. 
The doctrine of eudaimonism clearly embraces the second of these 
formulations, in the sense that it holds to a view of self that is inclusive of the 
other. 293 In consequence, a normative model of critical reflection, that claims 
to be eudaimonistic in structure, must find a way of accommodating this 
inclusiveness. I believe the necessary connection can be ensured by reference 
to the notion of moral imagination. 
Johnson defines moral imagination as the "... ability to imaginatively 
discern various possibilities for acting in a given situation and to envision the 
potential help and harm that are likely to result from a given action."294 Thus, 
at a very basic level, the following question would suggest itself to a managerial 
293 I am making this as a factual statement rather than a claim. Supporting evidence can be 
found, inter alia, in Annas, op. cit., pp. 439-455. 
294 Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 202. 
leader considering a particular course of action: "How might my peers, or my 
subordinates, view this particular strategy?" By reflecting on what she 
construes as the probable answer each would give, she is likely to discover 
perspectives that differ from her own. Comparative evaluation of these might 
then lead her to conclude that the original strategy, altered in some way, or 
perhaps abandoned altogether in favour of an alternative, would be morally and 
otherwise preferable. 
Kekes takes this into the more abstract domain by suggesting that it is a 
function of moral imagination to enlarge the field of ethical possibilities open to 
us, when considering ways in which to deal with life's challenges, especially in 
the face of adversity. When the realisation of possibilities is dependent on one's 
existing conception of the good, and, when that realisation gets threatened by 
contingency, conflict or evil, it is time to invoke a more morally imaginative 
frame of reference. When the arrival of an adversity forecloses on one 
possibility, imagination opens up other ways. Another way of thinking about 
moral imagination, then, is to see it as necessitating a regular reflective re-
appraisal of one's values. 
An especially fruitful engagement of moral imagination takes place when 
we learn to see the narrowness or shallowness of our existing conceptions of 
what it means to live a good life. As Kekes makes clear, the greater the 
breadth of our moral landscape, the less likely we are to be significantly 
discommoded by the closing off of certain possibilities, on account of the 
unexpected impact of an adversity. For his part, McCollough draws further 
attention to the contribution of moral imagination to a well-developed capacity 
for critical eudaimonistic reflection, with the assertion that moral imagination 
"... considers an issue in the light of the whole. 95 But it is not so much the 
explicit reference to holism that captures the interest, as the manner in which 
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he describes what constitutes "the whole". He argues that for the purpose of 
developing a fully empathetic perspective, the reflective agent needs to be 
capable of recognising the implications of the critical intersection between 
institutional functioning and personal morality. In his own words: "The whole 
is not only the complex interrelated functional aspects of a society's economic, 
political and social institutions. It is also the traditions, beliefs, values, ideals, 
and hopes of its members, who constitute a community with a stake in the 
good life and a hopeful future." 296 
What he is effectively doing here is drawing attention to the need for 
corporate leaders to expand their perspectival horizons. This, he argues, they 
need to do in such a way that their important judgements and decisions reflect 
not only a solid base of persuasive rationality, but also an appreciation of the 
psychological domain of human responsiveness. This domain, it will be 
recalled from Chapter 4, includes the operation of such potent forces as those 
relating to personal identity, loyalties, obligations, promises, love, trust, and 
hope. Good ethical judgement, he concludes, "... consists in making these 
values explicit, and taking responsibility for judging their implications for 
action". 297 
7.342 A depth perspective in reflective holism 
When I talk about the desirability of cultivating a depth perspective to 
one's reflective capacities, I have in mind a quite specific notion. To explain it, 
let me call on my Agritest experiences for one last time, on this occasion to 
introduce the reader to Richard Smith, a senior scientist at head office. He had 
jointed the company straight from university, graduating with both bachelor 
and master degrees in a relevant scientific discipline. In his first six years with 
the company, he progressed from scientific officer to laboratory scientist to 
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295 Thomas McCollough, op. cit., p. 17. 
296 Ibid., p. 17. 
284 
senior scientist. His career, apparently, was on a fast track. Even though he 
enjoyed a good remuneration package, with which he was more than satisfied, 
Richard had become less than ideally happy in his work. And, because his work 
had become such a time-consuming and important part of his world, the felt 
undercurrent of dissatisfaction had begun to spread into his private life. 
Richard later recounted to me that, on reflection, he had begun to feel 
disappointed in other people. He had, for instance, come to see how some 
individuals consistently manage to appropriate credit but assign blame. On 
one personalised and specific level, he felt that he had been overlooked for an 
important promotion six months earlier, when a rare Department Head role 
became available for which he, and many of his colleagues, felt he was 
especially well suited. Moreover, despite his relative youthfulness at the time 
(twenty eight), he was considered 'ready'. The job, however, went to what was 
widely perceived as a much less deserving colleague. 
While it was generally acknowledged among peers that Richard had 
worked hard at perfecting his scientific skills, and as having every attempt to be 
helpful and accommodating to his co-workers, the successful candidate - now 
Richard's boss - was seen to have gotten the job by 'brown-nosing the 
brass'. 298 Richard confided in me that he had become very disillusioned by 
these events, and had come to feel that values such as appeal to reason, a fair 
attitude, and a sense of personal decency do not seem to guarantee the 
felicitous realisation of one's aspirations. 
In the eight years that intervened between this promotion 
disappointment and the time I met him during my project, Richard says that his 
earlier disappointment had been progressively compounded and reinforced by 
many others. Consistent with actuarial probability for his age group, he has 
297 Thomas McCollough, op. cit., p. 17. 
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been through a marriage break-up, has lost a parent to cancer, and is finding it 
very hard to meet suitable prospective new partners. Moreover, he is still a 
senior scientist, albeit having progressed well financially. While he would like to 
leave Agritest and move to a bigger organisation offering better career 
prospects, this would require moving interstate or overseas. Richard, however, 
has two children from his marriage, the custody of whom he shares with his ex-
wife. Moving away would mean leaving his children, which he does not want to 
do. 
Experience shows that the 'Richard Smiths' of the world often continue 
down the slippery slope of existential disenchantment. Clinical psychologists 
would consider them high-risk candidates for full-blown emotional breakdowns. 
Richard, like many others in the early reaches of middle age, had reached the 
point at which life seems to have lost the sense of challenge, excitement, and 
meaning that was so prevalent ten years earlier. To arrive at this realisation is 
not a psychologically neutral event. It can rarely be reflected upon 
dispassionately. Rather, it can be expected to provoke feelings of despair, fear, 
self-pity, helplessness, and hopelessness. 
If this pattern of emotional disintegration persists beyond the short-
term, it can be destructive in at least two ways. First, it can sap one's energy 
and general sense of wellbeing. Second, it can work insidiously to undermine 
our moral motivation, that is, to want to continue making our best efforts to 
live a good life. If what we consider to have been our bests efforts and 
positive attitudes have let us down so badly, why should we continue with 
them? 
To have developed a depth perspective in one's reflective capacities, as 
here conceived in a eudaimonistic expression, is to have developed certain a 
298 A somewhat crude Australian metaphor, which is, no doubt, self-explanatory. 
certain type of understanding of the human condition. It is to have arrived at 
the realisation that permanent adversities are a part of life. It is to have 
arrived at the point of realising that it is impossible to avoid them. Instead, it 
is about the achievement of the sort of sanguine serenity that comes from 
being at peace within oneself. Kekes regards it as arriving at the point of 
having "sensible hope". This kind of psycho-ethical maturity spares us, to 
some extent at least, the disappointments that inevitably come from being 
overly-reliant or expectant of others, or of "hounding the unresponsive 
heavens" in a bid to receive some supernatural relief from our misfortune. He 
summarises his position thus: "Moral depth does not promise good lives; it 
promises to make lives as free from contingency, conflict and evil as our 
character and circumstances allow."299 
Critical eudaimonistic reflection, in its depth perspective, thus expresses 
itself through three distinct but interrelated functions. First, it makes explicit 
the inevitability and permanency of adversity in human life. Second, on a more 
personal level, it facilitates each of us to abandon the naive hope that, for some 
inexplicable reason, reality will make an exception in "my case", smile kindly on 
me, and be hospitable to my endeavours. Third, in a direct contribution to the 
elevation of emotional intelligence, it facilitates correction of what otherwise 
would be misguided emotional reaction to the inevitability and permanency of 
adversity in our lives. 
7.343 Summary 
I have argued, in this section, for a specific type of reflective discipline. 
The capacity to examine oneself must have both horizontal and vertical 
dimensions, if it is to qualify as a true eudaimonistic critique in the Aristotelian 
tradition. In respect of the former, I have shown how the concept of moral 
299 John Kekes, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 
p. 181. 
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imagination can be employed to inform the required syllabus content. This is 
largely because it deals with the need for reflective agents to learn how to open 
up their minds to a wider range of moral possibilities than might otherwise have 
been the case. In virtue of becoming more morally imaginative, in the sense 
here intended, the expectation is that the reflective individual will gradually 
evolve into a more thoughtful, empathetic, caring and compassionate person, 
all qualities relevant to the art and practice of effective leadership. m° 
The concept of moral depth, as it has been articulated recently within 
the neo-Aristotelian idiom of eudaimonism favoured by John Kekes, informs the 
syllabus in respect of bringing to the practice of self-reflective critique the 
necessary vertical dimension. In virtue of guiding the agent to a deeper 
understanding of the human condition, the aim is to increase her capacity for 
reasonable hope and resilience during the process of coping with life's 
inevitable vicissitudes. There are at least two specific lessons to be learned in 
this regard. First, no matter how reasonable, decent, and well intentioned we 
are, our best endeavours can, without warning or apparent justification, be 
thwarted by adversity. Second, the realisation that money, power, prestige, 
fame and reputation — all, incidentally, readily on offer in the higher echelons of 
corporate management - may offer little consolation or relief in the face of 
adversity, especially if its source is located in a character defect ml within 
ourselves. 
" Solomon is one philosophical commentator on the corporate world who has drawn 
attention to the importance of, what some would call, the feminine virtues. See, Robert C. 
Solomon, The Moral Psychology of Business: Care and Compassion in the Corporation, Business 
Ethics Quarterly, Volume 8, Issue 3, (1998), pp. 515-533. 
301 The sort of character defect I have in mind could be something like an inadequate 
capacity for care and compassion, or an inflated self-image that leads to the abuse of 
positional power. 
7.4 Overall Summary 
I began this essay by discussing what were no more than subjectively 
held intuitive perceptions of the poor state of leadership practice among the 
ranks of contemporary Australian corporate managers. I showed that, on 
commencing a systematic investigation of the perceived problem, these 
concerns were quickly corroborated by the findings of the Karpin study. 302 
Detailed study of these findings, especially when considered in light of 
phenomenological insights arising from my involvement at Agritest, led me to 
pinpoint, as a major source of the overall malaise, a blindspot in managerial 
consciousness. I argued that this blindspot could reasonably be construed as 
relating to inadequate ethical sensibility. 
The notion of ethical sensibility proved itself a complex and challenging 
one to unravel. I eventually settled on trust — giving it and earning it - as a 
plausible unifying theme, and went on to conceptualise ethical sensibility in 
managerial leadership as ineluctably bound up with the building and 
maintaining of high-trust communities. How, then, to address the question of 
eradicating the blindspot? 
I argued that to do this, both commercial and technical challenges need 
to be overcome. Commencing with the commercial, I showed that the applied 
ethicist, no matter how well-intentioned and knowledgeable, would be unlikely 
to succeed in the corporate arena without the capacity to satisfy the needs and 
concerns of the hard-nosed decision-maker. No development programme gets 
off the ground without the authorisation of this individual. I went on to argue 
that both willingness and ability to adopt the relevant corporate idiom are 
necessary prerequisites towards this end. 
302 Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, Enterprising Nation: 
Renewing Australia's Managers to Meet the Challenges of the Asia-Pacific Century (Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1995), aka Karpin Report. 
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One way in which idiomatic compliance can be expedited, I argued, is 
through employment of appropriate conceptual models. With this in mind, I 
suggested re-framing the development challenge as one of strategic 
organisational change. In this regard, the change that one is endeavouring to 
effect, is systematic and progressive movement from lower to higher levels of 
ethical competence among the target population of managers. With the 
assistance of the 7-5 Framework, I proceeded to conceptualise the technical 
dimension of the overall challenge as broadly a pedagogical one, thus focussing 
attention on the construction and articulation of a robust syllabus. I went one 
step further to suggest that the focal point of that syllabus should be human 
character and its susceptibility for movement from fortuitous to deliberate 
states. 
I then turned to the challenge of formulating a robust syllabus, 
suggesting the task be broken down into two components, formulating (a) a 
broad structural platform, and (b) the substantive content detail. In respect of 
the former, I made a case for selecting the ancient ethical doctrine of 
eudaimonism, presented in a contemporary neo-Aristotelian expression. 
Regarding the latter, I finished the essay by describing how the practice of 
critical eudaimonistic reflection can be leveraged to build the quality of personal 
control and judgement needed to underpin the emergence of a deliberate 
rather than purely fortuitous character. 
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Epilogue 
Throughout this essay I have emphasised the need to meet the practical 
challenges associated with the fostering of greater ethical competence among 
corporate leaders in this country. While appropriately concerned with the 
formulation of a robust syllabus, I have called attention, at every suitable 
opportunity, to the realities attendant upon getting development programmes 
successfully off the ground, and once in process, maintaining their momentum. 
With this in mind, it seems appropriate to close the essay by drawing attention 
to one final practical challenge that had to be overcome. 
I showed, in Chapter 7, how successful implementation of any 
development programme is dependent upon its having a robust syllabus, and I 
described how this, in turn, was a matter of attending both to questions of 
broad platform and specific content. In the real-world setting, however, one 
further element needs to be taken into consideration, the question of delivery 
strategy. Theoretically, the syllabus can simply exist on paper. For instance, it 
can reside in the leather-bound volume of a PhD dissertation, and serve no 
further purpose than that of repository for library dust. (The reader, familiar 
with the corporate world, will know that many expensive consulting reports 
receive this fate.) 
When it comes to delivery strategy for executive development 
programmes in contemporary Australia, perhaps the most challenging obstacle, 
of all, to be overcome, is that of engendering sufficient enthusiasm on the part 
of the programme participants. The old aphorism "You can lead the horse to 
water, but you can't make him drink" surely applies. 
Since completing the formal research work approximately three years 
ago, and contemporaneously with the academic task of writing this dissertation, 
I have continued my consulting involvement not only with Agritest, but also 
with several other corporations, both in Australia and overseas. Through trial 
and error, I have discovered that there is a way for engendering enthusiasm, 
on the part of corporate managers, for the task of learning how to become 
more critically self-reflective. In short, it involves introducing them to the 
intrigue associated with the question, "Do you know what it is, at a deep level, 
that makes you tick?" 
It should be noted that when this question is first posed in a corporate 
workshop setting, it can and often will be met with a chorus of dismissive 
comments like, "Who cares", or "I'm too busy for silly navel-gazing", and so 
forth. Here's where the workshop presenter needs both skill and emotional 
resilience, in addition to the requisite knowledge about the topic of unconscious 
motivational structures. Let me close with the claim, however, that experience 
continues to show that getting them engaged with this question will, in over 
eighty per cent of cases, have the effect of fuelling their interest to take up the 
challenge of learning how to become more critically self-reflective. 
The work described in the preceding pages is, therefore, a work in 
progress. 
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